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"It all seemed ... like a brilliant dream."
Charlotte Forten, a free young black woman teaching former
slaves at the Union enclave of Beaufort, South Carolina, upon
learning that President Lincoln had signed the Emancipation Proc-
lamation January 1, 18631
"What happens to a dream deferred?
Does it dry up
like a raisin in the sun?
Or fester like a sore-
And then run?"
Langston Hughes, 19512
1. ERIc FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877,
at 1-2 (1988).
2. LANGSTON HUGHES, Montage of a Dream Deferred, in THE LANGSTON HUGHES
READER 123 (1958).
BAYONETS FOR THE WOUNDED
"Don't tell students in this school about 'the dream.' Go and look
into a toilet here if you would like to know what life is like for
students in this city."
Christopher, a student in Clark Junior High School, East St. Louis,
c. 1990
Introduction
Our constitutional heritage is one of perplexing and sometimes ago-
nizing contradictions, many of which appear vividly-and disturbingly-
in our visions of equality. From America's first breath, its conception of
equality has been at odds with itself. Americans then expressed the "self-
evident" truth that "all men are created equal" with an inalienable right
to liberty, and concluded that those premises provided moral and polit-
ical legitimacy to the assertion of national autonomy.4 Yet the subscrib-
ers to that creed were willing to participate in an enormous political,
legal, social, and economic institution premised on a grotesque inversion
of that noble proposition: that many persons (conveniently identified by
skin color) are created inferior and therefore subject to the most extreme
deprivations of liberty.5 These normative contradictions of caste and
equality persisted in the Constitution's thinly euphemistic recognition
and protection of slavery,6 calling into question just who counts as "We
the People of the United States."7
Since its cornerstone was laid, our house has thus been divided
against itself-not just in terms of dramatic sectional disputes, but also in
terms of the principles that animate our ideological premises and aspira-
tions. Deep discord over such fundamental issues was bound to erupt
into open conflict: Explicit constitutional recognition of a principle of
equality was born out of America's bloodiest war, the origins of which
can be traced largely to those contradictions.
The constitutional conception of equality in the United States today
continues to exclude an identifiable class from "mainstream" American
society. I submit, however, that the excluded class and the means of
3. JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES 2, 36 (1991). See also infra note 248.
4. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
5. And more than half of the population (again conveniently identified, in this context,
by gender) were so far outside any principle of equality as not even to bear semantic
recognition.
6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; art. I, § 9, cl. 1; art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; art. V. Contradic-
tions also persisted in that document's consistent refusal to acknowledge women's existence
even by pronoun.
7. U.S. CONST. pmbl. As Akhil Amar observes, "no phrase appears in more of the first
ten amendments than 'the people.'" Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100
YALE L.J. 1131, 1210 (1991).
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exclusion are not confined to those commonly appreciated in constitu-
tional discourse. This Article contends that the most severely excluded
class is not defined exclusively by race or gender, but instead by member-
ship in that poverty-stricken, marginalized group sometimes referred to
as the "underclass," whose members are disproportionately minorities.8
The underclass remains trapped in a web of subordination, the strands of
which are spun in part from prevailing constitutional models-especially
models of equality.
One would think that the existence of an identifiable class subjected
to a distinct pattern of entrenched, severe, social and economic disadvan-
tage and exclusion would raise serious concerns articulated in terms of
"equality." And, in a society whose organic norms include an express
commitment to equality, one would expect to see a determined quest
both to understand that pattern of disadvantage and to remedy or at least
to mitigate it. One might even suppose such efforts are constitutionally
required if the disadvantages are severe enough and the equality norm is
sufficiently robust. One bringing those modest expectations to an exami-
nation of American constitutional law today would be rudely disap-
pointed. Our legal institutions (judicial, political, and academic) have
largely failed to meet this challenge and instead have developed a web of
equality conceptions that contribute both directly and indirectly to the
problem's perpetuation.
The first strand of this web consists of the interpretive paradigms
that the Supreme Court has applied in its entitlement, state action,
school finance, and school desegregation cases. Those paradigms share
the common thread of envisioning a limited menu of negative rights in
the liberal legalistic constitutional state. This perspective is largely blind
to the social realities confronting members of the underclass and the
myriad ways in which government action and inaction powerfully affect
their lives. The Court's approach thus denies the constitutional signifi-
cance of severe poverty as a social condition in many circumstances and
has contributed to and legitimatized the economic, political, and social
isolation of the underclass from mainstream American life-a condition
disturbingly similar to important characteristics of the caste system of
slavery.
Another strand derives from the affirmative action debate. That
controversy has entangled society in an ultimately empty paradigm po-
larized along dimensions of individual versus group rights and equality of
opportunity versus equality of result, forcing a choice between unaccept-
8. For discussion of the "underclass" phenomenon, including the debate over the label
itself, see infra notes 345-70 and accompanying text.
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able alternatives. Affirmative action's proponents demand a form of ra-
cial and gender discrimination and would dilute the significance of at
least some criteria-including educational achievement-traditionally
regarded as indicative of individual merit and ability. They take this po-
sition in the name of collective values, invoked to justify the adverse ef-
fects of racial or gender discrimination imposed on affirmative action's
individual victims. Advocacy of that troubled agenda has tended to dis-
tract attention from the more daunting task of offering equal opportunity
to the underclass. Many of affirmative action's opponents, by contrast,
adhere to a selective conception of individual rights and advocate a brand
of meritocracy that ignores inequalities in initial allocation of opportu-
nity. They often oppose redistributive investment of sufficient societal
resources to provide meaningful equality of opportunity, including edu-
cational opportunity. This Article questions whether both sides in this
conflict might really be contending for political and economic privilege in
the name of equality, and whether that contest has contributed to the
growing estrangement of the most disadvantaged class in the United
States, which neither has a real voice in nor benefits much from affirma-
tive action policies.9
This Article offers an interpretation of the Civil War Amendments
as collectively embodying a "caste-abolition" principle, which would
provide a remedy for conditions or actions that tend to recreate a caste
society in which one group is systematically and grossly disadvantaged,
dehumanized, and ostracized. 10 That principle would derive from the
special historical roots of those amendments: the American revolution's
fight to abolish the existence of a caste society. I argue that the caste-
abolition principle forms a coherent interpretive conjunction of the con-
9. This Article is an extension of ideas I first proposed in Donald P. Judges, Light Beams
and Particle Dreams: Rethinking the Individual vs. Group Rights Paradigm in Affirmative Ac-
tion, 44 ARK. L. REV. 1007 (1991) [hereafter Light Beams]. Portions of the description of
affirmative action originally appeared there. Light Beams was in part a response to Rod
Smolla, Affirmative Action in the Marketplace of Ideas, 44 ARK. L. REv. 935 (1991), which
sets forth an illuminating analysis of Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 493 U.S. 1017 (1990).
10. This Article is not the first to propose constitutional consideration of underclass sta-
tus. See, e.g., Olga Popov, Note, Towards a Theory of Underclass Review, 43 STAN. L. REv.
1095 (1991) [hereinafter Underclass Review]. The ideas in this Article differ in several impor-
tant respects from those in Underclass Review. First, although Underclass Review suggests a
significant revision of fundamental rights analysis, it nevertheless operates within the broader
paradigm of negative rights and means-ends scrutiny. This Article offers instead an alternative
positive-rights paradigm that looks to caste condition, not state action. Second, Underclass
Review focuses primarily on laws disadvantaging women as a class (and secondarily on laws
disadvantaging homosexuals). In contrast, this Article concentrates on the caste-creating con-
dition of membership in the socioeconomic underclass - especially the children of that under-
class - in relation to equal educational opportunity. Underclass Review does, however, provoke
thought about application of the caste-abolition principle in other contexts. Third, unlike this
Spring 1992]
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stitutional terms for bringing former slaves out of their caste status and
into the rest of American society: abolition of slavery; vesting of citizen-
ship; guarantees of due process, privileges or immunities, and equal pro-
tection; and extension of the franchise. Because it looks to caste-creating
and perpetuating conditions, the caste-abolition principle avoids the re-
lief-defeating strictures of the Supreme Court's negative rights and state
action paradigms. The prudential concerns that drive those paradigms-
separation of powers, deference to legislative judgment, and federalism-
are more appropriately addressed towards the formation of remedies,
rather than towards the determination of fights, as is currently the case.
The caste-abolition principle challenges us to make real the constitu-
tional promise of protection. This alternative also seeks to reconcile the
tensions between liberty and responsibility.
These strands converge on the issue of educational opportunity,
which even the Court has agreed in the abstract, is central to equality of
opportunity for meaningful participation in society. The current grossly
unequal distribution of educational resources perpetuates and aggravates
the caste-creating disadvantages, especially lack of employment opportu-
nity and political empowerment, suffered by children of the underclass,
its most helpless members. This condition would give rise to a claim
under the caste-abolition principle. The remedy I propose-equal alloca-
tion of educational resources-would take into account the interests that
now lead the Court to deny that such conditions are even matters of
constitutional concern.
This Article thus attacks San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,1 which has been aptly characterized as "the Dred Scott deci-
Article, Underclass Review does not situate its theory in the historical context of the Civil War
Amendments' relation to the abolition of a caste society.
A much broader work that considers the role of constitutional law in the creation and
maintenance of a caste society is KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL
CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989). Although Karst discusses many of the issues
addressed in this Article, he emphasizes the classifications traditionally regarded as suspect or
quasi-suspect-primarily those of race, as well as gender, alienage, and religion-rather than
socioeconomic status (although he does briefly consider the special problem of poverty). I
differ with him particularly in regard to the role affirmative action has played in the underclass
dynamic. Karst recognizes affirmative action's contribution to the concentration of poor
blacks in urban ghettos, but he does not identify as an additional cost to the underclass the
impact that advocacy of affirmative action programs may have had on defining the political
agenda. Compare id. at 167-72 with infra notes 203-53 and accompanying text. See also LAv-
RENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 1514-21 (2d ed. 1988) (describing
Equal Protection Clause as embodying "antisubjugation principle").
11. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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sion for the underclass," 2 and challenges the broader context of consti-
tutional doctrine in which Rodriguez is situated. Although several state
courts have stepped into the breach left by the federal judiciary's abdica-
tion of constitutional responsibility for the underclass problem in the
area of school finance, 3 we must consider the federal constitutional im-
plications of this national crisis. This Article, therefore, will leave explo-
ration of developments at the state level to others. 4
This Article contains four parts. Part I describes the limits of the
Court's constitutional vision of negative rights, state action, and equality
principles in the entitlement and educational opportunity contexts. Part
II considers the affirmative action strand by positing a relationship
among the individual versus group rights paradigm, disadvantaged
neighborhoods, and educational inequality. Part III describes and de-
fends the caste-abolition principle. Part IV seeks to tie these strands to-
gether by applying the caste-abolition principle to the plight of the
underclass and the issue of equal educational opportunity.
I. Equality Principles, Negative Rights
Rodriguez's denial of constitutional relief to the underclass derives
from the several fibers that intertwine to constitute the negative-rights
strand. First, the Supreme Court's narrow conception of when constitu-
tional obligations arise has largely closed the federal courthouse as an
12. My colleague John Watkins made that analogy in his comments on an earlier draft of
this paper. As a former teacher in the Texas public school system, John drafted the following
recollection of the conditions in one school district, and the community attitudes that tolerated
such conditions:
In the early 1970s, I was teaching in a rural school district in central Texas, not far
from Austin, the state capital. The district's students were racially mixed: roughly
40% white, 40% black, and 20% Mexican-American. I taught high school English
in a modem building less than ten years old. Elementary school students, however,
attended classes in a three-story structure built at the turn of the century and con-
demned as uninhabitable by county authorities. With no air conditioning, students
sweltered in the oppressive Texas heat. The plaster walls were crumbling; the roof
leaked; and the restrooms, located in the basement, overflowed with sewage during
rainy weather. Because there was no cafeteria, students were bused across town to
the high school for lunch. Under pressure from the state education agency, the dis-
trict eventually closed the building and moved the students to dilapidated barracks
obtained from the military and placed on the high school grounds. Despite these
conditions, voters declined to approve issuance of bonds to build a new elementary
school. Large landowners, who opposed the increase in the property tax necessary to
retire the bonds, led the fight. One of the opponents, a farmer who attended my
church, told me that he felt no obligation to shoulder an increased tax burden, since
his children had graduated from the school long ago. "It's somebody else's turn
now," he said. "Besides, I don't care anything about educating the niggers."
13. See infra notes 481-85 and accompanying text.
14. I do, however, briefly discuss reasons why it would be a mistake to rely completely on
state constitutional remedies. See infra notes 487-93 and accompanying text.
Spring 19921
606 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:599
avenue for mandating affirmative relief of underclass conditions. Second,
in a related series of decisions rejecting constitutional claims to a mini-
mum level of subsistence and equal school financing, the Court further
denied constitutional redress to claims arising from underclass condi-
tions. Finally, the Court's negative-rights paradigm has yielded school
desegregation decisions that lend constitutional approval to the economic
and ethnic isolation of urban underclass neighborhoods.
The Court's denial of constitutional obligation in its entitlement,
state action, school finance, and desegregation cases is objectionable in at
least two respects. First, it rests on an incomplete conception of equality
and an inadequate appreciation of the nature of state action. Second, it
legitimizes government's role in a status quo of extreme inequality that a
more complete conception of equal protection would not tolerate. A
richer account of constitutional rights, one informed by the parallels be-
tween the plight of underclass children and the social injustices that
spawned the Civil War Amendments, would require dedication of suffi-
cient resources to provide some minimal equality of educational opportu-
nity. This Part describes how the Court's vision of equality is blind to
the condition of the truly disadvantaged.
A. Negative Rights, Entitlements, and State Action
The Supreme Court's consistent refusal to recognize a constitutional
claim to minimum subsistence or to equal educational opportunity is
rooted in its paradigmatic vision of rights in the liberal legalistic constitu-
tional state."5 This paradigm regards individuals as existing in their own
spheres separate from the state, and conceives of the Constitution as pro-
viding a discrete set of individual rights against certain kinds of tangible
governmental intrusion into the individual sphere. The Constitution
thus specifies (either explicitly or implicitly) a finite set of negative
rights-prohibitions against a defined range of government action. The
baseline assumption is that the Constitution's requirements are limited to
observance of those prohibitions.
Several significant consequences flow from this model. First, liberal
legalism simply does not conceive of a positive constitutional obligation
to address social conditions. Second, the Court's paradigm demands defi-
nition of what counts as government action and establishes that determi-
nation as a threshold criterion for access to constitutional remedies.
Third, the Court's approach requires it to ask whether a constitutional
claim fits within a recognized taxonomy of individual rights. The net
15. For a brief description of liberal legalism, see Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom
Seriously, 104 HARv. L. Rv. 43 (1990).
result of this interpretive approach has been effectively to deny the con-
stitutional significance of poverty and powerlessness as a social condition
in many circumstances.1 6
L Negative Rights
The abortion funding cases exemplify the Court's negative rights ap-
proach. In Harris v. McRae, the Court concluded that although the Con-
stitution protects the limited negative right to choose an abortion free of
certain state restrictions, it does not provide a positive right to state fund-
ing to ensure that poor women have an opportunity to make a choice. 17
The Court therefore upheld the Hyde Amendment, which denied federal
Medicaid funds to reimburse the cost of all but a tiny number of abor-
tions for women who otherwise would be eligible for such aid. The nega-
tive privacy right to an abortion thus "did not translate into a [positive]
constitutional obligation.., to subsidize abortions ... ,,'1 The Court
explained that
although government may not place obstacles in the path of a wo-
man's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those
not of its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category. The
16. The foregoing statement must be qualified, however, because indigency has attained a
limited measure of constitutional relevance in a narrow class of cases. For example, the Court
has interpreted the Constitution to require the state to provide counsel to indigents in serious
criminal trials. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). And the Court has invalidated
state statutes barring access to the criminal appellate process to defendants unable to pay filing
and transcript fees. Eg., Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956). The Court also has required the state to provide counsel to indigent defend-
ants for the first appeal as of right. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). And the Court
has required appointment of counsel in adversarial proceedings brought by the state to termi-
nate parental rights. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). Even these
cases can be understood as resting on negative rights (to equal protection or due process) and
affirmative state action, because of the state's active role in criminal prosecution, execution of
sentences, and termination of parental rights. That the right is not a positive one triggered by
indigency alone can be seen by comparing the Court's rejection of procedural due process
challenges to fees in proceedings brought by private litigants. E.g., Little v. Streater, 452 U.S.
1 (1981); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), however, invalidated a state's refusal to waive a
filing fee for an indigent in a divorce action. In Kras, the Court distinguished Boddie in part as
involving a state monopoly over dissolution of the marital relation, a distinction which also
implicates associational and privacy interests. 409 U.S. at 443-44. Furthermore, the Court
has held that the state is not obligated to provide counsel for discretionary appeals, Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); in post-conviction proceedings, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.
551 (1987); or even in post-conviction proceedings in capital cases, Murray v. Giarratano, 492
U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality). In Ross, the Court observed that the state is not constitutionally
obligated to "duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant
in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction ...." 417 U.S. at 616.
17. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
18. Id at 315 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1977)).
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financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to en-
joy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice
are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to abor-
tions, but rather of her indigency.19
There are at least two problems with the Court's position. First, the
Court's distinction between state inaction and action is dubious. The
state has affirmatively decided-indeed enacted a statute-to exclude
from a comprehensive program of publicly funded medical care the one
medical procedure entitled to constitutional protection. Surely poor wo-
men who are in effect bribed to choose childbirth over abortion could
reasonably feel that the state has "done something" tangible and substan-
tial to them.2" Second, the Court gives a conclusion, not a reason. The
argument that indigency, not government action, is responsible for re-
strictions on a woman's choice is another way of stating that the govern-
ment bears no constitutional responsibility for her indigency.21 The
question remains whether government should bear this responsibility.
There may be something to the view that a legislative judgment that
our society will be insensitive to the plight of its least privileged and most
vulnerable citizens is entitled to some deference. But the Court's linear,
mechanistic view of the relationship between the individual and the state
ignores the pervasive and powerful ways in which government affects the
lives of individuals--especially the poor and the vulnerable. The Court's
ultimate responsibility, after all, is to ensure that the majority is not al-
lowed to negate the rights of citizens unable to command political sup-
port, but who are no less worthy of protection.22
An extreme example is Rust v. Sullivan.2" The regulations upheld in
Rust prohibit family planning clinics that receive Title X moneys from
discussing abortion as an option with their clients, even if the clients re-
quest abortion information, and even if the providers believe such infor-
19. 448 U.S. at 316-17.
20. See TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1346-47.
21. The Court reaffirmed this principle in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, up-
holding a prohibition on the use of public facilities or employees to perform abortions not
necessary to save the mother's life. 490 U.S. 1003 (1989). The Court has also applied this
approach under the First Amendment, reasoning that the First Amendment constitutes only a
prohibition against certain kinds of governmental restrictions on speech, not an entitlement to
the means to exercise one's free speech rights. E.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation,
461 U.S. 540 (1983).
22. E.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (Wheat.) 316 (1819); swe JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
23. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). See also Public Health Services Act, §§ 1002, 1008 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(2), 300a-6 (1991)); 42 C.F.R. § 59.8 (1990).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:599608
mation to be in the clients' best medical interests.24
The Supreme Court rejected both a free speech and an abortion
rights challenge to the regulations. In the Court's view, the administra-
tion had merely defined the Title X program as limited to family plan-
ning and reproductive health exclusive of abortion.25 In disposing of the
First Amendment claim, the Court made the remarkable assertion that
the regulations "do not significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient re-
lationship," because "[t]he program does not provide post-conception
medical care, and therefore a doctor's silence with regard to abortion
cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the
doctor does not consider abortion an appropriate option for her."26
The Court concluded that the regulations do not infringe a woman's
reproductive freedom because: (1) the woman is left "in no different posi-
tion than she would have been if the government had not enacted Title
X"; and (2) "a doctor's ability to provide, and a woman's right to receive,
information concerning abortion and abortion-related services outside
the context of the Title X project remains unfettered. ' 27 In short, in the
Court's eyes, the government's Title X program under the 1988 regula-
tions is like a canoe quietly slipping across a placid lake, leaving hardly a
ripple in its wake.
The Court's analysis provides important insights into its vision of
the relationship between government, its programs, and citizens' lives.
Only someone insulated from the effects of the regulations could accept
the Court's view of government's role in women's health care.28 Title X
24. Instead, the health care providers are required to refer pregnant clients to "appropri-
ate prenatal and/or social services .... " 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(2) (1991). If a client requests
abortion information, the provider may respond that "the project does not consider abortion
an appropriate method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for abor-
tion." 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5) (1991).
For seventeen years, the administration had interpreted Title X of the Public Health Ser-
vice Act to allow "nondirective" counseling and referrals-intended only to inform, not to
persuade or to influence--concerning all possible responses to pregnancy, including prenatal
care, delivery, infant care, foster care, adoption, and abortion. In February 1988, however, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services issued the regulations upheld in Rust.
25. Thus, the Court reasoned, the regulations involve not "a case of Government 'sup-
pressing a dangerous idea,' but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its employees from
engaging in activities outside of its scope." 111 S. Ct. at 1772-73. Providers remain free to
speak out on abortion outside the scope of Title X projects, the Court observed.
26. Id. at 1776.
27. Id. at 1777.
28. For an essay on the role of judicial empathy-the ability or willingness of judges to
identify with the plight of claimants of individual right against government intrusion-see
Donald P. Judges, Confirmation as Consciousness-Raising: Lessons for the Supreme Court from
the Clarence Thomas Confirmation Hearings, 7 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT (1992)
(forthcoming).
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is not a quiet canoe, it is a monstrous battleship. 29 These regulations and
the Court's decision will unquestionably have an enormous impact, espe-
cially on the health care received by millions of low-income women.30
The contention that women are in the same position they would have
occupied had there been no Title X is disingenuous and unconvincing.
Once government provides ideologically slanted medical information on
which Title X clients rely, it substantially intrudes into and has a major
impact on their lives.31 Yet by asserting the invidious distinction be-
tween indirect encouragement and outright prohibition, a distinction
made possible by the negative rights paradigm, and by positing a largely
hypothetical alternative to the exercise of the right, the Court manages to
deny that the administration is doing something palpable to the lives of
29. Title X is the largest single source of federal funding of family planning services, and
reaches an estimated 14.5 million women. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 415 n.1 (2d
Cir. 1989), affid sub nom. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
30. According to the lower courts, approximately one-third of those women are adoles-
cents and 90% of all women served have incomes below 150% of the poverty level. Id. For
many women, their first visit to the Title X grantee is for pregnancy testing, not for contracep-
tion. Massachusetts v. Secretary, H.H.S., 899 F.2d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 1990). Federal funds ac-
count for approximately one-half of the money received by Title X clinics. Id at 73 n.l1.
31. These women are going to Title X clinics for medical assistance concerning reproduc-
tive matters. They depend upon their health care providers to give them candid and complete
advice in the provider's best judgment, including referral for appropriate treatment. Doctors
are ethically and legally obligated to do no less. See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n., Principles
of Medical Ethics and Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs-1989,
in CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY 191 (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 2d ed. 1990) (pream-
ble) ("A physician shall... make relevant information available to patients, colleagues, and
the public, obtain consultation, and use the talents of other health professionals when indi-
cated."). When the physician remains silent concerning abortion or, what is worse, recites the
administration's dogma, any reasonable person would be grossly misled "into thinking that the
doctor does not consider abortion an appropriate option for her." As Justice Blackmun ob-
served in dissent:
The undeniable message conveyed by this forced speech... is that abortion is nearly
always an improper medical option. Although her physician's words, in fact, are
strictly controlled by the Government and wholly unrelated to her particular medical
situation, the Title X client will reasonably construe them as professional advice to
forgo her right to obtain an abortion. As would most rational patients, many of these
women will follow that perceived advice and carry their pregnancy to term, despite
their needs to the contrary and despite the safety of the abortion procedure for the
vast majority of them. Others, delayed by the Regulations' mandatory prenatal re-
ferral, will be prevented from acquiring abortions during the period in which the
process is medically sound and constitutionally protected.
111 S. Ct. at 1785. It therefore is perverse to suggest that government has not interfered with
the doctor-patient relationship when it censors doctors in the treatment room, and prescribes
an orthodox litany to be recited when patients request medically pertinent information.
Neither expressive nor reproductive freedom are protected when health care providers are
allowed to speak everywhere and to everyone except where and to whom it matters most. For
a thorough analysis of the constitutional implications of government's use of allocative sanc-
tions to control conduct, see Seth Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative
Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984).
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these women and their health professionals' ability to provide care."
An especially tragic application of the Court's model to the condi-
tion of the vulnerable is DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services.33 While little Joshua DeShaney remained in his abusive
father's lawful custody, the county maintained an administrative net-
work that funnelled all child-abuse information into itself, purported to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over such matters, and actively monitored
and dutifully recorded numerous indications that Joshua was being badly
abused. In fact, on one occasion the county actually obtained temporary
custody when Joshua was admitted to the hospital with multiple bruises
and abrasions; but the county shortly thereafter persuaded the juvenile
court to dismiss the child protection case and return Joshua to his
tormentor.
Despite those indicia of government involvement, the Court invoked
its negative rights paradigm to conclude that the county could not be
held constitutionally accountable for its failure to intervene before Rob-
ert DeShaney savagely but all too predictably beat his four-year-old son
into a state of severe, permanent brain damage.3 4 According to Chief
32. In other contexts, apart from cases directly raising the negative-rights problem, mem-
bers of the Court have also demonstrated a remarkable capacity to discount substantially or to
overlook the real-world impact of government action. Examples can again be found in recent
abortion-rights cases. In Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990), Justices Kennedy,
White, Scalia, and the Chief Justice disregarded uncontested findings of fact concerning the
detrimental impact of Minnesota's two-parent notification requirement in voting to sustain the
provision. On the whole, the District Court found the evidence overwhelmingly established
that the law failed to advance the state's interest in promoting the pregnant minor's welfare or
enhancing family integrity, but instead caused considerable harm to the minor and her family.
As the lower court found, almost all judicial bypass applications were granted: "The judges
who adjudicated 90% of the petitions testified; none of them found any positive effects of the
law." Id at 2940. Nevertheless, those four Justices, reciting platitudes about the state's inter-
est in protecting and fostering the parent-child relationship-and ignoring the contemporary
realities of divorce, separation, dysfunctional relationships, and abusive parents in many fami-
lies--were willing to defer to legislative judgment on the wisdom of the measure. Another
example is Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990), in which
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, uncritically sustained patently burdensome procedural
hurdles for access to judicial bypass of a single-parent notification requirement.
33. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
34. Another compelling example of government's role in child abuse is Yaakov Riegler's
fate at the hands of New York's child welfare system. See Celia W. Dugger, As Mother Kills
Her Son, Protectors Observed her Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1992, at Al. Yaakov's case
illustrates the painful emptiness of the Supreme Court's analysis in DeShaney.
Yaakov, a retarded eight-year-old boy who stood a full three feet, eight inches, and
weighed all of 48 pounds, was beaten to death in 1990 by his mother, Shulamis Riegler. Shu-
lamis had beaten Yaakov's brother Israel into a coma in 1986, but both boys were returned to
their mother after spending several years in foster care. State supervision of the family was
terminated on November 27, 1989, notwithstanding that school officials showed Yaakov's
bruises that very same day to a city child abuse investigator, who was "shocked." In March
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Justice Rehnquist, "the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirma-
tive right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to
secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself
may not deprive the individual.""5 Instead, the Due Process Clause is
"phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of
certain minimal levels of safety and security."36 In the Court's view,
Robert DeShaney, not the county, ruined Joshua's life. Apparently the
government's role in placing Joshua in harm's way, faithfully recording
his numerous injuries and "suspicions that someone in the DeShaney
household was physically abusing Joshua,"3 7 and monopolizing his one
avenue to relief is constitutionally irrelevant to establishing the kind of
relationship that would impose a minimal duty of care.3"
1990, the city's Probation Department terminated its supervision of Shulamis, uninformed
about additional reports that she might again be abusing her children. Over the next seven
months, Yaakov was examined and sometimes treated for numerous cuts, gashes, bruises, and
trouble with his elbow that an autopsy later revealed had been fractured. Yaakov's teachers
made repeated, "frantic" appeals for Yaakov's protection to the child abuse investigator, the
investigator's supervisor, and the state child abuse line. On September 27, 1990, another inves-
tigator visited the Riegler home, found burn marks on Yaakov, and was told by the boy that
both his father and mother hurt him but that his mother hurt him more. Two days later,
Shulamis beat Yaakov into the coma from which he never recovered.
It is difficult to conceive of a coherent system of constitutional accountability that could
conclude, as DeShaney apparently would, that the city did not participate significantly in the
taking of little Yaakov's life. According to the New York Times account,
When Mrs. Riegler pleaded guilty. . . , Judge Francis X. Egiito condemned the city's
child protection system-a system whose goal is, where possible, to reunite children
with their natural parents-and the boy's doctor for not saving Yaakov's life. "It's
not just Mrs. Riegler who is guilty of the death of Yaakov," the judge said.
Id. at A16, col. 1.
35. Id at 196.
36. Id. at 195.
37. Ia at 193.
38. Only in limited circumstances of actual confinement has the Court recognized the
kind of relationship that creates such a duty. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (criminal
inmates); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (non-criminal custody). Indeed, it is
unclear that Joshua's constitutional claim would have prevailed even had a county official
personally administered the beating. The Court has held that government employees' inten-
tional, random, and unauthorized deprivations of property, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517
(1984) (and presumably liberty as well, Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986)), do not
violate due process when a state tort remedy is available. This approach forces nice questions
about when a deprivation results from an established state procedure rather than from the
employee's random and unauthorized act. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990)
(failure to apply involuntary admission procedures to visibly disoriented "voluntarily" admit-
ted patient to mental health facility held not "unauthorized" but instead pursuant to delegated
authority). But see Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992) (Eighth Amendment is vio-
lated when prison officials use excessive force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, even
absent a showing of significant injury-prisoner had been beaten while wearing handcuffs and
shackles).
BAYONETS FOR THE WOUNDED
One can appreciate Chief Justice Rehnquist's fear that allowing
Joshua's claim would plunge the state action doctrine down a slippery
constitutional slope. But the dominant considerations in DeShaney seem
to be the Court's negative rights paradigm, its conception of its own role
in the constitutional process, and its assumptions about the detrimental
impact of a positive rights model on that role. The Court seems to fear
that judicial recognition of affirmative constitutional duties will require
the courts to intrude improperly into the legislative sphere. 39 This con-
cern is especially evident in the Court's sometimes categorical approach
to equal protection analysis, which requires either a suspect class or in-
fringement of a fundamental right to invoke strict scrutiny of the chal-
lenged government action, and otherwise generally defers to legislative
judgment.' Although the Court has on occasion appeared to occupy
various intermediate points between those largely outcome-determinative
categories,41 it has refused to subject wealth-based classifications to
heightened scrutiny. The abortion funding cases discussed above are
good examples of the Court's response to such claims.42
2. Entitlements
The Court expressly articulated these prudential concerns when it
rejected a claim to an affirmative constitutional right to minimum subsis-
39. For an argument that judicial checks on administrative neglect can protect local de-
mocracy, see Jack M. Beerman, Administrative Failure and Local Democracy: The Politics of
DeShaney, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1078, 1100-08.
40. For examination of the relationship between categorical decision making versus bal-
ancing and the level of judicial deference, see Kathleen Sullivan, Governmental Interests and
Unconstitutional Conditions Law: A Case Study in Categorization and Balancing, Paper deliv-
ered at the Conference on Compelling Government Interests, Albany Law School (Sept. 26-28,
1991).
41. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
42. See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text. Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court
in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), did state that
[l]ines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race (Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216), are traditionally disfavored. See Edwards v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (Jackson, J., concurring); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12;
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353.
Id. at 668. Each of the cited cases, however, expressly rested on a basis apart from equal
protection of the poor. See supra note 16. In Edwards, the Court invalidated under the dor-
mant Commerce Clause a state law making transportation of nonresident indigents into the
state a misdemeanor. In concurrence, Justice Jackson observed that "the migrations of a
human being do not fit easily into my notions as to what is commerce. To hold that the
measure of his rights is the commerce clause is likely to result eventually in distorting the
commercial law or in denaturing human rights." 314 U.S. at 182. Harper itself eventually
came to be seen as resting on the fundamental right to vote, and not on wealth as a suspect
class. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 117-18 (1980).
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tence in Dandridge v. Williams.43 Plaintiffs challenged, on equal protec-
tion grounds, Maryland's $250-a-month ceiling on Aid to Families with
Dependent Children payments regardless of family size. The Court held
that welfare assistance payments amount to mere "social and economic"
regulation, to which the most deferential judicial review applies.' Be-
cause government is almost always able to articulate a barely less than
irrational justification for social and economic policy choices4 5-and be-
cause the Court stands ready to do so when the imagination of govern-
ment lawyers fails to provide a post hoc justification'-the Court's
formula ensures that almost all such legislative judgments will be up-
held.47 The Court's institutional concerns are explicit in its insistence
that "the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems
presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of
this Court."48 As Justice Marshall observed in his dissent, the Court's
approach "avoids the task [of requiring a justification for the classifica-
tion] by focusing upon the abstract dichotomy between the two different
approaches to equal protection problems that have been utilized by the
Court."'49 The Court's bipolar approach in other public assistance con-
texts has similarly refused to consider the interests of impoverished
persons.50
43. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). For an account of the unsuccessful campaign to establish a
constitutional claim to minimal subsistence, see Samuel Krislov, The OEO Lawyers Fail to
Constitutionalize a Right to Welfare: A Study in the Uses and Limits of the Judicial Process, 58
MINN. L. REV. 211 (1973).
44. 397 U.S. at 485-87 (1970).
45. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam).
46. See, eg., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955).
47. Indeed, the Court will sustain even apparently irrational choices so long as the Court
is able to keep a straight face while saying something like: "The local authorities may well
have concluded that those who advertised their own wares on their trucks do not present the
same traffic problem in view of the nature or extent of the advertising which they use." Rail-
way Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
48. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 487.
49. 397 U.S. at 519.
50. E.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (upholding "household" eligibility criteria
for federal food stamp program); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (declining to apply
heightened scrutiny to California constitutional provision requiring a community referendum
to approve any subsidized low rent housing project). For a thoughtful examination of the
impact on privacy & dignity interests, especially for the poor, of administrative practices under
AFDC, see Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the
American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 Hastings L.J. (1992) (forthcoming).
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3. State Action
The Court's express consideration of the state action doctrine re-
flects a similar tendency to cabin the circumstances in which the Court
must consider government's real-world impact and entertain a claim of
constitutional right."' The doctrine reflects the Court's general hostility
toward recognition that underclass status is constitutionally germane.
The Court has found state action more readily when the underlying
claim stems from more familiar constitutional wrongs-such as racial
discrimination-rather than the prudentially problematic realm of eco-
nomic relations, especially economic disadvantage.
Compare, for example, the role of government in Blum v. Yaretsky 2
and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. " with that in Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority.54 As lessor to its $28,700-per-annum, apparently
racist tenant, Wilmington's "degree of state participation and involve-
ment" in the challenged action was not palpably more pervasive than in
Blum or Jackson. For example, it is well recognized that cost-contain-
ment measures mandated by health-care payors, including Medicaid and
Medicare, have had a dramatic impact on the decisions of health-care
providers.55 Nevertheless, the Court found no state action in Blum be-
cause Medicaid regulations did not directly and specifically mandate a
nursing home's decision to transfer a particular Medicaid patient to a
lower-care facility, even though the decision was made as part of feder-
ally required level-of-care review and undoubtedly was strongly influ-
enced by the government's requirements.56  Indeed, even when
government actually approved a challenged service termination proce-
dure employed by a heavily regulated, monopolistic utility company, the
Court refused in Jackson to find state action on the grounds that the
governmental approval was not focused with sufficient specificity on the
termination procedure itself (which was one provision of the utility's gen-
eral tarift).
57
Further, the extent of mutual benefit between private and public ac-
tivities was not manifestly greater in Burton: Presumably the provision
51. Indeed, in one sense Harris, Rust, and DeShaney can be conceptualized as state action
cases: The claimants lost because the state had done nothing constitutionally significant to
them.
52. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
53. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
54. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
55. See, eg., William B. Schwartz & Daniel N. Mendelson, Hospital Cost Containment in
the 1980s-Hard Lessons Learned and Prospects for the 1990s, 324 NEW ENG. J. MFD. 1037
(Apr. 11, 1991).
56. 457 U.S. at 1005-06.
57. 419 U.S. at 357.
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of nursing care and electricity also serve substantial state interests, while
nursing homes plainly benefit from the availability of public funds and
utility companies profit from their preferred status. Government in-
volvement in and benefit from the particular level-of-care decision in
Blum or termination procedure in Jackson would seem at least as patent
as Wilmington's benefit from the Eagle Coffee Shoppe's segregationist
policies in Burton. Moreover, the appearance of government approval of
the challenged practice is no greater in Burton. And the grounds for the
Court's selective rejection of the state inaction argument in Burton would
seem to apply with equal force to Blum and Jackson: "[Iln its lease with
Eagle, the Authority could have affirmatively required Eagle to discharge
the responsibilities under the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the
private enterprise as a consequence of state participation.""8
The nexus between the Court's state action analysis and its substan-
tive assumptions and choices continues to be a close one, with important
implications for claims rooted in economic disadvantage. 9 The Court's
model of the "passive state" in DeShaney, for example, suggests an un-
derlying choice made by the Court about state action. While the Court
disregarded government's role in perpetuating Robert's abusive custody
of Joshua DeShaney, it expressly relied on a similar kind of governmental
conduct as a ground for rejecting a Fifth Amendment claim against com-
pelled incrimination when a mother refused to produce her child in Balti-
more City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight.6° Drawing
parallels to heavily regulated industries, a context the Court has found
justifies limitations on the Fifth Amendment privilege,61 the Court rea-
soned in Bouknight (without citing DeShaney) that "[o]nce Maurice was
adjudicated a child in need of assistance, his care and safety became the
58. 365 U.S. at 725. Compare also Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), in which
the Court held unconstitutional Mississippi's provision of textbooks to private, racially dis-
criminatory schools, with Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), in which the Court
found no state action in the dismissal of a teacher, allegedly for engaging in constitutionally
protected speech, by a school for troubled high school students that received 90% to 99% of
funds from public sources.
59. This pattern also occurs in the Court's standing doctrine. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (indigents failed to show "injury in fact"
from IRS rulings granting tax-exempt status to hospitals that provided inadequate services to
indigents; plaintiffs failed to show a substantial likelihood that opposite outcome would im-
prove service to indigents); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (parents of black school
children lacked standing to challenge IRS policy with repect to tax-exempt status of segregated
private schools).
60. 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
61. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
431-34 (2d ed. 1992).
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particular object of the State's regulatory interests."'62 One suggested ex-
planation for this apparent contradiction is that
the state action doctrine has embedded within it unarticulated nat-
ural law assumptions about the "rightness" of certain initial alloca-
tions-such as the allocation of children to their biological
parents-and... these assumptions blind the court to state action
that creates or maintains this "natural" state of affairs. Consider
the possibility that the state action doctrine thus depends not at all
on whether there has been state action, but on whether the state
has deviated from a course of action that seems natural or
desirable.63
The Court's implicit assumption effectively reserves to the state legisla-
ture the power to decide when to intervene in that initial allocation by
de-constitutionalizing the state's role in maintaining that allocation, as in
DeShaney, or by narrowly reading constitutional limitations on "affirma-
tive" government decisions to alter it, as in Bouknight.
The relationship between state action, this suggested judicial ten-
dency to defer to legislative determinations concerning "natural" alloca-
tions, and the Court's receptivity to claims of racial discrimination
crystallize in the Shelley v. Kraemer" problem. That problem is the Ja-
nus-faced nature of the state action issue's link to substance: Though the
state actor's participation in the alleged unconstitutional conduct is obvi-
ous enough, the difficulty lies in attributing to the state actor the substan-
tive element of discriminatory intent as required under Washington v.
Davis.6  One suggestion has been that such intent could be found in
"Missouri's facially discriminatory body of common and statutory law
[which selectively enforced racial covenants but otherwise was generally
hostile to restraints on alienation of land]-the quintessence of a racist
state policy."' 66 The Court recently extended Shelley in Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., holding unconstitutional the use of race-based
peremptory challenges to jurors in a civil case.67 Unlike Shelley, Edmon-
son did not involve a "facially discriminatory" body of law. Instead, the
Court found sufficient indicia of state involvement in the intentionally
discriminatory conduct, largely symbolic in nature, to attribute the pri-
vate litigant's race-based action to the state: the actor's reliance on gov-
62. 493 U.S. at 559. Compare also the Court's reasoning in Jackson, supra notes 57-58
and accompanying text.
63. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1610 (2d ed. 1991).
64. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
65. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (noting conflict between DeShaney and Bouknight).
66. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTrrUTIONAL CHOICES 260 (1985).
67. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
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ernmental assistance and benefits;68 the performance of a traditional
government function;69 and aggravation of the injury "in a unique way
by the incidents of governmental authority."70 The Court reasoned that
"[b]y enforcing a discriminatory peremptory challenge, the [trial] court
'had not only made itself a party to the [biased act], but has elected to
place its power, property and prestige behind the [alleged] discrimina-
tion.'... In so doing, the government... in a significant way has in-
volved itself with invidious discrimination.
'71
Shelley is regarded by some as a troublesome and difficult case, and
presumably Edmonson also will be controversial.72 In both cases, the
Court appeared to fudge the intent issue to limit government's toleration
of and participation in a pervasive pattern of discriminatory social condi-
tions. As one writer has remarked, however, "[t]he problematic charac-
ter of Shelley is the result not of judicial activism but of the impoverished
conception of discrimination that is reflected in the intent test."
73
From this Article's perspective, both Shelley and Edmonson are the
exceptions that prove the rule. They are not notable because the Court
found a way around the intent requirement.74 Instead, they demonstrate
that the Court was willing to do so only in the limited case of govern-
mental toleration of overt racial discrimination, in circumstances where
the line between active involvement and mere inaction has blurred to the
point of tainting the state with that "wrongness." This result is consis-
tent with the Court's position, at least since Brown v. Board of Education,
that such discrimination is beyond the pale of any assumptions about the
"rightness" of initial allocations that the Court is willing to make. Simi-
larly, the Court has found state action in, and held unconstitutional, leg-
islative or constitutional provisions that authoritatively announce the
state's toleration of private racial discrimination and that erect political
barriers to enactment of antidiscrimination measures,7" while expressly
68. See Tulsa Prof. Collection Serv. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
69. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). It is curious that Justice Kennedy's opinion
for the Court in Edmonson omitted, without explanation, express reference to the requirement
that the function be traditionally performed exclusively by the government.
70. 111 S. Ct. at 2080 (citing Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
71. Id. at 2085 (citation omitted).
72. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA.
L. Rav. 473 (1962); Herbert Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. Rav. 1, 29-31 (1959).
73. David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Ciii. L.
REv. 935, 990 (1989).
74. As argued below, the caste-abolition principle depends on a finding of condition, not
intent. See infra notes 294-328 and accompanying text.
75. E.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (invalidating constitutional prohibition
of laws proscribing racial discrimination in housing); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969)
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declining to apply the same constitutional protection to provisions that
disable government-sponsored remediation of poverty, such as low rent
housing.7 6 In other contexts, such as debtor-creditor relations, the Court
has insisted on actual hands-on participation by state officials in the chal-
lenged conduct; even legislative creation of the background system of
rights and remedies authorizing the challenged conduct-and presuma-
bly government's implicit threat to use coercive power to enforce those
rights and remedies-are not sufficient.
77
In the realm of economic relations, therefore, the assumptions about
initial allocations implicit in the Court's state action cases enjoy consid-
erable vitality.7" Similar assumptions are also evident in Dandridge and
its progeny, which address the substantive constitutional status of gov-
ernment decisions to maintain initial allocations of wealth. Furthermore,
the distinction between the substantive element of intent and the thresh-
old requirement of state action is more apparent than real. Washington
v. Davis, for example, could be explained as concluding that the relatively
poorer performance of black applicants on Washington, D.C.'s Test 21
did not directly result from state action. Of course, a substantial cause of
that disparity may well have been the decades of de jure segregation in
Washington, D.C. schools and myriad other forms of state-sanctioned
discrimination and disadvantage. Thus, both the intent and state action
requirements reflect the Court's prudential reluctance to engage in
deeply transformative constitutional decision-making.
The intent and entitlement cases, when read along with the state
action cases and decisions such as Harris and Rust, deny the underclass
qua class any meaningful constitutional consideration. Neither the lan-
guage of the Fourteenth Amendment nor the prudential considerations
that in part animate the Court's position, including federalism and sepa-
ration of powers, command this result, as Part III discusses. 79 As Part
(invalidating city charter provision requiring voter approval of such antidiscrimination ordi-
nances); see also Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (invalidating voter
initiative prohibiting mandatory busing to achieve desegregation).
76. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971) (declining to apply Hunter v. Erickson to
California constitutional amendment requiring community approval by referendum of publicly
subsidized low rent housing).
77. Compare Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (issuance of prejudgment
writ of attachment by court clerk and execution by sheriff constituted state action for purposes
of debtor's due process claim), with Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (warehouse-
man's statutorily authorized sale of goods to enforce statutory lien does not constitute state
action).
78. Cf Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 68-69 (1972) (rejecting constitutional significance
of Oregon's omission of a defense to a forcible entry and detainer action for nonpayment of
rent, based on landlord's failure to maintain premises).
79. See infra notes 254-343 and accompanying text.
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IV explains, those interests can be adequately accounted for at the rem-
edy-definition stage of constitutional proceedings rather than through is-
sue-obscuring threshold doctrines of state action or definition of rights."0
B. Equality of Educational Opportunity
1. School Finance Cases
The Supreme Court has generally continued to apply its categorical
approach to the problem of economic inequality in the allocation of edu-
cational resources. Although there are a few important exceptions, this
approach has usually denied federal constitutional relief to the under-
class. The school finance cases, together with the outcome of the Court's
school desegregation cases, largely preclude constitutional consideration
of the impact of inadequate education as a causal factor in the mainte-
nance of a subordinate class. As Part IV describes, denial of equal (or
any) education has long been an effective means to lock a group into the
powerlessness, dehumanization, and isolation of caste status. Thus, not
only has the Court directly refused to recognize the poor as a constitu-
tionally significant class and refused to recognize many of the ways the
state affects their lives, it also has denied them access to constitutional
redress of their condition.
The leading Supreme Court statement on school finance is San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.81 In that case, the
Court upheld the Texas system of financing schools, even though the
system's partial reliance on local districts' taxing ability resulted in large
interdistrict disparities in per-pupil funding.8 2 The Court first rejected
the poor parents' assertion of suspect class status. Justice Powell rea-
soned that a class of parents of school-age children living in poor neigh-
borhoods hardly counted as a class at all.83 He concluded that both the
class and the alleged pattern of discrimination lacked traditional indicia
of suspectness because the class was "not saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or rele-
gated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command ex-
80. See infra notes 344-495 and accompanying text.
81. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
82. For example, the most affluent Texas district contributed a state and local total of
$558 per pupil (with a $36 federal grant, the total came to $594), while the poorest district
contributed a state and local total of only $248 (with a $108 federal grant, the total came to
$356). Id. at 12-13. For more contemporary figures on the disparities in school finance, see
infra notes 431-39 and accompanying text.
83. 411 U.S. at 25. The Court described the parents as "a large, diverse, and amorphous
class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less
taxable wealth than others. Id. at 28.
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traordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."" a
Second, the Court rejected the students' claim of a fundamental right to
an education. The Court was unwilling to infer constitutional rights
from the instrumental relationship between education and exercise of the
rights to vote and to speak, and the Court denied the constitutional sig-
nificance of education's "relative societal significance ... as opposed to
subsistence or housing." 5 Third, the Court invoked the interests of fed-
eralism and judicial deference to legislative judgment, especially in the
area of state revenue raising and in view of the Texas system's remedial
origins.8 6
Rodriguez thus effectively denies the constitutional significance of
underclass status. The Court refused to recognize both (1) the impor-
tance of sharp disparities in allocation of educational resources and resi-
dence in distressed neighborhoods to the perpetuation of that status, and
(2) the reality of powerlessness faced by the underclass. The patency of
the state's involvement precluded the Court from deploying an explicit
state action barrier to relief, and the Court could hardly deny that gov-
ernment's action affected the asserted interests of the claimants. With
those door-slamming moves foreclosed, the Court resorted to the strata-
gems of denying both that the claimants themselves existed as a meaning-
ful class and that their most salient common feature-their residence in
poor neighborhoods-counted in any constitutional sense.
The Court came closest to according constitutional recognition to
the underclass problem in Plyler v. Doe87 , in which it struck down a
Texas law denying free public education to school-age children not le-
gally admitted to the United States. But this openness to the underclass
issue was limited and short-lived. Eschewing a categorical approach,
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court pointed out that while illegal
aliens may not constitute a suspect class for equal protection purposes,
the involuntary presence of the children rendered their case special. 8
Further, although Rodriguez may have held that education is not a fun-
damental right, Justice Brennan found constitutional significance in the
observation that "education has a fundamental role in maintaining the
fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne
by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the
84. Id at 28.
85. Id at 33.
86. Id. at 58.
87. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
88. d at 216-24.
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values and skills upon which our social order rests." 9 Central to Justice
Brennan's analysis was the explicit recognition of an underclass dynamic,
at least in the context of undocumented aliens:
[T]he creation of a substantial "shadow population" of illegal im-
migrants ... raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocu-
mented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a
source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our
society makes available to citizens and lawful residents. The exist-
ence of such an underclass presents most difficult problems for a
Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of equality
under law.
The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special [inno-
cent and vulnerable] members of this underclass. 90
On this basis, the Court subjected Texas's law to heightened scrutiny.
The Court concluded that "[i]t is difficult to understand precisely what
the State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of
a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the
problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime."'"
Plyler's scope remains unclear. The Court's most recent pronounce-
ment in this area is Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, in which the
Court upheld a school board's refusal to provide free bus service to a
poor schoolgirl against a challenge that the policy denied "minimum ac-
cess to education."92 The Court sought to confine Plyler to its "unique
circumstances" and expressly stated that education is not a fundamental
right.93 Significantly, however, the Court asserted "[nor] do we see any
reason to suppose that this user fee will 'promot[e] the creation and per-
petuation of a sub-class of illiterates within our boundaries .... This
reference appears to hint that federal constitutional relief remains avail-
able if a litigant can establish an adequate causal relationship between the
challenged government action and the creation of a "sub-class" of
89. Id. at 221. The Court further noted the contradiction between a norm of equality and
a state law perpetuating the "enduring disability" of illiteracy. Id. at 222.
90. Id. at 218-219.
91. Id. at 230. In a subsequent case, the Court observed that "this Court has not yet
definitively settled the questions whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental
right and whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be accorded
heightened equal protection review." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986). In
Papasan, the Court suggested that the Equal Protection Clause might prohibit differential
school financing attributable not to district-based taxation, but to a state decision to allocate
funds unequally among school districts. Id. at 289.
92. 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988).
93. Id. at 459.
94. Id. (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230).
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illiterates.95
Nevertheless several considerations substantially attenuate such an
inference. First, Plyler involved a complete de jure denial of access to
education, not just a gross inequality in resource allocation. Anything
short of an express exclusion from the school system therefore probably
would be analyzed under Rodriguez. Second, although the Court has not
extended suspect class status to illegal aliens, the ethnic basis of Texas's
classification and its explicit aim at children appear to have colored the
Court's perception of the case. The undocumented school children in
Texas resembled the kind of class familiar to the Court-one defined by
ethnicity or alienage and not just by socioeconomic disadvantage. Third,
Plyler was a 5-4 decision; the Court is now dominated by Justices likely
to be hostile to Justice Brennan's approach and result, on the federalism
and separation of powers grounds expressed in Chief Justice Burger's
Plyler dissent. 96 Finally, Plyler did not seek to redefine equal protection
doctrine, but instead attempted to stretch the boundaries of the Court's
paradigm to reach a deeply troubling state policy. Because Plyler did not
clearly articulate an alternative to the fundamental rights/suspect class
paradigm, it provides scant doctrinal foundation for the identification of
an interpretive principle that would reach beyond the facts of the case.
2. Desegregation Cases
Almost four decades ago, a unanimous Supreme Court attributed
constitutional significance to the "present place in American life
throughout the Nation" of public education. 97 The Court saw that place
as central to participation in organized society:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments .... It is the very foundation of good citi-
zenship. Today it is the principle instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for late professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be ex-
95. See David C. Thompson, School Finance and the Courts: A Reanalysis of Progress, 59
W. EDUC. L. REP. 945 (1990) (arguing that federal constitutional relief may be available for a
claim of equal educational opportunity, at least in limited circumstances).
96. For a description of the increasingly categorical approach of the current Court and
the impact of that approach on results, see Sullivan, supra note 40. Plyler itself reveals the
weakness of the categorical approach. Justice Powell, who provided the swing vote, attempted
to cram the genie back into the bottle by asserting that Texas's law did not pass rational basis
scrutiny. 457 U.S. at 239. Chief Justice Burger in dissent, however, was prepared to uphold
the finance scheme even though he found it "senseless" and "folly-and wrong-to tolerate
creation of a segment of society made up of illiterate persons, many having a limited or no
command of our language." Id. at 242.
97. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) [hereinafter Brown 1].
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pected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of educa-
tion. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms. 
98
Those words, although bounded in negative rights terms, could have
formed the prelude to constitutionally mandated distributive harmony of
public educational resources. Instead, what followed was a discordant
sonata, the three movements of which have contributed to the under-
class's present circumstances.99  Several themes predominate: The
Court's own institutional inclination toward inertia; the Court's habitual
insistence, when it ventures to move forward at all, on wrongful govern-
ment action (in this context intentional racial discrimination); the
Court's correspondingly narrow focus on compensation of identifiable
victims, rather than on alleviation of the underlying social condition; and
the Court's interpretive preoccupation with classes defined exclusively by
race rather than by socioeconomic status. The combined effect of the
Court's desegregation cases has been to tolerate and perhaps to exacer-
bate socioeconomic structures--especially large disparities in access to
educational opportunity-that contribute to the underclass's isolation.
The focus on intentional racial discrimination in the educational context
has put the caste-creating and caste-perpetuating conditions impinging
on the underclass largely outside the Constitution's remedial reach.
The first movement lasted from 1955 to 1968. Under the second
Brown case,l"o school desegregation was to proceed "with all deliberate
speed," relying primarily on voluntary "freedom of choice" plans with
only occasional arm-twisting in the form of withheld federal funds. This
lento tempo impelled little change in southern schools and almost none in
northern districts. Central-city and suburban school districts alike re-
mained highly segregated in both regions.101
In the second movement, from 1968 to 1973, the tempo freshened to
andante. Green v. County School Board"0 2 repudiated the inertial conse-
quences of "all deliberate speed" and "freedom of choice" plans in favor
98. Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
99. For a discussion of Brown, redistributive policy, and reform, see James S. Liebman,
Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection, and Litiga-
tively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L. REv. 349 (1990).
100. Brown v. Board of Educ., 439 U.S. 294 (1955) (hereinafter Brown I1).
101. For example, a study of 65 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas found a mean
segregation level (with 1.0 indicating complete segregation) in 1968 of 0.86 in central-city dis-
tricts and 0.74 in suburban districts in the South; and 0.80 for central-city districts and 0.73 for
suburban districts in the North. David R. James, City Limits on Racial Equality: The Effects
of City-Suburb Boundaries on Public School Desegregation, 1968-76, 54 AM. Soc. REv. 963,
969-70 (1989).
102. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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of a judicially controlled remedial regime. Three years later, in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, '03 the Court approved af-
firmative remedial measures that included use of mathematical ratios "as
a starting point in the process of shaping a remedy," which remedy could
itself involve "the pairing and grouping of non-contiguous school zones,"
and bus transportation of students."°' Although the Court in Swann did
not foreclose the theoretical possibility that a school district could estab-
lish that its student assignment patterns were "neutral," proving neutral-
ity thereafter became almost impossible.105 Together Swann and Green
greatly increased the momentum toward desegregation in both the North
and South. 06 One writer has characterized this movement as "away
from formal equality and toward something like constitutionally man-
dated distributive equality."' 1 7
In the third movement, however, the distributive equality theme was
displaced by more dissonant "wavering between a relatively broad focus
on historical and systemic evils, demanding systemwide correction, and a
narrower focus on the individual misdeeds of idiosyncratic wrongdoers,
requiring isolated compensation for identifiable victims."' 1 While judi-
cially mandated desegregation became more prevalent after 1973 in the
North under Keyes v. School District, the Court's imposition of an intent
requirement in that case significantly eroded the power of school desegre-
gation as a vehicle for redressing the plight of the urban underclass.' 0 9
This consequence stems principally from Milliken v. Bradley, which in
1974 applied a district-specific intent requirement to preclude interdis-
trict remedies absent evidence that "racially discriminatory acts of the
state or local school districts, or of a single school district, have been a
substantial cause of interdistrict segregation."' 10 Subsequent cases con-
firmed the principle that the scope of the remedy would depend on the
103. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
104. Id. at 25, 28. See generally Leonard Strickman, School Desegregation at the Cross-
roads, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 725, 740-41 (1976).
105. Strickman, supra note 104, at 741.
106. Many southern school districts came under court order, and James found a decrease
in intra district segregation levels between 1968 and 1976 from 0.86 to 0.48 in southern central
cities, 0.74 to 0.48 in southern suburbs; 0.72 to 0.61 in northern central cities, and 0.73 to 0.54
in northern suburbs. James, supra note 101, at 969-70.
107. Liebman, supra note 99, at 353.
108. Id. at 354.
109. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). The Court subsequently extended the requirement of intent to
all equal protection cases in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
110. 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974). The examples given by the Court indicate the role of
intent: "Thus an inter-district remedy might be in order where the racially discriminatory acts
of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district, or where dis-
trict lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race." Id.
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scope of the demonstrated intentional segregation."' And, as discussed
above, the Court also held during this period that gross disparities in
allocation of educational resources did not alone constitute an equal pro-
tection violation."
2
The combined effect of Milliken and Rodriguez has been to reinforce
the isolation of the urban underclass. One study found that although
average racial segregation declined substantially nationwide between
1968 and 1976, it varied significantly across regions and between urban
and suburban areas. The decrease was largest in the South, where levels
were higher than the North before 1968 and lower after 1976.11
Those findings evidence the inability of the Court's model to address
underlying socioeconomic, structural inequalities no matter how severe
and how powerful their segregative force. Thus, in a development of spe-
cial importance from the underclass's perspective, by 1976 central-city
segregation persisted at high levels (above 0.80, with 1.0 indicating com-
plete school segregation and 0.0 indicating complete school integration)
or increased in several large (mostly northern) cities: Washington, D.C.
(0.86), St. Louis (0.85), Los Angeles (0.81), Cleveland (0.90), Chicago
(0.92), Newark (0.83), and Philadelphia (0.81)." 4 Moreover, "[r]acial
segregation between central-city districts and their suburban rings actu-
ally increased between 1968 and 1976."''n Not surprisingly, economic
disparities played an important role in perpetuating educational inequal-
ity: "The fiscal capacities of school systems, which are directly related to
the financial status of the communities they serve, had strong effects on
school segregation in both cities and suburbs.""' 6
In sum, once again, the Court's baseline constitutional model (in
this instance remedying specific, intentional governmental wrongdoing in
the form of racial segregation) and commitment to abstract values (in
this instance local autonomy) support or at least tolerate social structures
that perpetuate inequality in educational opportunity and thus perpetu-
ate the underclass problem. As one study concluded:
To the extent that residential segregation is linked to between-dis-
trict school segregation, the fragmentation of metropolitan public-
school systems serves the interests of the more affluent whites who
can take advantage of it as class theorists suggest.
111. Eg., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
112. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (discussed supra notes 81-86
and accompanying text).
113. James, supra note 101, at 975.
114. Id. at 969-70, 975.
115. Id. at 975.
116. Id. at 982.
... [L]ocal state boundaries foster racial and economic ine-
qualities in the consumption of public schooling when they split
metropolitan areas into autonomous units. Ostensibly neutral state
structures can facilitate unequal policy outcomes. Favored classes
and racial groups can substitute private means for public goods.
The less privileged have fewer options. 1
7
After a rest in the area of school desegregation during most of the
1980s, the Supreme Court began the 1990s with two decisions that con-
tinued to recognize sweeping equitable remedial power in the federal dis-
trict courts but narrowed the range of circumstances in which their
exercise of such power is appropriate. This trend magnifies the impor-
tance of intent and the segregative force of socioeconomic inequality. In
Missouri v. Jenkins, the Court affirmed the equitable power of the trial
court to apportion intradistrict desegregation costs between state and lo-
cal governmental entities and to "set aside state laws preventing local
governments from raising funds sufficient to satisfy their constitutional
obligations [even though] those funds could also be obtained from the
States.' 1 8 Thus, although the Court reversed the district court's direct
imposition of a tax to fund the $200 million magnet school program
(which had been sponsored by the defendant school district), the Court
upheld the lower court's power to enjoin operation of state laws that
prevented the school district from taxing at a rate sufficient to fund the
remedy. 119
In Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, however, the
Court ruled that a finding both that a school district "was being operated
in compliance with the commands of the Equal Protection Clause...
and that it was unlikely that the school board would return to its former
ways" would suffice to establish that the purposes of the desegregation
order had been achieved and hence that the injunctive decree could be
117. James, supra note 101, at 983. James goes on to observe:
The fact that the national school-busing controversy abated once it became clear that
desegregation of central-city districts would be confined to the boundaries of those
districts, and that large numbers of black students would not be transported to sub-
urbs except in rare instances, is also consistent with this view.
118. 495 U.S. 33, 54 (1990).
119. Id. In a public housing segregation case from the same term, the Court held that the
district court had abused its equitable discretion by ordering Yonkers City Council members
to vote for measures to implement the remedial decree, but upheld a contempt sanction against
the city itself that approached $1 million per diem. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265
(1990).
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dissolved. 120 Although the school district's implementation of a student
reassignment plan left half of the district's primary schools at more than
ninety percent black or ninety percent white, the district court based its
dissolution of the decree on findings that a dual school system had not
been re-established and that the plan had not been implemented with an
intent to discriminate. 12 1 Instead, the district court found that segrega-
tive patterns resulted from private residential decisions. Ongoing intent
thus is more important to the availability of judicial remedies than the
current effects of past discrimination, and certainly more important than
the effects of socioeconomic forces less directly traceable to identifiable
governmental wrongdoing.
122
C. The Paradigm as Problem
Although the Court's approach in the foregoing cases is open to sub-
stantial internal criticism, as the dissenting opinions in each demonstrate,
ultimately an external perspective is needed. For example, this Article's
discussion of Harris, Rust, and DeShaney implies that a more realistic
appreciation of how government affects the lives of its citizens would
produce more sensible and satisfactory results, as would recognition of
the poor as a suspect class. But even a clearer perception of govern-
ment's influence and a more coherent state action doctrine would still,
under the negative rights paradigm, require identification of some intru-
sive conduct by the state. Suspect class status is no panacea either. First,
as Japanese-Americans discovered 123 and white males are learning, 24
suspectness is vulnerable to the trump of state interests under the Court's
equal protection balancing approach. Second, finding suspectness would
not eliminate the confines of the Court's negative rights paradigm, nor
120. 111 S. Ct. 630, 636-37 (1991). As this Article was going to print, the Court returned
to the problem of determining when school desegregation has been achieved in Freeman v.
Pitts, Ill S. Ct. 2233 (1991). Freeman involves two issues. The first is whether a school
system must attain desegregation on all six Green factors at once (student assignment, staff,
faculty, facilities, transportation, and extracurricular activities). The second issue is whether
de facto resegregation vitiates the school system's compliance. In a further retreat from a
redistributive paradigm and an even stronger endorsement of an intent requirement, the Court
ruled that a federal court may incrementally relinquish supervision over areas of compliance,
even if further segregation occurs in such areas, so long as that further segregation is not
traceable to intentional conduct by school officials.
121. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 634.
122. See supra note 120. The Court confronts the problem of the extent of the state's
obligation to remedy lingering effects of past de jure discrimination again in the 1991 Term
cases of United States v. Mabus, and Ayers v. Mabus, 111 S. Ct. 1579 (1991).
123. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943).
124. See Judges, Light Beams, supra note 9.
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would it address the separation of powers concerns expressed in Dan-
dridge and both the institutional and federalism concerns raised in Rodri-
guez Further, by focusing on the classifications imposed by the
government, claims of competing governmental interests continue to de-
termine the extent of judicial review. This is, in essence, the outcome in
Rodriguez. And the shortcomings of the Court's desegregation cases in
part derive from the paradigmatic requirements of de jure segregation,
intent, and interdistrict discrimination.
In sum, the Court's constitutional visions have contributed to the
entrenchment of inequality by constitutionalizing the economic segrega-
tion of the underclass. The following Part carries this inquiry to the area
of employment discrimination. An analogous pattern emerges in that
context.
H. Affirmative Action and Disadvantaged Neighborhoods:
Paradigms of Paralysis
Civil rights joins abortion12 as among the most divisive issues of
our day, while the civil rights agenda has shifted in recent years.126 The
1980s saw the focus of the equality debate move from school desegrega-
tion to desegregation of the workplace, where the nature of available re-
medial measures helped to determine the shape of the right in that
context as well. What busing was to school desegregation, affirmative
action has become to workplace desegregation. This Part contends that
the dominant paradigm in the affirmative action debate, and the manifes-
tations of that paradigm, are more part of the problem than the solution
from the underclass's perspective. First, the prevailing remedy-afirma-
tive action-fails to take account of the most severely excluded group
(the underclass) and thus is likewise inadequate to remedy the grossest
forms of inequality. Second, the affirmative action debate contributes to
the perpetuation of the underclass problem by distracting attention from,
125. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990).
126. That shift became painfully evident in last year's rancorous conffict over civil rights
legislation and preferences. See, eg., Peter Applebome, Rights Movement in Struggle for an
Image as Well as a Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1991, at Al. For an overview of the emergence
of racial preferences from executive orders and civil rights legislation, see Martin Schiff, Re-
verse Discrimination Re-defined as Equal Protection: The Orwellian Nightmare in the Enforce-
ment of Civil Rights Laws, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 627 (1985).
Scholarly reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990), also illustrates the focus of the current debate. Compare, e.g., William
B. Reynolds, Individualism v. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995 (1984),
with Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104
HARV. L. REv. 525 (1990). Compare Smolla, supra note 9, with Judges, Light Beams, supra
note 9.
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and undermining the case for, provision of equal educational opportu-
nity. This Part briefly describes the affirmative action remedy and the
debate, both in the literature and on the Supreme Court, concerning the
normative premises and constitutional status of affirmative action, and
then addresses the impact of affirmative action on the underclass.
A. Affirmative Action: Definition of a Remedy
"Affirmative action" generically refers to the use of race or gender
as a criterion in hiring, most frequently through the application of goals
and timetables for the attainment of some predetermined range of racial
or gender mix, although there may well be important differences in de-
gree.127 The Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964128 in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.' 29 gave substantial
impetus to affirmative action in the private sector.130 Title VII expressly
127. One characteristic of the affirmative action debate, like that surrounding abortion, is
that disagreement about fundamental values often is obscured in debate about labels and
meaning. See generally Mark Killenbeck, Introduction: Prologues Without Pasts; Answers
Without Questions, 44 ARK. L. Rnv. 915 (1991). Discourse-defeating terms in the abortion
debate (pro-choice, right to life, baby-killing) have their affimative action counterpart in the
great "quota" controversy. "Quota" is a politically charged term that brings more heat than
light to the discussion. Some writers appear to lump most preferential programs together as a
practical matter. E.g., Smolla, supra note 9, at 957-58. Others, including the Supreme Court,
distinguish between "rigid quotas" and more flexible preference programs. See infra notes
143-48, 189-202 and accompanying text. I suggest that sufficient common understanding of
what constitutes affirmative action can be reached to permit attention to shift from definition
to substance.
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1981). Other statutory provisions, deriving from the
1866 Civil Rights Act, also address the problem of discrimination in the workplace, although
none has the reach of Title VII. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a person suffering intentional dis-
crimination in hiring can sue a private employer at his or her own expense. See McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976);
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975). The Supreme Court recently nar-
rowed the availability of claims under section 1981 to the formation of an employment con-
tract only, and not to discriminatory practices occurring once the employer-employee
relationship has been established. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
Congress, however, overruled Patterson in section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Discrimination claims can be brought against a govern-
mental employer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981), and against two or more persons engaging in
a conspiracy to discriminate intentionally. See generally Schiff, supra note 126, at 631-32.
129. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
130. Affirmative action as a remedial measure to end segregation in the workplace traces its
roots to Executive Order 11,246, issued by President Johnson in 1965, which prohibits govern-
ment contractors from discriminating on the basis of race, religion, age, national origin, or
physical handicap. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965), reprinted as amended
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1981). This background is related in Schiff, supra note 126. Under rules
developed by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (within the Department of
Labor), Executive Order 11,246 was to be enforced through the use of affirmative action plans,
goals, and timetables to attain greater proportions of minorities in the A, orkforce. See Schiff,
forbids hiring quotas 13 1 and embodies an intent requirement,13 2 and the
legislative history indicates that Congress rejected both a disparate-im-
pact test and race or gender preferences in hiring. 133 Nevertheless, the
Court interpreted Title VII to allow a plaintiff to make out a prima facie
case of discrimination by proving that employment tests and qualifica-
tions, such as the requirement of a high school diploma or literacy, had a
disparate impact along racial or gender lines. Such a showing would
then shift the burden to the employer to justify the practice as a matter of
business necessity because it was related to job performance. 3 The
Court also upheld under Title VII affirmative action plans that reserved
half of the openings in an in-plant training program for minorities 35 and
that expressly considered gender in hiring decisions. 36 In its 1989
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio decision, however, the Court substan-
tially relaxed the employer's burden by requiring the plaintiff to show
which specific practice has created a disparate impact, and by allowing
the employer to defend a prima facie case by showing merely that the
practice serves a legitimate business purpose.
137
In response to Wards Cove and other recent restrictive Supreme
Court interpretations of Title VII,131 Congress once again joined the civil
supra note 126 at 633. Executive Order 11,375 added gender discrimination to the list and
rules promulgated thereunder mandated that affirmative action plans include increased hiring
of women. Id. at 634.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1981).
132. § 2000e-2(h).
133. As Senator Humphrey, who promised to eat "the pages [of Title VII] one after an-
other" if any Senator could find language requiring an employer to hire "on the basis of per-
centage or quota related to color, race, religion, or national origin," observed, "tihe express
requirement of intent is designed to make it wholly clear that inadvertent or accidental [sic]
discriminations will not violate the title .... 110 CONG. REc. 6549, 7420, 12,723-24 (1964)
(statement of Sen. Humphrey). See Charles J. Cooper, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio: A
Step Toward Eliminating Quotas in the American Workplace, 14 HAIV. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 84
(1991); Schiff, supra note 126, at 641-42.
134. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
135. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
136. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
137. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). The Court also held in Wards Cove that to establish a prima
facie case of disparate impact, plaintiffs must show specifically that each challenged business
practice had a significant disparate impact. Id. at 659. The Court reasoned that any other rule
would subject employers to liability for disparities not caused by factors within their control.
For a recent selection of brief essays on quotas, Giggs, and Wards Cove, see Lino A. Graglia,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: From Prohibiting to Requiring Racial Discrimination
in Employment, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 68 (1991); Cooper, supra note 133; Randall L.
Kennedy, Competing Conceptions of "Racial Discrimination':" A Response to Cooper and Grag-
lia, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 93 (1991); see also William Cohen, Proving Discriminatory
Intent in Constitutional Law Disparate Impact Cases, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 78 (1991).
138. Eg., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (mixed-motive cases); Patter-
son v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490
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rights debate. President Bush originally opposed a civil rights bill as
mandating quotas, because of its reliance on numerical goals and timeta-
bles. 1 39 The first legislative response to the President's veto, after the
override effort failed, attempted to contain the "quota" concept through
express definitional and prohibitory provisions."4 Ultimately, the com-
promise engineered by Senator Danforth that became the Civil Rights
Act of 199141 omitted express reference to "quotas" and thus apparently
left the issue to be determined by the courts through application of the
resurrected "business necessity" and "job related" standards.1 42
A key issue in the "quota" debate thus remains defining "qualifica-
tion."143 After more that twenty years of race and gender preferences in
U.s. 900 (1989) (limitations period for challenging facially discriminatory seniority system
begins to run upon adoption of such system); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (allowing
white fire fighters who had failed to intervene in previous employment discrimination proceed-
ing to bring action challenging employment practices instituted pursuant to those decrees);
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991) (Title VII does not apply to U.S.
citizens working abroad for American companies).
139. See Ann Devroy & Sharon LaFraniere, Bush Outlines Objections to Civil Rights Propo-
sal; President Says He Won't Sign "Quota Bill," WASH. POST, May 18, 1990, at A6. As good
as his word, Bush vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1990 on October 22, 1990. Message to the
Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1632 (Oct. 22, 1990). For analysis of the 1990 bill, see Cynthia L. Alexander, The Defeat
of the Civil Rights Act of 1990: Wading Through the Rhetoric in Search of Compromise, 44
VAND. L. REV. 595 (1991).
140. Supporters of the House bill pointed out that it in fact would prohibit quotas. See 137
CONG. REC. H3938 (daily ed. July 16, 1991) (statement of Rep. Fish); Civil Rights and Wo-
men's Equity in Employment Act of 1991, H.R. REP. No. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 111(a)(2)
(1991). That bill defines quotas as "a fixed number or percentage of persons of a particular
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin which must be attained, or which cannot be ex-
ceeded, regardless of whether such persons meet necessary qualifications for the job." H.R.
REP. No. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 111(b) (1991).
141. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
142. See id §§ 3(2), 105(a)(i) (stating purpose to codify "business necessity" and "job re-
lated" concepts as enunciated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and applying those terms to em-
ployers' burden of proof in disparate impact cases). The difficulty of achieving a stable
compromise, and legislators' ambivalence about returning the issue to the judiciary, are evi-
dent in the Act's unusual provision to limit by statute the scope of "authoritative" legislative
history that may be considered in construing the Act. Id. § 107(b). The Act does provide,
however, that it is not intended to change the law regarding what constitutes lawful affirmative
action. Id § 116. The current debate over civil rights legislation is a remarkable reenactment
of the debate over Title VII itself, when the Congress rejected the disparate-impact test and
adopted instead an intent test. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
143. This point is illustrated by a recent General Accounting Office report on "EEO at
Justice." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, JUSTICE AND AGRICULTURE, HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERN-
MENT OPERATIONS, 102D CONG., lST SESS., EEO AT JUSTICE: PROGRESS MADE BUT UN-
DERREPRESENTATION REMAINS WIDESPREAD (1990) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. The GAO
found that minorities and women were underrepresented at the Justice Department for several
key jobs by comparison to their representation in related occupations (for attorneys) or catego-
hiring under explicit goals and timetables, it ought to be apparent that
regardless of how they are labelled, such measures will continue under
the new legislation. It is difficult to see how, as a practical matter, execu-
tives can be expected to meet numerical goals without employing sub-
stantial race- or gender-based preferences. Even if the law does not
require, for example, that blacks who have not graduated from law
school be hired for attorney positions, it surely means, as any law school
administrator knows, 1" that in at least some cases the factor of race or
gender will go very far, once such a threshold qualification is met, toward
offsetting differences on other dimensions conventionally regarded as
qualifications, such as class rank, law review editorship, and law school
prestigiousness. 145 For busy decision-makers who will be held accounta-
ble for meeting numerical goals, the natural tendency most likely will be
to accept as many "qualified" members of the underrepresented group as
quickly as possible, further elevating the importance of race or gender
over other dimensions.
146
In the context of antidiscrimination legislation, this issue translates
into the problem of determining what kinds of qualifications really are
necessary for a particular job, whether the employer or the employee
must bear the burden of proof on that question, and how heavy that
burden will be. Under Griggs, the presumption was that any general abil-
ity test or criterion on which minorities fared relatively poorly as a group
reflected unlawful discrimination. This approach required employers to
ries of employment (for other professional, administrative, technical, and clerical positions) in
the civilian labor force. (This means persons employed or seeking employment, according to
the latest census data.) The GAO concluded that the Justice Department should implement
goals and timetables, enforceable by holding executives "accountable," for the attainment of
representational proportions; and the GAO contended that this did not require quotas because
"numerical goals do not require or mandate selection of unqualified persons or preferential
treatment of EEO groups .... ." GAO REPORT, supra, at 8-9. The GAO apparently can say
this with a straight face because the question of qualification is one of degree once a minimum
threshold has been crossed.
144. What is common knowledge among law school admissions committees erupted into a
bitter public dispute when a Georgetown University law student published what he character-
ized as a "random sample" of admissions data to demonstrate that the law school admitted
blacks who scored lower than whites in terms of undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores. See,
eg., Michel Marriott, Unresolved: Role of Race in Law Class Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,
1991, at see. 4, p. 5.
145. The likelihood of this result presumably will also be enhanced by the Act's modera-
tion of the specificity requirement. Under the 1991 Act, a complaining party is relieved of
demonstrating that each particular employment practice caused a disparate impact when "the
complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent's decision-
making process are not capable of separation for analysis" in which case "the decisionmaking
process may be analyzed as one employment practice." Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a), 105
Stat. 1071 (1991).
146. See infra notes 215-16 and accompanying text (convenience of "quotas").
SnDrnz 19921 BAYONETS FOR THE WOUNDED
634 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:599
demonstrate, for example, that literacy requirements were related to job
performance. 47  The 1991 Act apparently would reinstate that
presumption.1
48
Another response to the disparate impact problem has been to insti-
tute a kind of incremental affirmative action program at the screening
stage. This practice, known as "within-group scoring" or "race norm-
ing," ranks test scores relative to a racially defined subset of the entire
population as a means to adjust for such groups' relatively poorer per-
formance on the test. 49 The prototype for this practice was developed
by the Department of Labor's United States Employment Service
(USES), which reported candidates' scores on the General Aptitude Test
Battery (GATB) in relation to race. 5 Thus, blacks are ranked with
other blacks, Hispanics with other Hispanics, and everyone else together.
Consequently, a black or Hispanic with a lower raw score than a white
on the GATB could receive a substantially higher percentile score.'
The rationale5 2 for race norming is that because tests such as the GATB
147. The Court also eventually rejected the so-called "bottom-line" defense, in which em-
ployers sought to justify their use of tests as an initial screening device so long as the end result
produced racial balance (usually achieved by racial preferences implemented later in the hiring
process). Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
148. See supra note 142.
149. At least initially, prospective employers were not informed that the scores had been
adjusted.
150. The GATB is a "referral system. It functions as an initial screen, determining which
clients will have the opportunity to compete for positions with a given employer." Alexandra
K. Wigdor & John A. Hartigan, The Case for Fairness, Soc'y, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 12, 15.
151. For example, one critic of race-norming reports the following data: Percentile Conver-
sion Tables
Jobs are grouped into five broad families: Family I includes, for example, machinists,
cabinet makers, and tool makers; Family II includes helpers in many types of agricul-
ture, manufacturing, and so on; Family III includes professional jobs such as ac-
countant, chemical engineer, nurse, editor; Family IV includes bus drivers,
bookkeepers, carpet layers; Family V includes exterminators, butchers, file clerks. A
raw score of 300 would convert to the following percentile rankings:
I II III IV V
Black 79 59 87 83 73
Hispanic 62 41 74 67 55
Others 39 42 47 45 42
Sources: Virginia Employment Commission; U.S. Department of Labor,
Employment and Training Administration; Validity Generalization Man-
ual (Section A: Job Family Scoring).
Robert G. Holland, Civil Wrongs: Big Brother's Test Scores, NAT'L REV., Sept. 3, 1990, at 35.
152. The justification for this practice was provided (after its implementation) by a Na-
tional Research Council (NRC) study of the GATB's predictive validity. Although the USES
concluded in its validity generalization analysis of the GATB that the battery "is a valid pre-
dictor of job performance for all 12,000 jobs found in the U.S. economy," the NRC study
found an average predictive validity of 0.3, which means that "only 60 percent of the people
who ranked in the top half of the test would be expected to rank in the top half on job perform-
have an adverse impact on minorities and imperfect predictive power,
"use of the test scores without adjustments would erect an 'artificial bar-
rier' to their [blacks' and Hispanics'] employment chances." '153 The
USES practice had widespread impact, because "more than 19 million
people pass through the 1,800 offices of the Public Employment Service
annually. About 3.5 million of them are actually placed in jobs."1 4
Under the 1991 Act, however, "race norming" constitutes an unlawful
employment practice; 155 but, again, the burden will be on the employer
to establish a job-related business necessity for use of a test that yields
such disparate results.
B. Affirmative Action's Search for Justification
1. Scholarly Views
Debate concerning affirmative action transpires within a paradigm
that forces one to choose between the allegedly competing values of indi-
vidualism versus collectivism, or individual versus group rights. 156 The
level of hostility in the affirmative action debate is evidenced by the alle-
gations of racism hurled by each side against the other.15 7 Affirmative
action's critics charge that the agenda has abandoned a "principled cam-
paign for equal justice under law to engage in an open contest for social
and economic benefits conferred on the basis of race or other classifica-
ance." Wigdor & Hartigan, supra note 150, at 15. This is a "meaningful, though only modest,
relationship to performance on the job, again roughly comparable to other general employ-
ment tests." Id.
153. aI. at 16.
154. Id. at 13. For debate concerning the issue of race-norming, see Jan H. Blits & Linda
S. Gottfredson, Equality or Lasting Inequality?, Soc'y, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 4; Mary L. Te-
nopyr, Fairness in Employment Testing, Soc'y, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 17; Mark Kelman, The
Problem of False Negatives, Soc'Y, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 21; 0. Peter Sherwood, Court Inno-
cence, Soc'y, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 24; Robert G. Holland, Race-Norming by Any Other Name,
NAT'L REV., July 29, 1991, at 36; Laurence I. Barrett, Cheating on the Tests, TIME, June 3,
1991, at 57; Peter Brown, Normin' Stormin" Why Republicans Love "Race-Norming," NEW
REPUBLIC, Apr. 29, 1991, at 12; Holland, supra note 151 at 35.
155. Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
156. See, eg., Judges, Light Beams, supra note 9; Smolla, supra note 9.
157. Randall Kennedy has argued, for example, that opponents of affirmative action are
not just opponents in a good-faith debate occurring within a consensus of opposition to racial
unfairness that involves disagreement about means. Instead, he says they are "enemies,"
whose objective is to rationalize white supremacy. It therefore is appropriate to question their
underlying motives. Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative
Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1327, 1338 (1986). He points to the civil rights record of the
Reagan Administration to support that conclusion. Id. at 1341-45. But see Morris B. Abram,
Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1312 (1986); Charles
Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARV. L. REv. 107
(1990).
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tions previously thought to be invidious."1 58 They argue that "one gets
beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a complete, resolute, and
credible commitment never to tolerate in one's own life-or in the life or
practices of one's government-the differential treatment of other human
beings by race."' 59 In reply, affirmative action's advocates characterize
the shift as an evolution beyond the original demand for race-neutrality
to an insistence on race-conscious measures to remedy "the self-perpetu-
ating dynamics of subordination that had survived the demise of Ameri-
can apartheid."'" They argue that getting beyond racism first requires
that we take race into account.'
61
This struggle reflects the tension between two divergent principles of
equality: the "antidiscrimination principle" and the "group-disadvantag-
ing principle." The antidiscrimination principle has been defined in
terms of the kinds of harm it seeks to prevent. First, certain kinds of
classifications, like race and gender, can be applied "to shame and de-
grade a class of persons by labeling it as inferior."'162 Stigmatizing classi-
fications thus "inflict psychological injury by assaulting a person's self-
respect and human dignity, and they brand the individual with a sign
that signals her inferior status to others and designates her as an out-
cast." 63  "Because race is not a factor indicating anything about the
moral worth of persons, race is morally irrelevant to state laws and poli-
cies."' ' Second, judicial intervention is justified to correct prejudicial
158. Abram, supra note 157, at 1312.
159. William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution,
46 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 809 (1979) (emphasis in original). See also Kennedy, supra note 157,
at 1327-28 (describing, and then criticizing, the position of opponents of affirmative action).
160. Kennedy, supra note 157, at 1335.
161. Id. at 1328 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978)
(Blackmun, J., plurality opinion)).
162. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Un-
conscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. Rnv. 317, 350 (1987).
163. Id. at 351. Outside the context of affirmative action, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that "[a] venireperson excluded from jury service because of race suffers a profound
personal humiliation heightened by its public character." Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364,
1372 (1991). And the Court has concluded that this offense to "the dignity of persons" is
unconstitutional regardless of identity of race between the defendant and the excluded juror,
id. at 1366, or whether the trial is civil or criminal. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111
S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
164. Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
COLUM. L. Rzv. 1023, 1030 (1979). Perry has described the "central guiding principle of
decisions such as [Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967)]" as "the principle that no person is morally inferior to another by virtue of
race." Id. Perry qualifies this notion of moral equality: "[A]Ithough not every person is the
moral equal of every other person, there are some traits and factors--of which race is the
paradigmatic example-by virtue of which no person ought to be deemed morally inferior to
any other person." Id. at 1031.
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distortions or defects in the democratic process resulting from exclusion
of a minority group, defined in terms of immutable characteristics, from
that process. 165 Some writers have described how the destructive effects
of both stigmatic and processual harm reinforce one another.
166
Owen Fiss offers the seminal formulation of the competing princi-
165. See ELY, supra note 22 at 135-79 (1980). For a summary of the two theories, see
Lawrence, supra note 162.
166. Paul Brest describes concerns of both process and result that animate an antidis-
crimination principle. Paul Brest, In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L.
Rlv. 1 (1976). Defects of process arise either because (1) race-dependent decisions rest on
irrational assumptions "that members of one race are less worthy than other people," or (2)
"race-dependent decisions that are rational and purport to be based solely on legitimate con-
siderations are likely in fact to rest on assumptions of the differential worth of racial groups or
on the related phenomenon of racially selective sympathy and indifference." Id. at 6-7. That
phenomenon is the "unconscious failure to extend to a minority the same recognition of hu-
manity, and hence the same sympathy and care, given as a matter of course to one's own
group." Id. at 7-8. Harmful results arise because "[d]ecisions based on assumptions of intrin-
sic worth and selective indifference inflict psychological injury by stigmatizing their victims as
inferior. Moreover, because acts of discrimination tend to occur in pervasive patterns, their
victims suffer especially frustrating, cumulative, and debilitating injuries." Id at 8. At least
one writer, however, who styles himself as an individualist, has rejected the idea that psycho-
logical injury resulting from racial discrimination has a proper place in equal protection analy-
sis. Clarence Thomas, Toward a "Plain Reading" of the Constitution: The Declaration of
Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 How. L.J. 983 (1987).
Brest goes on to argue that
[r]acial generalizations usually inflict psychic injury whether or not they are in fact
premised on assumptions of differential moral worth. Although all of us recognize
that institutional decisions must depend on generalizations based on objective char-
acteristics of persons and things rather than on individualized judgments, we none-
theless tend to feel unfairly treated when disadvantaged by a generalization that is
not true as applied to us. Generalizations based on immutable personal traits such as
race or sex are especially frustrating because we can do nothing to escape their
operation.
Brest, supra, at 10.
Charles Lawrence has described racism as "both a crime and a disease." Lawrence, supra
note 162, at 321. He addresses in terms of unconscious racial motives the problem of distor-
tions in the political process, described by Ely and others, that underlie suspect classification
analysis. See ELY, supra note 22, at 135-79; Brest, supra, at 15-22. The requirement that
discriminatory intent be shown subverts application of the Equal Protection Clause because it
leads to repression of racial motives by law-makers:
Where a society has recently adopted a moral ethic that repudiates racial dis-
advantaging for its own sake, governmental decisionmakers are as likely to repress
their racial motives as they are to lie to courts or to attempt after-the-fact rationaliza-
tions of classifications that are not racial on their face but that do have disproportion-
ate racial impact.
Lawrence, supra note 162, at 349. He also applies his concern with unconscious racial motives
to the problem of stigmatizing effect, and concludes that "[i]f stigmatizing actions injure by
virtue of the meaning society gives them, then it should be apparent that the evil intent of their
authors, while perhaps sufficient, is not necessary to the infliction of the injury." Id. at 352.
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ple.167 He argues that the "antidiscrimination principle," which he de-
scribes as "highly individualistic and confined to assessing the rationality
of means," is inadequate and should be supplemented or supplanted by
the "group-disadvantaging principle," under which the Equal Protection
Clause is seen as a mechanism for protecting specially disadvantaged
groups-African-Americans in particular but not necessarily exclu-
sively.' 68 Other writers have asserted that it is constitutionally and mor-
ally correct for government to extend benefits to individuals on the basis
of their membership in a disadvantaged group. Some argue that because
blacks have historically been injured by discrimination as a group, com-
pensation is due them today purely by virtue of their membership in that
group.' 69 These writers also contend that the current chronically disad-
vantaged status of many blacks in American society justifies implementa-
167. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHiL. & PUB. Arr. 107
(1976).
168. Id. at 108, 147-56.
169. See, e.g., Myrl L. Duncan, The Future of Affirmative Action: A Jurisprudential Legal
Critique, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 510-20 (1982). In response to arguments that race
is "morally irrelevant" whether taken into account in remedial or discriminatory measures,
advocates of this justification point out that America's history of racial discrimination has
always made race morally relevant-originally to discriminate and now to compensate.
Duncan, supra, at 514-15 (citing J.L. Cowan, Inverse Discrimination, 33 ANALYSIS 10, 12
(1972)). In response to the objection that affirmative action is overinclusive in that it helps
those who have not been demonstrably discriminated against, see infra note 209-16, this side
argues first that even middle-class blacks have suffered discrimination (that their social, profes-
sional, and economic success evidences triumph over, not an absence of, discrimination), and
second that even if they were not materially disadvantaged (e.g., by attending inferior schools),
they nevertheless suffered the humiliation and stigmatization inflicted on all blacks in
America. Duncan, supra, at 516-17 (quoting Justice Marshall's separate opinion in Bakke:
"[It] is unnecessary in 20th century America to have individual Negroes demonstrate that they
have been victims of racial discrimination; the racism of our society has been so pervasive that
none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact." 438 U.S. 265, 400
(1978)). Furthermore, discrimination can occur through vectors other than the direct denial
of a job because of race. For example, Duncan suggests that employers may rely on "their
white male work force to do word-of-mouth recruitment, thereby effectively excluding minor-
ity applicants"; and that some blacks may be discouraged from even applying because of em-
ployers' past patterns of exclusion. Duncan, supra, at 518.
Others point out that affirmative action has had an enormously positive impact on the
position of African-Americans:
It has enabled blacks to attain occupational and educational advancement in num-
bers and at a pace that would otherwise have been impossible. These breakthroughs
engender self-perpetuating benefits: the accumulation of valuable experience, the ex-
pansion of a professional class able to pass its material advantages and elevated aspi-
rations to subsequent generations, the eradication of debilitating stereotypes, and the
inclusion of black participants in the making of consequential decisions affecting
black interests.
Kennedy, supra note 157, at 1329. For a brief discussion of the complexities of evaluating
whether antidiscrimination legislation, which has been enforced through racial preferences and
numerical goals, has aided the economic condition of blacks, see John J. Donohue, The Impact
tion of programs, including affirmative action, to achieve distributive
justice, independently of the existence of past wrongs. 170 Finally, propo-
nents of affirmative action have argued the social utility of preferential
treatment of members of disadvantaged groups. Benefits are said to in-
clude the displacement of negative stereotypic images of blacks and the
inclusion of blacks in important public positions, provision of positive
role models, increased provision of services to the minority community,
and increased diversity.
171
These two principles thus are divided by a chasm of widely diver-
gent normative premises and empirical assumptions. Two general objec-
tions to affirmative action, whatever the justification, further illustrate
the gulf between these antipodal positions. One is that affirmative action
programs, which often in practice subject applicants to different criteria
based on race, will erode standards of competence in professions and
skilled trades.' 72 More strongly stated, this objection insists that affirma-
tive action is antithetical to the American stratification system of re-
warding individual achievement and initiative. 73  Affirmative action
proponents reply that the United States has never had a meritocracy, but
instead has had a system of racial and gender privilege. 74 Further, be-
yond pointing out that affirmative action programs generally do require
of Federal Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
41(1991).
Another common objection is that affirmative action hurts blacks in several important
ways. First, the objection goes, affirmative action exacerbates racial tension and provokes
white backlash. Kennedy responds that white resistance has met every effort at remedying the
racial subordination of blacks, no matter how circumspect, and that racial justice will never be
accomplished if fears of white animosity hamstring reform efforts. Kennedy, supra, at 1330.
The second argument is that affirmative action stigmatizes blacks by reinforcing the belief that
they cannot compete on equal terms and by tainting the accomplishment of those who attain
success without the assistance of affirmative action. Kennedy responds that although affirma-
tive action may have some stigmatizing effect, blacks are already stigmatized anyway and af-
firmative action's benefits far outweigh and partially counteract any further stigmatizing effect
of affirmative action. Id at 1330-31.
170. Duncan, supra note 169, at 520-24; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last
Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 78, 96 (1986). The distributive justice
claim has been met with over-inclusiveness arguments similar to those raised against compen-
satory justice claims, and its proponents have responded in kind. See, eg., Duncan, supra note
169, at 520-24.
171. Kennedy, supra note 157, at 1329; Duncan, supra note 169, at 525; Sullivan, supra
note 170, at 96; Williams, supra note 126, at 525; Smolla, supra note 9, at 958-63.
172. Eg., Abram, supra note 157, at 1319-20. This aspect of the controversy includes the
debate over "race-norming" job-related test scores of blacks and Hispanics to compare more
favorably with those of whites. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
173. Abram, supra note 157, at 1316.
174. Duncan, supra note 169, at 529-30.
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applicants to possess some minimum level of qualification,1 75 they chal-
lenge the very notion of "merit" and the means used to measure it.'
76
Some have argued that race itself can be a badge of merit, particularly in
advancing the goal of diversity.
177
The other general objection is that affirmative action unfairly im-
poses its entire burden on "innocent" victims, who themselves may never
have engaged in racial discrimination.'78 It is here that the two groups
most clearly appear to be talking past each other. Owen Fiss replies that
fairness among individuals is simply not what equal protection is cen-
trally about.179 Instead, he argues, equal protection is about aiding dis-
advantaged groups. Others reply that white males' claims of innocence
and unfair treatment rest on dehistoricized premises. They insist that the
notion of equality of opportunity is unintelligible unless it takes into ac-
count the disadvantages historically inflicted on minorities and women.
Affirmative action is necessary to ensure equality of opportunity from the
outset; far from giving minorities and women an unfair advantage, it
merely equalizes the unfair advantage society has given white males at
every turn.' 8 0 Thus, proponents defend affirmative action against objec-
tions of unfairness to individuals by pointing to unfairness to groups.
Critics of affirmative action complain that it tests one's faith in rea-
soned discourse to be confronted with accusations of racism (or sexism)
for invoking the antidiscrimination principle when the issue is affirmative
action."'' Some writers, acknowledging the substantial demise in
175. Id. at 531.
176. Id. at 530-31.
177. See Smolla, supra note 9, at 935-36; Duncan, supra note 169, at 531; Williams, supra
note 126, at 533-38.
178. E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294-95 n.34 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J.). As Rod Smolla readily acknowledges, "[r]eal affirmative action programs work
when they hurt; the racial preference granted to members of some groups necessarily creates
racial disadvantages to members of other groups-the notion of a preference is meaningless
unless someone is preferred." Smolla, supra note 9, at 951. For an argument that this harm
may be more severe than commonly appreciated, thus undermining affirmative action's claim
to moral legitimacy, see Judges, Light Beams, supra note 9, at 1027-39.
179. Fiss, supra note 167, at 173-77.
180. Duncan, supra note 169, at 534-36.
181. As Alexander Bickel observed,
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson of contempo-
rary history have been the same for at least a generation; discrimination on the basis
of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of
democratic society. Now this is to be unlearned and we are told that this is not a
matter of fundamental principle but only a matter of whose ox is gored. Those for
whom racial equality was demanded are to be more equal than others. Having found
support in the Constitution for equality, [proponents of equal opportunity] now
claim support for inequality under the same Constitution.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975).
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America of old-fashioned racism (i.e., notions of white supremacy), reply
that it has been supplanted by a "new" or "symbolic" racism, manifested
in opposition to affirmative action programs and busing, that blames
blacks for perceived major threats to the social order and accuses them of
violating cherished beliefs of individualism and self-reliance.182 One
study, however, has concluded that
all opposition to these programs cannot be seen as indicating white
racial antagonism. The partial effects of several aspects of stratifi-
cation beliefs, controlling for racial affect and other factors, show
that whites' evaluation of affirmative action also is directly based
on beliefs about how the American stratification system should and
does work.
183
Opposition to affirmative action is at least partially rooted in widely
held normative beliefs that one's social position and rewards should be
based on demonstrated ability and individual effort, and on faith that the
American stratification system can be made to work for blacks. These
beliefs in part account for the pattern of white attitudes toward affirma-
tive action: overwhelming white opposition to preferential treatment for
blacks coexisting with strong white support (at least in the abstract) for
programs to assist blacks in gaining access to jobs or higher education.
184
The demand that individuals must be evaluated and rewarded on their
own merits resonates strongly with the antidiscrimination principle de-
scribed above."8 5
182. For an overview of the literature, see Cardell K. Johnson, Resistance to Affirmative
Action: Self-Interest or Racism, 29 J. CoNFLicr RESOL. 306 (1985) (concluding that the "new
racism" scale is the best predictor of attitudes concerning affirmative action, and that the
"new" racism shares much in common with the old). For a somewhat more balanced study,
which does not limit its vision to a choice between racism and self-interest, see James R.
Klugel & Eliot R. Smith, Affirmative Action Attitudes: Effects of Self-Interest, Racial Affect,
and Stratification Beliefs on Whites' Views, 61 Soc. FORcES 797 (1983).
183. Kluegel & Smith, supra note 182, at 814.
184. See, eg., id at 797-98.
185. One study of the relationship between social and personal identity offered the follow-
ing observations:
While everyone would deplore discrimination based on an individual's social iden-
tity, the present results suggest that affirmative action programs may also backfire.
That is, people seem to analyze positive feedback subtly and to react negatively to
judgments directed at the social aspect of their identity. But this is precisely the
ideology underlying affirmative action programs for women, and for ethnic and racial
minorities. Such programs may thus evoke unintentional negative feelings among
the very people they want to treat more justly.... [A recent study] asked male and
female undergraduates the extent of their endorsement for a policy whereby prefer-
ence would go to the female candidate if a man and woman of equal qualifications
were considered for a position. That men disagreed with such a policy is not surpris-
ing. More surprising, but consistent with the present argument, women were also
fundamentally opposed to such an affirmative action policy.
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2. Constitutional Standards
The Supreme Court, like the country as a whole, has found it diffi-
cult to reconcile affrmative action with its conception of equality, which
draws largely from the antidiscrimination principle. Typically, the Court
has responded by attempting to fit the issue into its categorical frame-
work of levels of judicial review, finally settling (by a thin majority) on
strict scrutiny for state and local government programs. This strategy
has proved unruly, and the Court's most recent effort in Metro Broad-
casting, Inc. v. FCC reflects more an ad hoe balancing approach resem-
bling intermediate scrutiny, at least with respect to certain federal
programs. Further, the Court in Metro Broadcasting appeared to en-
dorse the group-disadvantaging principle of equal protection, again at the
federal level.' 6
The Court has struggled with voluntary'8 7 government-sponsored
affirmative action programs in five cases.18 8 The first four of those cases
(before Metro Broadcasting) yielded twenty-three opinions; and the
Court did not assemble a majority in support of an opinion until City of
Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., in which the Court held that racial prefer-
ence programs (at least those implemented by state and local govern-
ments) would be subject to strict scrutiny.
Although the outer boundaries of that standard are unclear, it at
least means that government must establish by strong evidence a very
good reason indeed before discriminating on the basis of race, and that it
can discriminate, if at all, only to the extent necessary to that reason.18 9
Thus, state-mandated minority preference programs may be permissible
to remedy past discrimination and perhaps to achieve diversity in an edu-
cational context, but not simply to achieve racial balance or proportional
Donald M. Taylor & Lise Dub6, Two Faces of Identity: The "I" and the "We", 42 J. Soc.
IssuEs 81, 92 (1986) (citing F. Tougas et aL, Privation Relative et Programmes d'Action Positive
(1985) (unpublished manuscript, Universit6 d'Ottawa)).
186. See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
187. Voluntary programs are distinguished from court-ordered programs directed at reme-
dying employment discrimination. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987);
Local 28 v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
188. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990); City of Richmond v. IA.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Fulli-
love v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978).
189. This summary derives largely from Judge Silberman's opinion in one of the Court of
Appeals cases that went to the Supreme Court in the Metro Broadcasting proceedings. The
judge's opinion provides a convenient overview of the parameters established by the Supreme
Court. Shurberg Broadcasting v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 912-13 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (opinion of
Silberman, J.), rev'd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
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representation of minorities.19' State and local governments must meet a
stringent standard of proof that discrimination has occurred; 91 congres-
sional determinations are accorded more deference. 192 The requirement
that the plan be narrowly tailored to the remedial purpose involves sev-
eral factors. First, "a racial preference plan must allow for case-by-case
consideration of applicants to ensure that each minority has in fact suf-
fered from the effects of past discrimination." '193 Second, "[t]he prefer-
ence also must be structured in a way that minimizes the burden on
nonminorities, so that innocent people are not asked to shoulder an un-
due share of the cost of remedying discrimination."1 94 Although some
burden may incidentally fall on innocent third parties, "the government's
compelling need to employ a race-conscious remedy must outweigh the
unfairness to innocent nonminorities."' 195 A key consideration in this de-
termination will be whether the governmental entity considered race-
neutral alternatives before adopting the minority preference. 96 And
190. Shurberg Broadcasting, 876 F.2d at 912 (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 475).
191. The Croson Court, in striking down Richmond's 30% minority set-aside program for
public works subcontractors, clarified the showing that state and local government must make.
The Court concluded that generalized assertions of past discrimination within an industry are
insufficient to establish a remedial justification, and required instead comparison to the number
of qualified minority firms. Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
192. Shurberg Broadcasting, 876 F.2d at 912 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-491; Fullilove,
448 U.S. at 472, 483, 499-502 (Powell, J., concurring)).
193. Id (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 490, 504-511; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 486-87).
194. Id at 913 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-84; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 514-15 (Powell, J.,
concurring)). In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion
invalidated a layoff policy that preferred minorities over more senior nonminorities. Justice
O'Connor's opinion rejected as a justification the need to provide role models, because it had
"no logical stopping point"; and she concluded that goals based on the ratio of black teachers
to black students (as opposed to the ratio of black teachers to qualified minority teachers
within the relevant labor pool) was not narrowly tailored to remedying past discrimination.
She also observed that the provision placed its entire burden on particular individuals, by
depriving them of legitimate interests in their jobs. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 284-94. In Fullilove v.
Klutznick, Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion relied heavily on congressional enforcement
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Powell's separate opinion, in
contrast, emphasized the findings of past discrimination in public works contracting and the
narrowness of the minority set-aside program. In particular, the federal program was designed
to give a preference only to disadvantaged minority owned businesses and to minimize the
burden imposed on nonminorities. The preference was available only to enterprises that could
show, in the face of challenge, that they were suffering the effects of past discrimination. The
burden was light and diffuse because the amount of set-aside funds was small in proportion to
the total amount spent in the construction industry and the impact was not concentrated on
particular individuals. Fullilove, 488 U.S. at 495-517.
195. 876 F.2d at 913 (citing Fulllove, 448 U.S. at 515).
196. In finding the City's plan not narrowly tailored, the Court in Croson noted that the
City had failed to consider race-neutral means (such as financial assistance) to increase minor-
ity contracting and to provide some means for inquiry into whether the particular minority
owned business had suffered the effects of past discrimination.
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third, before Metro Broadcasting, minority set-asides could not be used to
promote diversity as that would be "synonymous with the illegitimate
objective of racial balance or proportional representation and is thus
equivalent to 'discrimination for its own sake.' 197 "Because ethnic (or
racial) origin is just one of many factors that combine to create 'genuine
diversity' in an educational environment, the state's interest is better pro-
moted when ancestry is one element of a multi-factor evaluation that
takes into consideration a variety of characteristics and attributes."198
In Metro Broadcasting, however, a five-to-four majority of the Court
applied intermediate scrutiny to uphold an FCC program that gave
broadcasters with minority ownership either special preference in com-
petitive applications for licenses or exclusive and discount bidding rights
in distress sales. The Court's ruling was significant in at least two re-
spects. First, a majority of the Justices held that Congress enjoys greater
power to implement affirmative action programs than do states, and
therefore intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for federal programs.
199
Second, a majority held for the first time that diversity, which some writ-
ers characterize as a positive, forward-looking value, suffices to justify an
affirmative action program; and the Court did not require government to
establish retrospective, remedial objectives.2° Thus, at least with respect
to some federal programs, the Court has moved away from the antidis-
crimination principle and toward the group-disadvantaging principle.20'
The Court's commitment to the group-disadvantaging principle, how-
ever, as well as the precedential stability of Metro Broadcasting itself, are
in doubt. The replacement of Justice Marshall by Justice Thomas, who
is openly hostile to affirmative action and who wrote an opinion for the
D.C. Circuit holding unconstitutional the FCC's licensing preference for
women, may well signal the demise of Metro Broadcasting.2 "2
C. Impact on the Underclass
Affirmative action in the workplace, like its counterpart in the
school system, has done little or nothing to relieve the plight of the un-
197. 876 F.2d at 913 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307).
198. Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-318).
199. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990); see also Neal Devins, Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC- Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEx. L. REv. 125 (1990); Smolla, supra
note 9.
200. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3009-11.
201. Smolla, supra note 9 at 958-63.
202. Lamprecht v. FCC, No. 88-1395, 1992 WL 27168 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 1992). Circuit
Judge Thomas distinguished Metro Broadcasting on the basis that the record in Lamprecht
failed to support the assumption that women who own radio or television stations are more
likely than white men to broadcast "women's programming." Id. at 30.
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derclass. If anything, affirmative action has only made matters worse.
Not only is the affirmative action debate cast in terms that largely omit
consideration of the underclass problem, but it may also have crowded
out consideration of relief for the underclass by dominating the political
agenda and by advocating a narrow conception of social justice in terms
that conflict with the principles of individual justice, meritocracy, and a
commitment to basic educational achievement. And it has done so self-
righteously in the name of fairness by accusing anyone who dares to
question the affirmative action mission of racism, selfishness, and social
irresponsibility.
1. Misplaced Focus
In the first place, affirmative action simply is not addressed to the
underclass problem in any direct way. Instead, some members of the
black middle class and middle class women are the primary direct benefi-
ciaries of affirmative action programs, which tend to target white-collar
positions and depend on at least some minimal level of employability
even if within-group criteria and race-conscious preferences are used.20 3
Although recent data indicate that there remains much room for im-
provement because blacks and women continue to lag behind white men
in income and encounter the "glass ceiling" phenomenon in corporate
advancement, 2" substantial progress has been made.20 5 Meanwhile,
203. That middle class blacks are the primary beneficiaries is recognized by conservatives
and liberals alike. See Christopher Jencks, Affirmative Action for Blacks: Past, Present, and
Future, 6 AM. BEHAVIORAL Sci. 731, 749-52 (1985) (affirmative action has helped black wo-
men and highly educated black men, but not less educated black men); America's Wasted
Blacks, ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1991, at 11:
For some individuals, affirmative action may still do more good than harm. But the
real problem is that it reaches mainly those who need it least. The chief beneficiaries
of affirmative action are university students and black businessmen, who are the
blacks most likely to succeed anyway. It does not touch most poor blacks' lives.
See also James W. Nickel, Preferential Policies in Hiring and Admissions: A Jurisprudential
Approach, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 538 (1975); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 538
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tjhose who are the most disadvantaged ... are the least
likely to receive any benefit[s] from the special privilege.") As even advocates of affirmative
action concede, it does appear to be the case that affirmative action programs have primarily
benefitted the black middle class. See e.g., Kennedy, supra note 157, at 1333 n.23 (citing J.
LEONARD, THE IMPACT OF APPIRMATIVE AcrION 132 (1983) (noting that federal affirmative
action programs have "raised the demand for black males more in the highly skilled profes-
sional and technical occupations and in white collar clerical jobs than in the blue collar opera-
tive and laborer occupations")).
204. For example, of persons 25 years old or older with four or more years of college in
1989, white men earned an average of $41,090, black men earned $31,380, white women
earned $27,440, and black women earned $26,730. ARK. DEMOCRAT, Sept. 20, 1991, at 5A.
The congressional response to this problem is the Glass Ceiling Act of 1991, Title II of Pub. L.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), which creates the Glass Ceiling Commission, mandates study
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although the black middle class is growing rapidly, the number of black
families in poverty has reached distressing levels.2"6
The problem is that the affirmative action debate typically is con-
fined to race- and gender-specific, as opposed to socioeconomic, dimen-
sions. Affirmative action therefore is indifferent to the extreme economic
and political powerlessness of the underclass, whose minority and female
members are in no position to benefit from hiring preferences for jobs for
which they are unqualified and cannot reach because of their disadvan-
taged status.2" 7 And affirmative action actively discriminates against the
large and growing number of white males living in conditions of extreme
disadvantage,20 8 who neither share in nor benefit from the alleged unfair
advantages obtained by some other persons who possess the same gender
or racial characteristics.
of the problem, and establishes the Frances Perkins-Elizabeth Hanford Dole National Award
for Diversity and Excellence in American Executive Management.
205. For example, black affluence has increased markedly since 1967: The number of black
families with an annual income of $50,000 or more (in constant 1987 dollars) has increased
360%, so that today 9.5% of black families have an income of $50,000 or more. William
O'Hare, In the Black, AM. DEMOGR., Nov. 1989, at 25. And black representation in the
workplace has increased markedly, in part because of affirmative action. See, eg., Years Later:
A Civil Rights Scorecard, SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, Apr. 7, 1989, at 20-21:
Corporate affirmative-action programs have also brought millions of blacks into the
factories and offices that were once lily white. Blacks now represent 9.4 percent of all
teachers, 18.1 percent of all social workers, and 7.4 percent of all accountants and
auditors. In 1987 there were 799,000 black managers and executives-5.6 percent of
the total-compared to 506,000 (4.7 percent) only four years earlier.
On the other hand, the median income of black families was only 57% that of whites in 1988.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1990, at 450, tbl. 727 (1990).
206. For example,
the proportion of black families with incomes over $35,000 grew from 15.7 percent to
21.2 percent between 1970 and 1986 while the number of black families with incomes
of more than $50,000 increased from 3.7 percent to 8.8 percent. During the same
period, the proportion of black families with incomes of less than $10,000 also grew
substantially, from 28.8 percent to a staggering 30.2 percent.
Derek T. Dingle, An Agenda for the Black Middle Class, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Nov. 1989, at
53, 55 (citing NATIONAL RESOURCE COUNCIL, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERI-
CAN SOCIETY (1990)). See also infra notes 345-70.
207. Further, it has been observed that
[T]he composition of litigation has shifted dramatically: While most cases formerly
attacked discrimination in hiring, today the vast majority of all litigation suits chal-
lenge discrimination in discharge. Although the authors and early architects of em-
ployment discrimination laws envisioned them as tools for opening employment
opportunities to blacks, women, and other minorities, this is no longer their primary
use. Instead, the antidiscrimination laws are predominantly used to protect the ex-
isting positions of incumbent workers.
John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 43 STAN. L. Rv. 983, 984 (1991).
208. See infra notes 367, 405-06 and accompanying text.
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2. Politics of Race and Politics of Poverty
The affirmative action debate has had the unfortunate side-effect of
contributing to the overall problem. "The number and difficulties of the
estranged poor grew during the 1970s and 1980s because of foreseeable,
intelligible, and avoidable choices made by other Americans. ''209 Those
choices include, in addition to macroeconomic policies that have in-
creased joblessness among inner-city blacks and a decline in society's
commitment to educational and subsistence programs, a preference for
affirmative action programs rather than economic and social restructur-
ing to address inequality.21° It should not be surprising that, in view of
the large and growing disparity in economic and political power between
the black middle class and the black urban underclass, socially conscious
policy-making should prefer programs that promote the interests of the
former.
For example, one scholar has argued that affirmative action pro-
grams reflect the familiar process of interest-group rent-seeking, 211 which
creates incentives for perpetuating race-consciousness and politicians' ex-
ploitation of racial hostility.2 1 2 The relevant interest group would appear
209. Jennifer L. Hochschild, The Politics of the Estranged Poor, 101 ETHICS 560, 561
(1991). In view of the causal factors he cites, William Julius Wilson argues that solutions must
come in the form of comprehensive macroeconomic restructuring and social programming:
I therefore proposed a liberal-Left social democratic policy agenda that highlights
macroeconomic policies to promote balanced economic growth and create a tight job
market, public sector employment programs for those who have difficulty finding
jobs in the private sector, manpower training and education programs, a child sup-
port assurance program, a child-care strategy, and a family allowance program.
William J. Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged Revisited.- A Response to Hochschild and Boxill,
101 ETHICS 593, 595-96 (1991).
As I have observed elsewhere:
More broadly, affirmative action may be the path of least resistance for those in
power. Wilson's suggestion that his reforms should be politically palatable because
they would increase employment across racial lines underestimates the resistance of
the relatively affluent to redistributive policies. The economic and social policies
Wilson identifies as important causal factors in the underclass's condition are per-
haps the strongest evidence of the wealthier classes' increasing political dominance.
Those classes, which include a growing number of relatively affluent blacks, have
little incentive to undertake the complex and messy task of addressing the hardship
of the underclass, and plainly have refused to do so. The final bitter irony is that
affirmative action thus may represent more an accommodation of than a challenge to
the status quo.
Judges, Light Beams, supra note 9, at 1045-46.
210. WILLIAM J. WILsON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UN-
DERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY at vii-19 (1985) (summary).
211. "Rent-seeking" is the creation through the political process of returns in excess of
normal market returns or opportunity costs.
212. Jennifer Roback, Racism as Rent Seeking, 27 ECON. INQUIRY 661 (1989); Jennifer
Roback, The Separation of Race and State, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 58 (1991) [hereinafter
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to be the black middle class. Another study found that political mobili-
zation and official recognition as a deserving category were the key
mediators in groups' success in attaining admission to elite colleges:
During a period of general expansion of the nation's system of higher
education, women and blacks succeeded in improving their access to
such institutions. Lacking either official recognition or political mobili-
zation as a group, however, persons defined by low socioeconomic status
were relatively unsuccessful in improving their access.213
Affirmative action thus in a sense reflects one more triumph of the
relative haves over the relative have-nots, and demonstrates that the poli-
tics of wealth may be more powerful than the politics of race. 14 There
may be an element of co-optation in the process. To be sure, as discussed
above, whites tend to prefer in principle antidiscrimination programs and
nonpreferential programs that assist blacks in overcoming the effects of
historical discrimination. In practice, however, affirmative action pro-
grams in the form of numerical goals offer a much simpler and less costly
approach to the problem of racial discrimination; and, as a practical mat-
ter, affirmative action programs are most conveniently implemented that
way. 215 These advantages in part account for the programs' prevalence
in the face of white hostility. The antidiscrimination principle may yield
to pragmatic self-interest as public-sector bureaucrats and private-sector
managers, who do not personally bear the burden anyway, find it expedi-
ent to adopt affirmative action quotas to satisfy the requirements of an-
Roback, Separation]. Roback points out, however, that blacks certainly did not invent the
venerable practice of rent-seeking, and may not even be net beneficiaries, all rents considered.
She asks:
So long as the timber companies are unwilling to give up the [taxpayer-]subsidized
Forest Service, so long as the teachers' unions are unwilling to give up the taxpayer-
supported Department of Education, why should African-Americans give up the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission? I can think of no particular reason
why ethnic minorities should be the first groups in the economy to give up their
rents.
Roback, Separation, supra, at 62.
213. David Karen, The Politics of Class, Race, and Gender: Access to Higher Education in
the United States, 1960-86, 99 AM. J. EDUC. 208 (1991).
214. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 91-92
(1991). Those forces combine when macroeconomic changes result in increasing unemploy-
ment. A recent study has found that
[t]he link between macroeconomic performance and the number of employment dis-
crimination filings is therefore a strong one.... The increase in the unemployment
rate has had a major effect on the volume of litigation, by itself explaining 19.5 per-
cent of the growth in cases since 1969. Other exogenous economic factors seem less
significant in explaining the rising caseload.
Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 207, at 999-1000.
215. For a description of how this process occurs, see Jencks, supra note 203, at 754-56.
For an example that this result is indeed the case, see supra note 143.
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3. The Politics of Stalemate
The affirmative action debate has become a "diversion,''2 17 in which
conservatives and liberals in the past two decades have occupied them-
selves with hurling epithets at one another and seeking to monopolize the
rhetorical agenda on racial issues, while the position of the most severely
disadvantaged class in this country has deteriorated catastrophically de-
spite broad antipoverty and antidiscrimination legislation and aggressive
affirmative action programs.218 On one side, the liberal agenda has been
busy advancing the difficult case for affirmative action and attempting to
preclude any critical examination of this nation's priorities for achieving
racial and social justice. For example, fearing racial stigmatization and
destructive criticism of social welfare programs, liberals have frequently
reacted to bad news about lower-class urban black life (especially unflat-
tering descriptions of behavior among that class) by vehement denial and
resistance.2 19 Sociologist William Julius Wilson observes:
Thus, after 1970, for a period of several years, the deteriorating
social and economic conditions of the ghetto underclass were not
addressed by the liberal community as scholars backed away from
research on the topic, policymakers were silent, and civil rights
leaders were preoccupied with the affirmative action agenda of the
black middle class.
By 1980, however, the problems of the inner-city social dislo-
cations had reached such catastrophic proportions that liberals
were forced to readdress the question of ghetto underclass, but this
time their reactions were confused and defensive. The extraordi-
nary rise in inner-city social dislocations following the passage of
216. See, e.g., Note, Rethinking Weber: The Business Response to Affirmative Action, 102
HARv. L. REv. 658, 658-62 (1989) (businesses have come to accept and even favor affirmative
action programs); Cindy Skrzycki, Civil Rights and Corporate Qualms: Executives Fear Huge
Damage Awards as Result of Hiring Bill, WASH. PosT, June 13, 1991, at B1l:
"Most companies have accepted affirmative action," said Larry Lorber, an attorney
who represented the Business Roundtable, a group of 200 of the nations's largest
companies, in recent informal talks with civil rights groups involved with the [civil
rights] legislation. "In some respects, they view it as a helpful management tool to
keep them from getting sued."
217. America's Wasted Blacks, supra note 203, at 11: "The whole argument is a diversion.
Blacks need to realize that affirmative action cannot solve their most serious problems, whites
need to remember that affirmative action does not make it an advantage to be born black."
218. See infra notes 344-70 and accompanying text (deteriorating plight of underclass).
219. This pattern first emerged in the firestorm of criticism that greeted Daniel Patrick
Moynihan's 1965 report on black family life. See WILSON, supra note 210, at 8-15; DANIEL P.
MOYNIHAN, OFFICE OF POL'Y PLAN. AND REs., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAM-
1LY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL AcTION (1965).
Snrina 19921 BAYONETS FOR THE WOUNDED
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
the most sweeping anti-discrimination and antipoverty legislation
in the nation's history could not be explained by the 1960s explana-
tions of ghetto-specific behavior. Moreover, because liberals had
ignored these problems throughout most of the 1970s, they had no
alternative explanations to advance and were therefore ill prepared
to confront a new and forceful challenge from conservative
thinkers.
220
The consequence of this process was that the neoconservative per-
spective came to dominate policy making in the 1980s. According to
Wilson, that "culture-of-poverty" perspective
has focused almost exclusively on the interconnection between cul-
tural traditions, family history, and individual character. For ex-
ample, [neoconservatives] have argued that a ghetto family that
has had a history of welfare dependency will tend to bear offspring
who lack ambition, a work ethic, and a sense of self-reliance. Some
even suggest that ghetto underclass individuals have to be rehabili-
tated culturally before they can advance in society.22'
The neoconservative agenda has added little to the original con-
servative position, except to argue unconvincingly that "the growth of
liberal social policies has exacerbated, not alleviated, ghetto-specific cul-
tural tendencies and problems of inner-city social dislocations. 222 And
the neoconservative movement has failed to offer constructive solutions
of its own,223 as the underclass has continued to lose even more ground
220. WILSON, supra note 210, at 15.
221. ME at 13.
222. Id. at 16. For an example of neoconservative writing on the subject, see CHARLES
MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 (1084).
223. Instead, the neoconservative position has advanced an agenda ostensibly devoted to
"limited government." Cf CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 89-131 (1991) (describing
conservative objections to affirmative action). The National Review recently published musings
from several leading conservatives about "what the future may hold-politically, socially, eco-
nomically, [and] technologically-as we approach the end of a century and a millennium."
The following excerpt captures the flavor of the neoconservative position with respect to the
underclass:
We seem to have ignored conservative wisdom and, instead, left social policy to the
bad guys. Welfare schemes that guarantee a permanently dependent underclass are
now thoroughly embedded in our political and social life. Neither the intellect of
Charles Murray nor the energy of Jack Kemp can cope with the grim determination
of ghetto politicians to hold their constituents in thrall by denying them incentives to
work and to establish normal family lives; by insulating them from pressures to use
our language and otherwise enter the American mainstream; and by blaming the
lethal nature of street life on the police rather than on the dealers and muggers.
These malignancies, and others like them, might, of course, be excised from the
body politic. But that would mean enduring short-term pain in exchange for long-
term gain-something our political system is not organized to do. There is simply no
constituency for it. The apparent beneficiaries of the welfare system (in fact, its vic-
tims) can't do without their transfer-payment "fix"; the dispensers of the welfare
narcotic, fearing redundancy if those clients kick the habit, dole out enough money
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under the Reagan and Bush administrations.224 Instead, neoconserva-
tives have advocated an economic and social restructuring that has pro-
duced the most massive upward redistribution of wealth in American
history.225 With respect to the underclass, the neoconservative agenda
has been one of "masterly inactivity,"226 which has effectively exploited
the liberals' disarray.
4. Impact on Education
This dynamic contributes to society's failure to provide adequate
and equal educational opportunity to its children. Most generally, as the
foregoing suggests, liberal concern with the atfirmative action agenda has
displaced attention to social programs that directly aid disadvantaged
children, such as equality across the socioeconomic scale of resource allo-
to retain control; the great majority crinkles up its nose, moves to the suburbs, and
contents itself with a tax revolt that is negated by huge budget deficits.
Irwin M. Seltzer et al., Millennial Thoughw" The Shape of Things to Come, NAT'L REVIEW,
July 8, 1991, at 26 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Millennial Thoughts]. Seltzer's use of the
exclusionary and inclusionary pronouns "them" and "our" is especially revealing, if that is
possible in such a rich passage. For a discussion of this phenomenon of "negative identity"
and the process by which we "turn real people into objects, to see not the person but the
abstract image of the Other" and thereby to "rationalize the subordinate position of a group,"
see KARST, supra note 10, at 23.
224. The Brookings Institution recently compiled studies re-examining the underclass is-
sues raised by Wilson. THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, THE URBAN UNDERCLASS (Christopher
Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991). For discussion of a selection of those studies, see infra
notes 357-61 and accompanying text.
225. For recitation of the facts and figures to substantiate these claims, see KEVIN PHIL-
LIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR: WEALTH AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE IN
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (1990). Phillips' detailed indictment indicates that conserva-
tives are beginning to become concerned about these trends. Indeed, even Charles Murray
appears to be worried about the urban underclass's alienated "caste" status and the increasing
concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a selfish elite. Charles Murray et al., Mil-
lenial Thoughts, supra note 223, at 29-30; see also Karen Pennar, The Rich Are Richer-And
America May Be the Poorer, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 18, 1991, at 85.
226. The phrase "masterly inactivity" has an apt pedigree. Originally coined in James
Macintosh's Vindicae Galliae (1797) (in response to Burke's Reflections on the French Revolu-
tion), the phrase appeared in a newspaper editorial advising the South on how best to resist
radical Republican proposals for black suffrage and the Fourteenth Amendment:
We answer, let them do nothing, so far as political action is concerned. Let them
simply watch and walt. A masterly inactivity is the best policy they can adopt.
Time, that will gradually teach the masses of the North the necessity of redeeming
the republicanism of the country, will work out the problem in the interests of the
South. The Radicals demand negro suffrage and the ratification of the Constitutional
Amendment. They can get neither except by the consent of the Southern States and
the suffrages of the Southern people ....
Benjamin Wood, Masterly Inactivity the Policy of the South, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 1, 1866,
quoted in Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion 1864-88 (Part One), in 6 THE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 256
(Paul A. Freund ed., 1971).
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cation, nutrition and health-care programs, job training and education
programs, an adequate child-support program, and child-care pro-
grams.227 By suggesting that affirmative action is the path to social jus-
tice, liberals may be assisting the neoconservative agenda of ignoring the
educational disadvantages faced by the underclass. As suggested above,
affirmative action's challenge to the antidiscrimination principle is heavy
lifting indeed; and the task of convincing political leaders, judges, and the
public that what looks very much like racial or gender discrimination is
really a form of justice and equality leaves scant energy-or credibility-
for advocating redistributive programs for education.228 On the con-
trary, the political and moral demand for long-term structural reform at
the beginning of the opportunity cycle-at the education stage-has been
blunted by emphasis on short-term remediation at the mid- and end-
points of that cycle-at the hiring and promotion stages. The legislative
record reflects this choice and the distribution of power it implies: The
political response to Wards Cove's threat to affirmative action was imme-
diate and forceful-comprehensive civil rights legislation became a na-
tional priority and was enacted within a scant two years. By contrast, no
effective national policy to equalize educational opportunity has emerged
in the twenty years since Rodriguez,229 while the underclass's circum-
stances have deteriorated alarmingly and the education-funding gap in
many areas has widened to a chasm.230
227. See Wilson, supra note 209, at 595-96.
228. See Thomas B. Edsall, Why Liberals Lose: Willie Horton's Message, N.Y. REv. OF
BoOKs, Feb. 13, 1992, at 7, 10 (liberal demands of majority sacrifice to assist minorities, for
example through affirmative action programs, are undercut "by the visible decay of cities with
large majority populations, [and] by the worsening of conditions in the black underclass").
Even proponents of affirmative action recognize that advocacy of such programs consumes
scarce political resources, especially under the demanding standard that application of the
antidiscrimination principle yielded in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493-98 (1989). See Linda S. Greene, Race in the 21st Century: Equality Through Law?, 64
TUL. L. REv. 1515, 1531 (1990) ("In the last decade of the twentieth century, the Court
demands that the precious political capital of minorities seeking economic equality be spent
determining the existence of racial economic discrimination, rather than pursuing policies to
insure minority participation in public economic programs."). Recent research demonstrating
that contemporary black Americans continue the emphasis blacks historically have placed on
educational attainment makes this dilemma more acute. A. Wade Smith, Educational Attain-
ment as a Determinant of Social Class Among Black Americans, 58 J. NEGRO EDUc. 416
(1989).
229. For discussion of the shortcomings of the so-called "excellence movement," which is
to date-the principal national response to the crisis in education, see infra notes 454-58 and
accompanying text. As this Article was going to print, the Senate passed the Neighborhood
Schools Improvement Act, S. 2, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 138 CONG. REc. S476-02 (1992), which
would partially address the problem of inequality of educational opportunity by allocating
federal funds for "high need schools."
230. See infra notes 344-70 and accompanying text.
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More specifically, but also less directly, the affirmative action con-
cept contains elements that actually conflict with remedying the educa-
tional disadvantages of the underclass. As described above, affirmative
action programs sometimes attempt to redress the results of the historical
disadvantages of a group by "levelling" strategies such as race norming,
or by shifting the burden to employers to establish the "business neces-
sity" of generalized tests. 31 Taken on their own terms, such strategies
may be intelligible-it may make some sense, for example, to attempt to
mitigate the difficult burden of establishing discriminatory intent and to
put the burden of production concerning the relationship between test
and job performance on the party with the best access to the relevant
information.232 The problem, however, is that such strategies implicitly
discount the importance of basic educational skills and individual aca-
demic achievement by labelling deficiencies in those areas as "artificial
barriers." By concentrating on adjusting standards so that disadvan-
taged groups can meet them in roughly the same proportions as more
advantaged groups, affirmative action diminishes the importance of de-
voting resources to help groups become less disadvantaged in the first
place and thus more competitive relative to others (and, concomitantly,
perhaps better able to contribute more fully to society as a whole).2 33 It
may be difficult to obtain the resources needed to achieve real equality of
opportunity-by directly remedying the educational and other disadvan-
tages of excluded groups-when one must spend the energy required to
sustain the case for what appear to be double standards.234
231. See supra notes 129-55 and accompanying text.
232. This "smoke out" function is familiar to other legal contexts, such as the tort doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. See, eg. Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944). When the shoe
was on the other foot, Justice O'Connor recognized that "the purpose of strict scrutiny is to
'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal
important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool." City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion).
233. As discussed above, much of the argument for affirmative action rests on a challenge
to the American meritocratic stratification system. See supra notes 156-85 and accompanying
text. Affirmative action seeks to go beyond requiring the procedural fairness of holding every-
one to the same conventional standards and instead demands a remedial, group-based adjust-
ment of the standards themselves. Whether this approach has actually reduced competence in
the workplace, as some of its critics charge, is a difficult empirical question that I leave for
others.
234. It appears that employers, their receptivity to goals and timetables notwithstanding,
continue to need their employees to possess basic skills; and literacy has been shown to be
related to job performance in a variety of contexts. See, eg., COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, ENGI-
NEERING, AND PUBLIC POLICY OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, & INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HIGH SCHOOLS AND THE CHANG-
ING WORKPLACE: THE EMPLOYERS' VIEW, REPORT OF THE PANEL ON SECONDARY SCHOOL
EDUCATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (1984) (young employees show the greatest
deficiencies in the basic intellectual skills most demanded by employers: "the ability to draw
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A related problem stems from the theories advanced under the ru-
bric of "critical race theory" (sometimes "CRT"). This theory involves
taking a scholar's race into account in evaluating his or her work. Like
other forms of affirmative action, it proceeds from a claim of discrimina-
tion; and it adds an assertion that members of minority groups have a
unique contribution to make when they speak in "voices of color." '235
One goal of this theory is to deconstruct the validity of objectivist, lib-
eral, "hierarchical majoritarian" neutral standards for assessing the qual-
ity of academic work, and to contend that such standards are hopelessly
indeterminate instruments of oppression by the hegemonic white male
professorate.236 Another goal is to promote the "[m]onistic dialect of the
voice of color," which supposedly "focus[es] on the community's press-
ing concerns and issues, advocating the expansion of opportunities for
those socioeconomically disadvantaged, racially disadvantaged, or
both." '23 7 Those pressing concerns presumably will be taken into account
by critical race theory's asserted ability to "look at the bottom. 2 38 And
some critical race theorists have argued that an interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause that applies the antidiscrimination principle to
affirmative action is an example of how "potentially disruptive and trans-
formative forces like the Reconstruction Amendments in general and the
fourteenth amendment in particular, are roped off, domesticated, and
neutralized by powers seeking to preserve the status quo.
' '239
correct inferences from written, pictorial or mathematical information; to understand oral in-
structions; to develop alternatives and reach conclusions; to express their ideas intelligibly and
effectively"); Larry Mikulecky & Dorothy Winchester, Job Literacy and Job Performance
Among Nurses at Varying Employment Levels, 34 ADULT EDUC. Q. 1 (1983) (effective use of
job literacy skills related to job performance); Larry Mikulecky & Jeanne Ehlinger, The Influ-
ence of Metacognitive Aspects of Literacy on Job Performance of Electronics Technicians, 18 J.
READING BEHAV. 41 (1986) (metacognitive aspects of literacy significantly and consistently
correlates with job performance).
235. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991).
236. For citations to the literature and a reprise of this argument, along with all its code
words and slogans, see id Although Johnson seeks to limit his claim to the judgmental inde-
terminacy of objective criteria for scholarship to exclude works that are "conventional" and
"acolored," the viability of his distinction is open to challenge from his own premises and
apparently is not shared by other advocates of a "voice of color." See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WIL-
LIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
237. Johnson, supra note 235, at 2011.
238. See Mar J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 323 (1987).
239. Anthony Cook, Critical Race Law and Affirmative Action. The Legacy of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 61, 74-75 (1991). Cook characterizes suggestions
that Dr. King embraced the antidiscrimination principle as a "murderous... reconfiguring and
packaging of an image given meaning by those who wish to neutralize the revolutionary poten-
tial of prophetic struggle." Id. Critical race theory thus approves the result in Metro Broad-
casting, but argues that the Court should abandon its "formalistic and mechanical" approach,
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A kind of analogue to critical race theory finds expression in the
debate over public school curricula that is referred to as "multicultural-
ism," and in some more specific applications as "Afrocentrism." Propo-
nents of these measures allege that existing public school curricula
constitute a propagandistic form of intellectual discrimination that im-
poses a "Eurocentric" perspective, dominated by Western European cul-
tural values and traditions to the exclusion of perspectives from African,
Asian, Hispanic, and American Indian cultures.2 " Some advocates ar-
gue that such a shift in perspective is necessary to preserve the self-image
of minority children and to enable those children to identify with the
subject matter, rather than simply to imbibe the accomplishments of the
dominant white majority.241
Critical race theory and multiculturalism, to be sure, offer important
contributions. Among the more obvious benefits are their potential to
broaden and to enrich everyone's cultural perspective and to stimulate
critical examination of curricula and evaluative standards. Not only do
critical race theory and multiculturalism offer an avenue for inclusion of
historically excluded groups from academic and pedagogic legitimacy,
but they also provide an opportunity for whites to learn how to live in an
increasingly pluralistic society.242 And the narrative style advocated by
some critical race theorists243 has long been a vital medium for communi-
cating the perspective of the disadvantaged.
2 4
There are, however, several problems. First, critical race theory's
deconstructive mission undermines the very concept of academic
and instead "talk in terms of historically deconstructed identities, the need for empowerment
of historically disempowered groups, and the efficacy and mutual benefits of Black self-deter-
mination." Id at 83.
240. See, e.g., Elizabeth Steinberger, America's Identity in Transition: Multicultural, SCH.
ADMIN., Apr. 1991, at 8. For a discussion of the distinction between multiculturalism and
Afrocentrism, see Robert K. Landers, Conflict Over Multicultural Education, EDITORIAL RES.
REPS., Nov. 30, 1990, at 682. For a brief discussion of Afrocentric studies, see Bayo Oyebade,
African Studies and the Afrocentric Paradigm: A Critique, 21 J. BLACK STUDIES 233 (1990).
241. See Landers, supra note 240, at 684, 691; Steinberger, supra note 240, at 9.
242. A recent survey reveals that while most racial and ethnic groups continue to harbor
some prejudice against all other groups, education is a powerful force in fostering positive or at
least neutral inter-group attitudes. See Liz S. Armstrong, Racial, Ethnic Prejudice Still Preva-
lent, Survey Finds, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 16, 1991, at 7 (citing National Opinion Research
Survey).
243. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 235, at 2015-20.
244. For example, slave narratives played a key role in the abolition movement. See infra
notes 329-43 and accompanying text. The narrative style embraced by some critical race theo-
rists, however, is not their exclusive preserve; and it has been adopted for much the same
reasons by their critics. See, eg., STEPHEN L. CARTER, supra note 214; SHELBY STEELE, THE
CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA (1990).
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achievement and excellence.245 If standards based on what one does and
says are hopelessly indeterminate, and if one's work can be evaluated
only in terms that include reference to one's racial or gender characteris-
tics, then the case for demanding the resources necessary to bring minor-
ity achievement up to that of other groups has been diluted. If it is
identity and not performance that counts, it is difficult to see why society
should be concerned at all about "sub-standard" performance-a con-
cept that critical race theory implies is epistemologically suspect.2'
Multiculturalism presents an analogous risk if taken to an obsessive ex-
treme. In an educational system whose average students cannot locate
Sudan or Guatemala on a map, are barely able to read, and lag behind
the industrialized world in math and science skills, 247 one must question
whether the educational needs of its most disadvantaged students are
best served by making a pedagogical priority out of achieving the appro-
priate quota of ideologically correct geocultural representation in the
curriculum. In view of the acutely limited resources at the disposal of
poor public school districts, it would seem advisable to consider the risk
that commitment to teaching basic reading, writing, math, and science
skills might suffer from excessive focus on cultural diversity themes.248
245. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure and "White Male" Standards: Some
Lessons from the Patent Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2065 (1991) (response to Alex Johnson); DINESH
D'SoUzA, THE ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS
(1991).
246. See Carter, supra note 245 at 2067:
Nowadays, however, a great deal of academic dialogue turns out to be not about the
ideas that people express but about the people who express the ideas. It isn't what
one says that matters, it is who is doing the saying.... The more assumptions one
can attach to the author before the process of reading begins, the greater the number
of biases and preconceptions that one will bring to the reading itself. And the greater
the number of biases and preconceptions the reader brings along, the lower the
probability that true communication might occur.
247. For example, on a 1981-82 international mathematics test of eighth grade students the
United States' performance (mean score 45.3% correct) was below the average of 18 selected
countries (47.4%) and lagged far behind, for example, Belgium (53.2% for Flemish, 51.4% for
French), Canada (51.6% for British Columbia), France (52.5%), Hungary (56%), Japan
(whose seventh grade students scored 62.1%), and the Netherlands (57.1%). NATIONAL
CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1990, at 383
(Thomas D. Snyder, Project Director, 1991). The United States scored worse than all reported
countries on a 1981-82 international mathematics test administered to twelfth graders. Id
(selected countries were: Belgium, Canada, England and Wales, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Ja-
pan, New Zealand, Scotland, Sweden, Thailand, and United States). Further, Americans aged
18 to 24 years again found themselves at the bottom of the class on a test of areas correctly
identified in a test of geography knowledge. Id. at 385 (test results reported for Canada,
France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States).
248. For a description of multiculturalism's potential for creating conflict between peda-
gogical and political goals, see Jane Gross, A City's Determination to Rewrite History Puts Its
Classrooms in Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1991, at A17. The following passage from
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Second, both critical race theory and multiculturalism can be pur-
sued in a way that is hostile to the value of open intellectual debate and
thus ironically can threaten the value of diversity that they invoke.249
Jonathan Kozol's Savage Inequalities, quoted in part above, describes (in narrative style) his
visit to Clark Junior High School in East St. Louis:
Christopher approaches me at the end of class. The room is too hot. His skin looks
warm and his black hair is damp. "Write this down. You asked a question about
Martin Luther King. I'm going to say something. All that stuff about 'the dream'
means nothing to the kids I know in East St. Louis. So far as they're concerned, he
died in vain. He was famous and he lived and gave his speeches and he died and now
he's gone. But we're still here. Don't tell students in this school about 'the dream.'
Go and look into a toilet here if you would like to know what life is like for students
in this city."
Before I leave, I do as Christopher asked and enter a boy's bathroom. Four of
the six toilets do not work. The toilet stalls, which are eaten away by red and brown
corrosion, have no doors. The toilets have no seats. One has a rotted wooden stump.
There are no paper towels and no soap. Near the door is a loop of wire with an
empty toilet-paper roll.
"This," says Sister Julia, "is the best school that we have in East St. Louis."
KOZOL, supra note 3, at 36.
For an argument that "multiculturalism's critics are selling students short by propagating
five key myths"-that multiculturalism and affirmative action cause divisiveness, dilute stan-
dards, are unnecessary, subvert meritocracy, and dominate academic thought-see Troy
Duster, They're Taking Overt And Other Myths About Race on Campus, MOTHER JONES,
Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 30.
249. In the context of critical race theory, this problem is known as "essentialism," in
which one faction attempts to achieve a kind of rhetorical hegemony by purporting to define
what counts as a true "voice of color." While Alex Johnson, for example, denies making such
moves and instead professes a "pluralistic interpretation of Critical Race Theory," his article
nevertheless begins with an attempt to determine whether Randall Kennedy and Stephen
Carter are persons of color legitimately speaking in voices of color. For further indications
that "voices of color" are limited to only the ones critical race theorists want to hear, consider
the brickbats that greeted Shelby Steele's collection of essays on his own black experience and
his perception of race in America. Steele had the temerity to suggest that some black Ameri-
cans have a demoralizing "hidden investment in victimization and poverty" that inhibits indi-
viduality and achievement. STEELE, supra note 244, at 15. In view of her own impressionistic,
autobiographical-psychological narrative approach in The Alchemy of Race and Rights, for
example, Patricia Williams' criticisms of Steele's use of narrative suggest that the only stories
("limited personal circumstances") that count are the ones that have the "correct" moral:
While there is undoubtedly some truth to Mr. Steele's characterizations as individual
psychological models, they do not adequately address the complex reinforcements of
group behavior. More dangerous still, they tend to minimize the force of deeply
embedded social pathologies. Yet a distinguishing feature of Mr. Steele's message is
precisely his use of psychology as politics. As a device, this risks substituting limited
personal circumstances for broader historical analyses. In Mr. Steele's case, it has
produced a narrative perspective that is relentlessly isolationist, even as it claims to
be all-knowing.
Patricia Williams, A Kind of Race Fatigue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1990, § 7, at 12. Adolph
Reed described Steele's book as "abominably thin" and "simply[sic]-minded," and he accuses
Steele of pandering to "the social prejudices of the wealthy and powerful, all the while com-
plaining of censure and persecution and receiving praise for courageously taking an unpopular
stand." Adolph Reed, Book Review, NATION, Mar. 4, 1991, at 274. For criticism of Wil-
liams's own narrative as "clumsy and ideologically predetermined" and failing "miserably as
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This conflict is part of the larger debate over "political correctness."25
As indicated above, Wilson argues that liberal refusal to engage in an
open and critical dialogue about the condition of the underclass contrib-
uted to an intellectual vacuum that conservatives have been able to ex-
ploit to advance their agenda of not-so-benign neglect. A similar taboo
has been noted surrounding open inquiry into the impacts of affirmative
action.251
Beyond those effects, collateral damage may also be done to the
value of education itself. Long a familiar tool of both the extreme right
and left, suppression of debate and inquiry stabs at the heart of what
intellectual life is about. As described above, obsession with political
correctness can compromise the instrumental value of education by man-
dating a cramped version of diversity and by crowding out attention to
basic skills. Insistence on political correctness also erodes the intrinsic
value of education-the self-affirming and communication-building expe-
rience of open, critical examination and discourse. The importance of
developing, examining, and sharing ideas becomes subordinated to a co-
erced, slanted vision of political and cultural morality. And the damage
to those values may be especially serious when inflicted by members of
the institutions that embody society's highest intellectual aspirations. It
is hard to see how education as a social value can be expected to thrive in
such a hostile environment. Society's commitment to education in gen-
eral is tenuous enough as it is, and commitment to education of the un-
derclass in particular is in extremis; it is doubtful whether either
commitment will be hardy enough to survive such an assault on its roots.
rigorous analysis," see Jonathan Rieder, Tawana and the Professor, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 21,
1991, at 39-41.
250. See, e.g., ArLynn L. Presser, The Politically Correct Law Schoo" Where It's Right to
be Left, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1991, at 52; Jane E. Bahls, Dissenting Opinions: What's Happening to
Dialogue in the Law Schools?, STUDENT LAW., Sept. 1991, at 12. For an example of a college
professor who alleged that expression of his controversial views on affirmative action, race
relations, and the relative intelligence of racial groups was unconstitutionally suppressed by a
pattern of harassment and retaliation by the college, see Levin v. Harleston, 770 F. Supp. 895
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). For analysis of the problem of so-called "hate speech" on university cam-
puses, and argument that the nature of the university entity as speech-regulator is a basis for
relaxed first amendment concern, see J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the
University, 79 GEO. L.J. 399 (1991). For an argument that the "political correctness" debate is
a bogus neoconservative creation, see David Beers, PC? B.S.; Behind the Hysteria: How the
Right Invented Victims of PC Police, MOTHER JONES, Sept-Oct. 1991, at 34. For an example
of a right-wing version of political correctness, see the discussion of Rust v. Sullivan and the
"gag rule" imposed on federally funded family planning clinics, supra notes 23-32 and accom-
panying text.
251. See Judges, Light Beams, supra note 9, at 1059.
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Finally, critical race theory and multiculturalism are troublesome,
again in their extreme forms, because they hold out a false promise of
justice. Like the more overt forms of affirmative action that it endorses,
critical race theory offers little to the most disadvantaged classes, its
claims to communitarian values notwithstanding. If it really "looked at
the bottom," critical race theory would see Third World conditions right
in our own cities that have gotten worse despite twenty years of affirma-
tive action and more than a decade of an abstract, sometimes almost
unintelligible critical legal studies movement. Real justice will elude us
until we aggressively remedy those conditions, regardless of how many
tenure decisions take race and racial scholarship into account. And
sending inner-city children to school in crime-, poverty-, disease-, and
toxin-ridden "death zones" '252 will remain a monstrous injustice no mat-
ter how many African-American heroes they hear about during Black
History Month.253
M. Remedying Myopic Visions of Equality: The Caste-
Abolition Principle
Only a society with an eroded ethical base would allow more than
a fifth of its children to live in abject poverty in the midst of the
greatest affluence the world has ever known and to have the audac-
ity to think it does not and will not affect us all.254
This Article commenced with a description of the ways in which
constitutional paradigms-both interpretive and remedial-have not
only largely failed to mitigate but have actually contributed to the social,
economic, and consequently political exclusion of an identifiable, severely
disadvantaged class. This Part argues that the Civil War Amendments
to the Constitution require positive measures to redress those condi-
tions-in particular through the establishment of a claim for equality of
educational opportunity under the caste-abolition principle.2 55 Before
moving to consideration of that suggestion, a brief description of the in-
252. KozoL, supra note 3, at 5.
253. See supra note 248 (Christopher quote).
254. REPORT OF THE CITIZENS' COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE:
THE CIVIL RIGHTS CHALLENGE FOR THE 1990s 215 (Reginald C. Govan & William I. Taylor
eds., 1989) (quoting CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, A CHILDREN'S DEFENSE BUDGET FY
1989, AT xxiv (1989)).
255. As an initial matter, one might question whether, given the emergence of a solid ex-
treme right-wing majority on the Supreme Court, it is worth the effort to develop critical
constitutional arguments on behalf of the poor. I believe it is. First, that development is itself
evidence that times change and can change again. Second, constitutional law debates are,
among other things, public debates about the heart and soul of this country and are addressed
to a wider audience than the federal courts. We will have reached an ethically and intellectu-
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terpretive and normative criteria such a claim ought to meet will set the
stage. The debate over positive rights to minimal subsistence provides
that frame of reference.
A. Positive Rights to Minimal Subsistence
An argument that the Constitution may impose positive obligations
on government to address the problems of severe poverty25 6 must take
seriously two general kinds of considerations.257 Originalism aside, the
first arises from constitutional interpretive theory and largely rests on
prudential separation-of-powers concerns.25 1 According to Frank
ally impoverished place indeed when critical constitutional discourse ceases to be worth the
candle.
One might further question whether the courts are institutionally capable of creating the
kind of social transformation needed to remedy the caste-creating tendencies of the underclass
dynamic. The judiciary's power to effect deep social change has been questioned. Kg., GER-
ALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
(1991). There is considerable force to Rosenberg's challenge. Indeed, much of this Article is
devoted to describing how aspects of the Supreme Court's constitutional work have exacer-
bated the underclass's plight and hence the caste problem. Nevertheless, although the courts
plainly cannot do the job alone, it surely would be a mistake to ignore their duty to deploy
whatever persuasive and coercive resources they command to enforce the state's constitutional
obligations. Education-finance litigation at the state level and Missouri v. Jenkins indicate that
the courts, when mobilized, can have a substantial and tangible impact on the allocation of
social capital for education. See infra notes 479-85 and accompanying test. Furthermore,
courts have been described as serving a kind of oracular function, contributing to our moral
evolution as a people. Michael Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Func-
tional Justification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278 (1981). Therefore, just as critical constitutional
scholars serve a valuable function by reminding the courts of their responsibilities, the courts
play a vital political and social role by declaring constitutional imperatives.
256. This Article is hardly the first to raise such an argument. See, e.g., Frank I.
Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7
(1969); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WAsH. U.
L.Q. 659 [hereinafter Welfare Rights]; Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitu-
tion: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J 1 (1987); Melvyn R. Durchslag,
Constraints on Equal Access to Fundamental Liberties: Another Look at Professor Michelman's
Theory of Minimum Protection, 19 GA. L. REv. 1041 (1985); Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling
National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government
Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1977).
257. Another set of objections asserts that welfare rights are bad policy because welfare
allegedly corrupts those whom it feeds. E.g., MURRAY, supra note 222. The empirical prem-
ises of this argument, which do not purport to involve constitutional theory, have been refuted.
See infra note 357-59 and accompanying text.
258. This Article assumes that Brown I correctly rejected the originalist interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause. Karst argues that
[b]y providing firm constitutional protection for the substantive rights of the 1866
act, the framers expected that all citizens, including blacks, who were the most obvi-
ous stigmatized caste, would share equally the civil rights that seemed most signifi-
cant at the time. But they deliberately cast the amendment in general terms,
declining to use the language of specific rights and particular groups that they had
used in the 1866 act.
Michelman's convenient summary of objections to welfare rights claims,
those issues include the idea
that the concept of welfare rights is fanciful, uncorroborated by
legal texts or decisions; that the notion is ill-conceived because
there is no justiciable standard for determining when the supposed
rights are satisfied; that the courts, in the absence of a justiciable
standard, cannot presume to define or enforce these rights without
usurping legislative and executive roles; that the judicial vindica-
tion of these rights would be illegitimate and undemocratic because
nothing in our traditional law or written Constitution signifies any
general acceptance of the obligations these rights entail.... 259
The second set of considerations rests on more explicitly normative
premises concerning claims of distributive justice, which, according to
Thomas Grey, "can usefully be classified as either egalitarian or liberta-
rian."' 26 ° John Rawls261 and Robert Nozick262 represent the two ex-
tremes in that normative debate. According to Grey: "Egalitarians hold
that economic assets should be distributed equally-allowing various ex-
ceptions. Libertarians hold that economic assets should be left in
whatever hands they reach through free and fair individual transac-
tions-again, allowing various exceptions.
263
Michelman, Peter Edelman, and Grey have presented responses to
the interpretive and libertarian objections that are relevant to the caste-
abolition principle. Michelman bases his argument 264 on John Hart Ely's
interpretivist conception of the Constitution, especially the Equal Protec-
KARST, supra note 10, at 54. He concludes that "[wlhat has changed in the century since the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment is not the principle of equal citizenship, but the idea
of what it means to be a fully participating member of our society." Id. at 56.
259. Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 256, at 659-60 (citing RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977)); see also Henry P. Monaghan, The Constitution
Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 117 (1978); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty,
Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 41.
260. Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive
Justice, 28 STAN. L. Rnv. 877 (1976).
261. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
262. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
263. Grey, supra note 260, at 877. Grey is careful to note that Karl Marx's views "do not
fit well within this framework precisely because he was not primarily concerned with questions
of distribution." Iad at 877 n.1.
264. Michelman argues first that at least on several occasions, for example in the right to
interstate migration cases, the Supreme Court's opinions have appeared to reflect some recog-
nition of a constitutional claim to minimal subsistence. See, eg., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Michelman, Wel-
fare Rights, supra note 256, at 661-63. But Michelman concedes, as he must, that many con-
trary cases can be cited and that the case law only weakly supports an assertion of a welfare-
rights claim-although it does respond to the objection of "fancifulness." Id. at 664.
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tion Clause, as embodying a "representation-reinforcing" principle.26
This approach responds to the "lawlessness" concerns. Michelman char-
acterizes the representation-reinforcing principle as describing an ellipse
embracing two cores related to protecting access to political participation
and prohibiting stigmatizing discrimination.266 Extreme poverty and
deprivation of basic education inflict both harms and thus violate Ely's
principle, Michelman argues, because they disable any real participation
in politics and plainly do ascribe social and political stigma.267 Edelman
adds that recognition of a welfare rights claim, although presenting re-
medial complexities such as eligibility determinations, would not so ex-
ceed courts' institutional competence as to threaten the idea of law.268
Michelman and Edelman also respond to the special objections
raised against recognition of positive rights-the problems of voracity
and nonreciprocity.269 Michelman responds that the problem is not in-
herent in positive rights themselves; for we of course recognize positive
rights all the time, "when fashioned in contracts, legislation, or condi-
tions. ' 27 0 Thus, if positive rights are not unbearably troubling when they
come from institutional deliberation, then there seems no greater reason
to fear boundlessness and nonreciprocity when such rights are "consid-
265. Michelman, supra note 256, at 667-70; see ELY, supra note 22. (At the time
Michelman wrote, Ely had presented his ideas in a series of articles that formed the basis for
his subsequent book.) Peter Edelman adds that denial of basic subsistence "destroys the idea
of law, since it perpetuates shameful and shocking suffering in the richest nation on earth,
suffering that could be alleviated by a relatively modest expenditure." Peter Edelman, Man-
dated Minimum Income, Judge Posner, and the Destruction of the Rule of Law, paper deliv-
ered at "Conference on Compelling Government Interests," Albany Law School (Sept. 26-28,
1991).
266. For an overview of the stigmatic- and processual-harm aspects of the antidiscrimina-
tion principles, supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
267. Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 256, at 677-79. Edelman responds to the ob-
jection that the poor are simply political "losers" in a constitutionally protected contest by
arguing that, "[a]t least since footnote 4 of Carolene Products, especially as elaborated by the
representation-reinforcement theories of John Hart Ely and others, the nature of the political
weakness of a legislative loser is relevant to the decision whether it can claim constitutional
protection and how much." Edelman, supra note 265, at 19. The poor, Edelman goes on to
argue, have largely been legislative losers and have "always been stereotyped and classified on
the basis of popular attitudes that had little to do with the truth." Id. at 20.
268. Edelman, supra note 265, at 30-33.
269. Michelman describes one aspect of those problems thus:
Positive rights, including welfare rights, pose problems largely because the reciproc-
ity and boundedness of duties seem gravely threatened by the idea of being duty-
bound to contribute actively to the satisfaction of other people's interests or needs.
Needs are neither equal, nor reciprocal, nor quite finite. They are to some extent
unilaterally controllable, inasmuch as one's needs may be traceable to one's prior
choices, but the resource requirements of satisfying them may be virtually limitless.
Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 256, at 681.
270. Id.
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ered as a priori claims that condition the workings of institutions.
271
Edelman suggests noncontroversial examples of such obligations, to es-
tablish that the concept of positive constitutional obligations is not inher-
ently foreign to the Constitution, and concludes that governmental
obligations give rise to correlative rights: "If there is a fundamental right
of life, liberty, and property to receive enough income to subsist in
America in 1991, it is not a shocking idea that this right takes a positive
form." 272
A corollary of the positive rights objection is insistence on a state
action requirement. Edelman first notes the incoherence of the Court's
state action doctrine, then observes that legislative silence as well as posi-
tive laws reflect legislative outcomes, and finally counters that
[b]oth the distinction between state "action" and "inaction" and.
the distinction between "positive" and "negative" rights are artifi-
cial and misleading. The real question is not whether there is a
legislative outcome, but whether the minority coming to court is
identifying a public value which is not outweighed by a public
value asserted by the majority .... The constitutional work-that
of discovering and explicating a public value espoused by a minor-
ity and matching it against the public value identified by the major-
ity-is the same. The same adverse impact on the minority-in
this case on the poor-is equally measurable and analytically the
same.
2 73
As mentioned above, welfare rights claims also raise normative lib-
ertarian concerns. Grey attempts to reconcile a redistributive right to a
minimal subsistence income with Nozick's libertarianism. 274 The ful-
crum for Grey is "a moral claim to the bare biological necessities of life,
a claim that would arise even under the pure individualism of a Lockean
state of nature," expressed in the familiar Lockean proviso that "the
271. Id.
272. For example, the existence of specie being essential to commerce, Edelman suggests
that Congress's power to coin money "may well transform into an obligation which even an
electoral majority could not negate." Edelman, supra note 265, at 26. The government may
also have an obligation to defend the nation from foreign invasion. Indeed, the Supreme Court
recognized such an obligation in dicta in The Prize Cases, in which the Court stated, for exam-
ple, that "[i]f a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only author-
ized but bound to resist force by force." 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863). The limits of that
example, however, are set by the Court's conclusion therein that determination of the necessity
for application of military force (at least to suppress rebellion) rested exclusively with the
President and in effect constituted a political question. Id.
273. Edelman, supra note 265, at 29-30.
274. Grey first notes that Rawls' liberty principle is lexically superior to his equality princi-
ple, so that distributive equality claims cannot trump valid liberty claims. Grey concedes that
Nozick's property rights claim must be taken seriously and is not adequately accounted for in
Rawls' theory, and admits that corrective justice claims are inadequate to justify substantial
egalitarian redistribution. Grey, supra note 260, at 880-88.
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right of appropriation of resources from nature existed only so long as
there was 'enough and as good left in common for others.' "275 That
proviso is consistent with the concession by some libertarians that, for
example, one may not appropriate the only water hole in a desert to the
life-threatening exclusion or the extortion of others.276 Because most lib-
ertarians would accept the Hobbesian formation of the minimal state to
protect their property, Grey concludes that "[t]he existence of even this
minimal state-the sort accepted by many libertarians who fall short of
the full measure of anarchist purity-would now make it quite possible
to enforce the right of otherwise helpless persons to live."277 For Grey,
American taxpayers today thus are the appropriators of the desert's only
water hole; and the extremely indigent are the thirsty onlookers whose
claim to minimal subsistence is made tolerable under libertarian theory
by the existence of the facilitative minimal state.
In short, a claim for minimal subsistence income fits within the
bounds of a coherent interpretive theory that identifies a constitutional
principle of representation reinforcement. The baseline assumption that
the Constitution does not create positive rights, and its corollary state
action requirement, have been challenged. A welfare-rights claim would
present complex questions, as do many other less controversial constitu-
tional claims, but would not exceed the institutional competence of the
courts. And a claim to minimal subsistence is consistent with a con-
straint on liberty that even many libertarians would concede. These ar-
guments inform consideration of a constitutional claim to equality of
educational opportunity for the underclass. That claim derives from an
interpretation of the Civil War Amendments as embodying a "caste-abo-
lition" principle.
275. Id. at 888; see also NOZICK, supra note 262, at 175 (quoting the Lockean proviso).
276. Even Nozick accepts this constraint; but he seeks to delimit the Lockean proviso to
protect the property claim of the appropriator who invests special precautions to prevent that
water hole from drying up and who leaves others in no worse position than nature would have
done. Grey asserts that "there is no significant justification for this result under any concep-
tion of justice that deserves to be recognized as governing human conduct." Grey, supra note
260, at 889.
277. The existing taxing mechanism could spread the burden of support over the pro-
ductive taxpayers. Each of them would then be in the situation of the water-owner
on the desert island: at very little cost, a sharing of his property could preserve
human life.... If through [some] catastrophe, there came to be too many helpless
persons relative to the number of productive taxpayers, the cost to the rest would no
longer be slight. In that case, the right to subsistence would no longer exist; the
helpless would have to fall back on appeals to compassion and generosity.
Id. at 890.
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B. Constitutional Basis for a Right to Equality of Educational
Opportunity for the Underclass: The Caste-Abolition
Principle
The foregoing overview suggests that a claim to some kind of posi-
tive constitutional obligation on government to provide minimally ade-
quate social programs must meet several requirements to be taken
seriously by rights-based legal institutions. First, it must be founded on a
principle that satisfies the interpretivist demand of a basis "in legally ad-
missible sources construed by legally acceptable methods, as distin-
guished from, say, the sources and methods of moral philosophy or from
mere judicial preference." '278 Second, it must not threaten the idea of law
by overwhelming the institutional competence of the courts. And third,
it ought to be consistent with those values that are constituent elements
of our national normative culture.2 79 This section argues that the caste-
abolition principle satisfies these criteria and provides a claim to equality
of educational opportunity for the underclass.
1. The Caste-Abolition Principle
Webster's dictionary defines "caste" as "a system of social stratifica-
tion more rigid than a class and characterized by hereditary status, en-
dogamy, and social barriers rigidly sanctioned by custom, law, or
religion."28 The term thus describes an extreme, institutionalized form
of social immobility. Derived from the historical context of the Civil
War Amendments, as discussed below, the caste-abolition principle is vi-
olated whenever social conditions impinging on a segment of the popula-
tion (not necessarily defined exclusively by race) threaten to recreate the
278. Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 256, at 664-65.
279. Of course, one might challenge the premises of a rights-based approach. See, eg.,
Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. Rnv. 1363 (1984). This Article seeks instead
to supplement, not supplant, rights-based constitutionalism with a more complete account of
governmental obligation to remedy at least the most severe allocational inequalities while pre-
serving a more morally responsible conception of individual liberty. An agenda that requires
wholesale abandonment of individually enforceable rights calls to mind a line from one of the
first soul ballads to make the national charts: "You don't miss your water/ till the well runs
dry." WILLIAM BELL, You Don't Miss Your Water (Stax/Volt Records 1961).
280. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICIONARY 348 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1969). Social
stratification at all levels may be sufficiently impermeable in other cultures to require clarifica-
tion of the term "caste" by a relativistic adjective. I use the term unqualifiedly in this Article,
however, to emphasize that the social and economic barriers between America's underclass
"caste" and the upper classes are qualitatively more upwardly impenetrable than are the dis-
tinctions among those upper classes themselves: While perhaps no one stands on a solid floor,
the underclass huddles under an impervious ceiling. In other words, social mobility (either
upwards or downwards) may continue to be a possibility for upper classes; but the underclass
here has been locked into its caste status.
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kind of severe and chronic inequality, dehumanization, and powerless-
ness that characterized the caste system the Civil War was fought to
abolish. The principle thus prohibits, and affirmatively requires the state
to remedy, actions or conditions that recreate a caste society in which
one group is systematically and grossly disadvantaged and excluded from
participation in the American promises of class mobility and meritocratic
stratification. As discussed below, denial of minimal equality of educa-
tional opportunity is the quintessential caste-creating and caste-perpetu-
ating condition.
a. The Principle's Roots
The idea that the Civil War Amendments, particularly the Four-
teenth, established the constitutional illegitimacy of caste is well recog-
nized.28 1 The Supreme Court, and individual Justices from Marshall and
Douglas to Scalia and Rehnquist, have acknowledged this interpretation
on numerous occasions. 282 The caste-abolition principle nevertheless has
281. During Senate debate preceding adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, for exam-
ple, Senator Howard stated that "[tihis [Amendment] abolishes all class legislation in the
States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applica-
ble to another." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). And Charles Sumner has
been quoted as stating that the Fourteenth Amendment abolished "oligarchy, aristocracy,
caste, or monopoly with peculiar privileges and powers." See FAIRMAN, supra note 226, at
1348 (quoting unsuccessful brief of J.Q.A. Fellows in The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36 (1872)).
282. E.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982) ("The Equal Protection Clause was
intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based
legislation."); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in the judgment) (a quota is constitutionally objectionable because it is a "creator of
caste", (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 113 (1975)); Kadrmas v.
Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 468 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to abolish caste legislation."); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Liv-
ing Center, 473 U.S. 432, 471 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part in the judgment and
dissenting in part) ("the Fourteenth Amendment does prohibit other results under virtually all
circumstances, such as castes created by law along racial or ethnic lines"); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 254 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (a racial quota violates
the equality norms expressed in Title VII because it is a creator of "castes, a two-edged sword
that must demean one in order to prefer another"); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 342
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (University of Washington's "segregated admissions process
creates suggestions of stigma and caste no less than a segregated classroom," because black
graduates' accomplishment will be tainted); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255 (1972)
(opinion of Douglas, J.) ("In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no
permissible 'caste' system of law enforcement," yet death penalty is selectively applied, "feed-
ing prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised, lacking political clout, or if he is a
member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social position may be in
a more protected position"; noting that Brahmans were exempt from capital punishment under
ancient Hindu law); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 385 (1971) (Douglas, J. dissenting)
(Equal Protection Clause's reach is not precise, but "rather definite guidelines have been devel-
oped: race is one... class or caste yet another"); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 287 (1964)
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remained largely a rhetorical device, and has not become a potent consti-
tutional principle, because of the constraining force of the Court's nega-
tive rights paradigm-which implicitly assumes that the Constitution is
an inert, passive instrument of the socioeconomic status quo. That as-
sumption is incorrect. The Civil War Amendments themselves definitely
sought to produce dramatic and positive social change. They were born
of a violent revolution in America's social, political, and economic life
that in some respects was more profound (and infinitely more bloody)
than the Revolution of 1776. Surely the transformative objectives of the
bloodiest war in the history of the Western Hemisphere carry immense
weight in our interpretation of the amendments resulting from that war.
The content of the caste-abolition principle, its historical roots, and
the positive rights issue are interrelated. A positive constitutional right
demands that today's society honor the constitutional commitments of
prior generations. The unique provenance of the Civil War Amendments
establishes an especially appropriate basis for a positive rights claim
under the caste-abolition principle. The Union's extraordinary war effort
rested in part on the assumption that constitutional imperatives justified
the government in demanding of its citizens that revolution's enormous
sacrifices.283 In a flesh-and-blood sense, the true Framers of the Civil
War Amendments were the men and women who made those sacrifices.
Their moral and political claim on the faithfulness of subsequent genera-
tions to the constitutional articulation of their revolutionary objectives is
certainly no weaker than that of the participants in the Revolution of
1776. Thus, positive rights claimants today are not the illegitimate
usurpers of our national heritage and institutions that their opponents
make them out to be, but instead are like private attorneys general,
ensuring
(Goldberg, J., concurring) ("The denial of the constitutional right of Negroes to access to
places of public accommodation would perpetuate a caste system in the United States"; invok-
ing all three Civil War Amendments); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 600 (1964) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Senator Howard's description, quoted supra note 281); Garner v. State,
368 U.S. 157, 185 (1963) (quoting Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, quoted below);
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring) (to allow state to
create exception to right of national citizenship to prevent indigents from entering the state
"would... introduce a caste system of government" by relegating indigents "to an inferior
class of citizenship"); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("But in view of the Constitution, in the eyes of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is colorblind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
308 (1880) (Civil War Amendments intended to protect former slaves from state laws that are
"steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race").
283. See generally ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE GETTYSBURG ADDRESS (1863).
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that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that
cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion-that
we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain-
that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom-
and that government of the people, by the people, for the people,
shall not perish from the earth. 84
The content of the caste-abolition principle derives from the objec-
tives of the revolution of 1860--"the cause for which they gave the last
full measure of devotion." Those objectives were not limited to preserva-
tion of the Union.285 Historian Eric Foner observes instead that with
President Lincoln's signing of the Emancipation Proclamation, the Civil
War officially and irretrievably turned from a "war of armies into a con-
flict of societies, ensuring that Union victory would produce a social
revolution within the South:
' 28 6
For emancipation meant more than the end of a labor system,
more even than the uncompensated liquidation of the nation's larg-
est concentration of private property ("the most stupendous act of
sequestration in the history of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence...").
The demise of slavery inevitably threw open the most basic ques-
tions of polity, economy, and society. Begun to preserve the
Union, the Civil War now portended a far-reaching transformation
in Southern life and a redefinition of the place of blacks in Ameri-
can society and of the very meaning of freedom in the American
republic.
287
The most important transforming objective of the revolution of 1860
was to eradicate an extreme form of a caste system called slavery.
2 8 Of
course, the chattel principle of slavery, upheld by the Court in Dred Scott
v. Sandford,2 s9 was the most obvious and readily objectionable manifesta-
tion of that system.290 But the emergence of the Black Codes following
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment demonstrated that the sys-
284. Id.
285. The overriding of President Johnson's veto of the Sherman Bill concerning readmis-
sion of the rebellious states constituted a resounding repudiation of Johnson's veto message
that, in Charles Fairman's words, "the sole objective in the Civil War ... had been to enforce
the Constitution" and that the political procedures specified in the Constitution "supplied all
that the country needed." FAIRMAN, supra note 226, at 308.
286. FONER, supra note 1, at 7.
287. Id. at 2-3.
288. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
289. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
290. In the words of Thomas W.C. Pennington (an escaped slave who received a Doctor of
Divinity from the University of Heidelberg while still legally a slave):
iTihe sin of slavery lies in the chattel principle, or relation.... The being of slavery,
its soul and body, lives and moves in the chattel principle, the property principle, the
bill of sale principle; the cart-whip, starvation, and nakedness, are its inevitable con-
sequences to a greater or lesser extent, warring with the dispositions of men.
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tem's scope was broader than the legalistic question of title to human
beings.2 91 This is the insight that the Supreme Court captured, and ulti-
mately imprisoned, in the phrase "badges and incidents of slavery. '292
The incidents of a caste system go beyond the specific legal disabilities
the Court has recognized under the Thirteenth Amendment. 293
b. The Principle's Reach
Modem scholars' reexamination of the Civil War Amendments in
an effort to restore them to their original revolutionary force provides
perspective on the reach of the caste-abolition principle. Akhil Reed
Amar, for example, argues forcefully that the Thirteenth Amendment is
a powerful redistributive provision, not dependent on a finding of state
action, that provides a sound constitutional basis for positive claims like
Joshua DeShaney's. 294  The system of domination, humiliation, and
abuse that marked the institution of slavery finds a modem counterpart
in child abuse, Amar contends, so that the Thirteenth Amendment pro-
vides a remedy for the "servitude" of abuse inflicted on Joshua by obli-
gating the state to intervene to protect him.295 Amar avoids reliance on
the Fourteenth Amendment because of its state action requirement, the
overworked and textually problematic nature of the Due Process Clause,
the failure of equal protection doctrine to take seriously the concept of
"protection," and the potentially voracious demands of a robust "equal-
James W.C. Pennington, The Fugitive Blacksmith, or Events in the History of James WC.
Pennington, GREAT SLAVE NARRATIVES 196 (Ama Bontempts ed., 1969) [hereinafter SLAVE
NARRATIVES].
291. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 70-71.
292. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). For a modem example of the
Supreme Court's constricted interpretation of that phrase, see City of Memphis v. Greene, 451
U.S. 100 (1981) (finding no badge or incident of slavery in the closing of a city street through a
white neighborhood, forcing residents of a nearby black neighborhood to go around the white
community).
293. Those disabilities include prohibitions on owning and conveying real estate, bringing
and defending civil actions, and testifying as a witness in court. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Solicitor General Phillips, arguing before the Court in The Civil
Rights Cases, emphasized the role of social structures in perpetuating the caste system:
Granting that by involuntary servitude, as prohibited in the Thirteenth Amendment,
is intended some institution, viz., custom, etc., of that sort, and not primarily mere
scattered trespasses against liberty committed by private persons, yet, considering
what must be the social tendency in at least large parts of the country, it is "appropri-
ate legislation" against such an institution to forbid any action by private persons
which in light of our history may reasonably be apprehended to tend, on account of
its being incidental to quasi public occupations, to create an institution.
109 U.S. at 7.
294. Akhil Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment
Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992).
295. Id.
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ity" principle as opposed to one demanding only minimal protection.2 9 6
Amar's is a useful starting point; but I would go further and derive
the caste-abolition principle from all three Civil War Amendments, at
least so far as that principle supports a claim for equal educational op-
portunity.297 First, all three amendments must be considered together to
appreciate fully the extent of the constitutional commitment to abolition
of the caste system, as Amar himself recognizes:
When the Reconstruction Amendments are viewed as a whole, a
radically different vision of society emerges. Precisely because the
Fifteenth Amendment gave former slaves the right to vote, and the
Fourteenth Amendment made them citizens by dint of their birth,
we should interpret the Thirteenth Amendment to guarantee each
American a certain minimum stake in society.
29 8
Second, all three amendments taken together form a more solid ba-
sis for a claim of equality of educational opportunity than any one taken
separately. Abolition of slavery; vesting of citizenship; guarantees of due
process, privileges or immunities, and equal protection; and extension of
the franchise all were necessary to bring former slaves out of their caste
status and into the remainder of American society.2 99 The Framers' rec-
ognition of this relationship is partly evidenced, for example, in the de-
bates over the Fourteenth Amendment that followed President Johnson's
veto of the second Freedman's Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights Bill of
18 66 .10 The Thirteenth Amendment certainly directs attention to the
296. IA
297. The Court's crabbed interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment apparently has
forced scholars like Amar to resourceful quests for fresh, "untainted" constitutional sources.
But advocates of recognition of a constitutional right to minimal entitlements already are nec-
essarily challenging prevailing conclusions about what the Constitution demands. Today's
Supreme Court seems no more likely to adopt Amar's Thirteenth Amendment argument than
it is to embrace Michelman's or Edelman's arguments under the Equal Protection Clause-or
my caste-abolition principle, for that matter. Critical discourse might as well also challenge
the Court's narrow conception of state action and equality that underlie the Court's impover-
ished paradigm.
298. Akhil R. Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitle-
ments, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 37, 40 (1990).
299. In this regard, the caste-abolition principle rests on a more solid textual foundation
than the "penumbras" and "emanations" that form the basis for the modem right to privacy.
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
300. See, for example, the history compiled by Justice Black in the appendix to his dissent
in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 92 (1947), in which he asserts that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the first eight amendments to the Constitution. For detailed consid-
eration of the incorporation problem, see Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); Wil-
liam W. Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "'Legislative History, " and the Constitutional Limitations
on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954); Alfred Avins, Incorporation of the Bill of
Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited, 6 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1968).
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caste problems of servitude, but it is not the sole constitutional measure
for remedying caste conditions.
In particular, the concept of equal protection of the laws is an essen-
tial component of the caste-abolition principle, which principle provides
a much richer frame of reference than does the Court's suspect
class/fundamental rights paradigm and its concomitant means-end ana-
lytical structure. The shortcoming of the Court's paradigm is evident,
for example, in Rodriguez As described above, the Court in that case
was able to acknowledge the necessity of education for full participation
in society and exercise of the fundamental rights to speak and to vote,
while denying any meaningful constitutional protection to equal educa-
tional opportunity itself.3" 1 The caste-abolition principle avoids this con-
tradiction by not depending on whether education is deemed a
"fundamental right" inferable from the text. Instead, the principle con-
siders the tendency of the challenged action or condition systematically
and grossly to disadvantage one group, and thus to create a caste. The
principle also avoids the excessive demands of strict egalitarianism be-
cause it is activated by inequalities of a severity and kind that tend to
create a caste society, rather than all distributive inequalities.3 "2
Further, the caste-abolition principle does not confine the operation
of the Equal Protection Clause to groups conveniently identified by indi-
cia of discreteness, such as race or gender. To be sure, African ethnicity
originally defined membership in the Antebellum slave caste; 30 3 but the
Court itself quickly realized 31 that the Civil War Amendments embody
a broader principle than protection of one race. The caste-abolition prin-
ciple examines the realities of a group's situation in society, rather than
simply the members' most superficial visible characteristics. Thus, con-
signing the underclass-perpetuating disadvantage of grossly inferior edu-
cational opportunity to the poorest school districts would raise serious
constitutional concerns under the caste-abolition principle even if the af-
fected group looked like an "amorphous class" in the Court's categorical
vision and was racially heterogeneous. The caste-abolition principle
would not tolerate race or gender discrimination either, however, be-
301. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
302. It is not immediately apparent why the potential for this kind of over-articulation
should be a basis for denying any vitality to an equality principle. The Court is capable of
applying other constitutional guarantees of individual right with less force than an absolutist
interpretation would require.
303. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
304. Eg., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The Court has rejected the argument
that evenhanded application of invidious discriminatory measures, e.g. punishing blacks and
whites alike for interracial marriages, insulates such measures from equal protection challenge.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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cause history teaches that discrimination along such lines is the caste-
creating condition par excellence.3 °5
c. The Principle's Interpretive Coherence
The caste-abolition principle's roots and branches are joined by a
solid trunk. In general, the caste-abolition principle complements and
overlaps the widely accepted representation-reinforcing principle. Delib-
erate constitutional efforts to empower the freedman were necessary both
to abolish the caste system of slavery and to establish representative de-
mocracy for a large segment of the people.306 Prohibiting social struc-
tures that threaten to return anyone to the powerlessness of a caste
society provides protection against a particularly pernicious form of rep-
resentation-defeating conditions, as Michelman's description of Ely's
principle illustrates.30 7
Next, the caste-abolition principle's imposition of an affirmative
constitutional obligation to remedy caste-creating conditions is consistent
with a coherent resolution of the positive rights and state action
problems. In addition to being internally contradictory, the Court's ap-
proach effectively rewrites the text of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. That text provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.308
It is the Privileges or Immunities Clause, not the Equal Protection
Clause, that expressly refers to "make or enforce any law." The Equal
Protection Clause is insulated from the modifying force of those words
by two semicolons and the Due Process Clause, which stands as an in-
dependent clause. The Equal Protection Clause in terms thus forbids
denial of equal protection by the state, not the making or enforcing of
laws that deny equal protection. As Edelman has pointed out,309 the
Court in other contexts has recognized, 310 and experience confirms,311
305. Judges, supra note 9.
306. See supra notes 294-305 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 264-67 and accompanying text.
308. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
309. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
310. On numerous occasions the Court has inferred legislative intent from legislative inac-
tion, thus according legislative silence the force of law. e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
311. See supra notes 217-26 and accompanying text (demonstrating impact of conservative
agenda's "masterly inactivity").
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that profound governmental impacts follow from legislative activity and
silence alike.
There is thus both textual and historical support for the conclusion
that the Fourteenth Amendment affirmatively obligates the state to pro-
tect persons against caste-creating conditions. First, the Court's insis-
tence on overt state misfeasance would revise the Equal Protection
Clause itself to read "nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protectionfrom the laws." "Of," however, is "used as a function
word indicating the object of an action denoted or implied by the preced-
ing noun."'2 Thus, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from
denying to persons an equal measure of the protection that the laws
could provide them, and is not limited to protecting persons equallyfrom
the laws themselves as the Court's doctrine implies. Second, Steven Hey-
man has recently shown how the Privileges or Immunities, Due Process,
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment embody a
positive obligation of protection that has roots in social contract theory,
common law tradition, and Framers' intent.313 The caste-abolition prin-
ciple requires the state to protect persons from conditions that tend to
force them into caste status. A state's failure to provide such protection,
whether arising from a governmental act or omission, offends the Equal
Protection Clause as interpreted under the caste-abolition principle.
The caste-abolition principle's equality norm also avoids some of the
difficulties of Fiss's group-disadvantaging principle. One problem with
his approach is that it contradicts the antidiscrimination principle, a
principle that resonates strongly with deeply held values and the notion
of evenhandedness implied by the idea of equality. Another problem is
that Fiss's principle does not really empower the least powerful, and thus
does not reach the core problem to which the Civil War Amendments
were addressed. This shortcoming is evident in the effect of affirmative
action programs in relation to the underclass.31 4
312. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1565 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1969).
313. Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 41 DuKE L.J. 507 (1991). Heyman describes the content of the obligation
of protection as including civil protection (the right of civil redress), criminal protection (the
right to share in the benefit of criminal laws to protect the security of life, liberty, and prop-
erty), and the prevention of injury (the right to prevention of private violence). Id. at 566-70.
This understanding is consistent with common definitions of "protection," which include: "the
act of protecting: the state or fact of being protected: shelter from danger or harm," and "the
oversight or support usu[ally] of one that is smaller and weaker... government [protection]
for small business ... her brother's [protection] was very welcome on the way home from
school." Id at 1822.
314. See supra notes 203-53 and accompanying text.
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The caste-abolition principle, by contrast, synthesizes both the an-
tidiscrimination and group-disadvantaging approaches and has the added
benefit of focusing on the underlying social problem rather than any par-
ticular government conduct. Satisfaction of the obligation thus depends
on remediation of caste conditions. As to institutional concerns, the
Court need only make a finding that caste conditions exist and order
their remediation. The more difficult details, resolution of which raises
the prudential concerns of separation of powers and federalism, may
largely be left to legislators and administrators.315 Of course, the key
question will be determining when such conditions exist. This Article
focuses on education because of its historical importance (denial of edu-
cation was a central tool in sustaining the Antebellum caste system), the
powerlessness of children, and the role of inequality in educational op-
portunity in perpetuating the caste-like condition of the underclass.
Finally, the caste-abolition principle finds support in the normative
traditions that permeate our national constitutional culture. First, it fits
within the resolution of the tension between liberty and equality de-
scribed by Grey. Society has the means, and thus the moral obligation,
to ensure the social survival of all its members without substantially in-
truding on the liberty of individuals.316
Second, the caste-abolition principle straddles the two traditions
most commonly associated with the American constitutional culture-
the liberal, possessive, individualist tradition and the civic republican,
communitarian tradition. It has been asserted that although the Framers
of the Constitution of 1789 recognized some convergence between indi-
vidualism and communitarianism, "the liberal tradition is so dominant
today that it has become difficult to appreciate the force of the civic re-
publican tradition."3 17 Yet civic republicanism may still have constitu-
tional lessons for today's society;31 and, as both Amar and Edelman
have argued, it substantiates a constitutional claim to minimal subsis-
tence. Under the republican tradition, institutions are designed to instill
civic virtue in citizens and "[p]roperty provides the independent founda-
tion that a citizen needs for proper consideration of the public inter-
est." '319 Without at least minimal sustenance and shelter, Amar and
Edelman observe, citizens have little basis for a stake in the community
315. See infra notes 450-80 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text.
317. MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 5-6 (1988).
318. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
319. TUSHNET, supra note 317, at 11.
from which to form civic virtues.3 2 ° One might also argue, as suggested
by the Lockean proviso, that at least a minimal amount of wealth redis-
tribution is necessary to preserve "a government of ordered liberty." '21
Converging on some aspects of republicanism, the liberal tradition not
only protects property, but in part also depends on distribution of prop-
erty as a means to preserve the independence of citizens; for it also de-
pends on the diffusion of power: "Widespread property holding gives
many people a stake in maintaining the order that secures their hold-
ings." '22 What has been said of property under either tradition would
apply with equal or greater force to education, which is a prerequisite in
today's society to the preservation of both civic virtue and liberty (as well
as an important tool for the acquisition of property).323
Once we accept the establishment of universal citizenship, as the
Fourteenth Amendment commands, the creation of a caste system of-
fends both traditions in important ways. Caste members by definition
are denied the stake in and access to society that republicanism requires
for development of civic virtue among all citizens;324 and the remainder
of society's toleration of caste conditions, no less than the active creation
of them, ought to count as among the most objectionable forms of civic
corruption. And a caste system effectively denies much of the liberty (at
least of opportunity) of citizens forced into the disadvantaged caste.
Such systems also threaten the "ordered liberty" of the favored classes,
as both the Civil War and modern urban violence vividly demonstrate.
320. Amar, supra note 298; Edelman, supra note 265; see also, Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue
and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986).
321. Tushnet describes our Constitution in those terms, borrowing a phrase from Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). TuSHNET, supra note 317, at 7.
322. TUSHNET, supra note 317, at 9.
323. See Allen W. Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right to Education Under
State Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 93-96 (1989) (education and republican theory).
As Amar has observed,
The idea of popular education resurfaces over and over in the Bill of Rights. As we
have seen, each of the three intermediate associations it safeguards-church, militia,
and jury-was understood as a device for educating ordinary Citizens about their
rights and duties. The erosion of these institutions over the last 200 years has created
a vacuum at the center of our Constitution. Thus, one of the main tasks for today's
constitutional theorists should be to explore ways this vacuum might be filled. Revi-
siting the Rodriguez case and establishing a constitutional right to public education
might be one place to start. An uneducated populace cannot be a truly sovereign
populace.
Amar, supra note 7, at 1210.
324. For an anecdotal description of the alienated attitudinal correlates of underclass sta-
tus, see KENNETH AULETTA, THE UNDERCLASS (1982). For a discussion of the adverse im-
pact of life in the impoverished ghetto on the development of civic values, see Hochshild, supra
note 209, at 563-70.
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The caste-abolition principle thus seeks to synthesize individualism
and communitarianism into an autonomy-respecting form of caring con-
nectedness to one another.325 Liberty and civic responsibility need not
always be incompatible. In other words, recognition of a value of indi-
vidual liberty need not require indifference to the social injustice of gross
inequalities in the distribution of wealth and power, and programs pre-
mised on collectivistic justifications are not necessarily morally superior
or even adequate.326 A caring connectedness, properly articulated,
would recognize our intrinsic worth as individuals and would respect our
autonomy to find our own meaning and fulfillment in life,327 yet it would
also require that we make sacrifices to take care of our neighbors when
necessary.328
325. For consideration of this ethic in other contexts, see Judges, supra note 9; Donald P.
Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice (forthcoming).
326. See Judges, supra note 9.
327. This value of self-fulfillment or self-fulfillment as a political norm has been described
in MICHAEL PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988); considered an animating consti-
tutional principle in the First Amendment area, THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE-
DOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring); MARTIN REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 11
(1984); and regarded as a constituent element of civic virtue in Aristotle, Nichomachean Eth-
ics, in ON MAN IN THE UNIVERSE 85 (W.J. Black ed. & J.E.C. Weldon trans., 1943). For a
qualification in the First Amendment context, see C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization:
Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
646 (1982); David Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech, 18 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 541 (1991).
328. Robin West's recent analysis of Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel's theory of re-
sponsibility-based "postdemocratic" individualism offers valuable insights to help us bridge
this conceptual gulf. Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV.
43, 71 (1990). She contrasts the modern vision of liberal legalism's atomistic individual focus
with Havel's conception of civic responsibility:
[I]n liberal legalism's conception of public life, a central feature of "rights" is that
they "insulate" the subjectivity of the individual right-holder against the judgment,
scrutiny, sympathy, or simple understanding of presumably hostile dictators, majori-
ties, communities, or fellow citizens. For the liberal legalist, the indihidual's posses-
sion of a "right" must be totally independent of the moral worthiness of the right-
holder.... Nevertheless, this insularity has its cost. Precisely because of its insis-
tence on insularity, liberal legalism demands of the citizen almost none of the so-
called "civic virtues": mercy, compassion, public involvement, fellow-feeling, sym-
pathy, or, simply, love .... By contrast, Havelian postdemocratic liberalism demands
of the citizen a great deal of communitarian virtues of compassion, sympathy, fellow-
feeling, and love.
Id. at 71-72 (footnotes omitted). This is not, however, simply collectivism in mufti. Instead,
"Havelian liberalism views the individual rather than the group, the community, or any other
social structure as the basic moral unit of political society.... In short, Havel is as skeptical of
collective politics as he is of constitutionalism as a guardian of individual freedom." Id. at 76.
West urges not the displacement of the rights-based form of American constitutional liber-
alism by Havelian postdemocratic liberalism, but rather the examination of "our own premises
from Havel's point of view." Id. at 78. That perspective insists that "[a] meaningful commit-
ment to individual freedom surely requires that individuals-not legislative process or the
The viability of this interpretive principle of caste abolition depends
on the salience of the conditions that tend to recreate a caste system.
And its susceptibility to judicially manageable implementation is a ques-
tion best considered in terms of its remedial shape. The following sub-
section briefly describes such conditions and concludes that the caste-
abolition principle satisfies the criteria for interpretive legitimacy de-
scribed above. Part IV's discussion of remedies takes up the problem of
workability.
2. Incidents of a Caste System
Amar's insight is that we must look deeply into the nature of the
social system that the Civil War sought to abolish to identify the animat-
ing principle behind the amendments resulting from that war. Here the
critical race theorists also make a valuable contribution: No interpreta-
tion of the Civil War Amendments can be meaningful without considera-
tion of the perspective of the class of persons whose status lay at the
center of that conflict.
32 9
Slave narratives indicate that the core attributes of that social insti-
tution were the utter dehumanization of its victims by systematic domi-
nation of key aspects of their lives, a crushing deprivation of their
personal integrity and dignity, and their effective exclusion from the re-
mainder of society.330 It must be understood that a caste system is a
collection of conditions and results, not intentions and actions. Slavery
demonstrates that actual malice toward the victims is not a necessary
element of such a system. Instead, "[t]he dehumanization process was
less a conscious and deliberate attempt on the part of the slaveholders to
deprive the slaves of their humanity than it was a natural consequence of
the system. ' 331 Second, as Amar has pointed out, it is not necessary to
machinations of the rule of law-bear the responsibility for the personal and public decisions
they make." Id. at 79.
329. The most comprehensive collection of slave narratives is the nineteen-volume series
THE FEDERAL WRITERS' PROJECT OF THE WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION, THE
AMERICAN SLAVE: A COMPOSITE AUTOBIOGRAPHY (George P. Rawick ed., 1941; reprint
1972). More easily accessible collections, largely taken from the Writers' Project, include:
SLAVE NARRATIVES, supra note 290; SLAVE TESTIMONY: TwO CENTURIES OF LETTERS,
SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS, AND AUTOBIOGRAPHIES (John W. Blassingame ed., 1977) [hereinaf-
ter SLAVE TESTIMONY]; THE SLAVE'S NARRATIVES (Charles T. Davis & Henry Louis Gates,
Jr., eds., 1985); SOLOMON NORTHRUP, TWELVE YEARS A SLAVE, NARRATIVE OF SOLOMON
NORTHRUP, A CITIZEN OF NEW YORK, KIDNAPPED IN WASHINGTON CITY IN 1841, AND
RESCUED IN 1853, FROM A COTTON PLANTATION NEAR THE RED RIVER IN LOUISIANA (Sue
Eakin & Joseph Logsdon eds., 1968); STANLEY FELDSTEIN, ONCE A SLAVE: THE SLAVES'
VIEW OF SLAVERY (1971).
330. See generally, FELDSTEIN, supra note 329, at 41-86.
331. I. at 41. Feldstein goes on to explain:
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the establishment of such a system that the rational self-interest of the
dominant party be furthered by its abuses. The narratives are full of
examples of masters or their agents viciously and senselessly abusing and
even destroying their own "property" for no apparent pecuniary
advantage.
332
Next, this dehumanization process did not depend on hard treat-
ment of the slave by the master, although the treatment often was hard
indeed. Slaves of "kind" and "generous" masters were slaves nonetheless
and therefore suffered the dehumanizing force of that caste status. Ac-
cording to escaped slave Lewis Clarke, speaking eloquently at an aboli-
tionists' rally in 1842, degradation and not physical deprivation was the
worst aspect of the institution:
I want to tell you, not so much about the slave's being whipped, or
about his not having enough to eat; though I could tell you enough
of that, too, if I had a chance. But what I want to make you under-
stand is, that A SLAVE CAN'T BE A MAN! Slavery makes a
brute of a man; I don't mean that he is a brute, neither. But a
horse can't speak; and [the slave] daren't. He daren't tell what's in
him; it wouldn't do. The worse he's treated, the more he must
smile; the more he's kicked the lower he must crawl.333
The abject powerlessness of the slaves' position is wrenchingly illustrated
by their attempts to purchase their own freedom or the freedom of loved
The basic purpose of the slave system was surely not a grand design to perpetuate a
horrendous crime on the black race. Notwithstanding the psychological motivations
that are the source of racial prejudice and, later on, the fear of a black revolt against
the masters, the system was designed primarily for its economic advantages to the
masters. Nevertheless, in order to perpetuate the institution, and simply to make it
work, it was essential that a strict code of rules, regulations, punishments, and con-
trols be established and followed. The enforcement of these rules resulted in what I
call the slave's dehumanization-his eventual inability to fulfill his natural human
desires, needs, instincts and to maintain his integrity and dignity.
Id. at 41-42.
332. A few vivid examples will suffice. Former slave Moses Roper reports that a slave-
owner paid $550 to recover an escaped slave (who had fled his master's threat of 500 lashes for
preaching to fellow slaves), whom he promptly burned alive at the stake. Letter from Moses
Roper to Thomas Price, London (June 27, 1936) reprinted in SLAVE TESTIMONY supra note
329, at 23-26. Roper also tells of a slaveowner flogging a slave at intervals from eight a.m.
until five p.m. The slave's offense was "working on the Sabbath," which he had done to com-
plete Saturday's assigned chores for fear of receiving one hundred lashes. Id. Mr. Johnson, a
former slave of Judge Jabez Bowen, Jr., judge of the Eastern Circuit of Georgia (1802-04),
related at an abolition meeting in 1837 an account of another slaveowner who casually decapi-
tated a slave girl for spilling gravy on her mistress at a dinner with Judge Bowen. SLAVE
TESTIMONY, supra note 329, at 124-28 (by way, of corroboration, the editors note that Judge
Bowen's impassioned speech to the Chatham County grand jury advocating emancipation,
which resulted in his own imprisonment and impeachment for fomenting insurrection, may
have resulted from his having witnessed the event described by Johnson).
333. SLAVE TESTIMONY, supra note 329, at 152.
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ones.334 For slave women and girls, the degradation and exploitation
was often absolute; and frequently slave men were reduced to the emas-
culating position of beseeching sympathetic whites for the means to res-
cue their wives and daughters from being sold into a kind of
uncompensated prostitution.335 Other graphic indicia of former slaves'
sense of powerlessness were their fierce expressions of independence once
they attained liberty and autonomy, and the deprivations they were will-
ing to endure to reach freedom.336
Of course, the physical conditions facing slaves were inhuman.
Families were generally commingled and crowded into crude cabins.
Their food rations were chronically inadequate, forcing them to forage
and to appropriate from the slaveowner. Clothing allocations also were
inadequate. Working and living conditions often exposed the slaves to
grievous injury, disease, exhaustion, and, of course, flogging. 337 Beatings
334. See e.g. SLAVE TESIMONY, supra note 329, at 84 (citing May 13, 1850, letter from
James R. Starkey to Gerard Hallock requesting $450 to buy his freedom to emigrate to
Liberia).
335. See eg., Pennington, supra note 290, at 193, 199-200 (describing Paul Edmondson's
successful effort to raise $2,250 with which to purchase his daughters Mary Jane and Emily
Cathrine, fourteen and sixteen years of age, who were to be sold for purposes of prostitution).
Another example is Harriet Newby's entreaties to her husband:
I want you to buy me as soon as possible, for if you do not get me some body else
will.... It is said Master is in want of monney. If so, I know not what time he may
sell me, an then all my bright hops of the futer are blasted, for their has ben one
bright hope to cheer me in all my troubles, that is to be with you, for if I thought I
shoul never see you this earth would have no charms for me. Do all you can for me,
witch I have no doubt you will.
SLAVE TESTIMONY, supra note 329, at 117-18 (Aug. 16, 1859, letter from Harriet to Danger-
field Newby). Archer Alexander (who supplied intelligence to Union forces while still a slave,
ultimately escaped to avoid execution as a "traitor," and served as the artist's model for the
slave kneeling at Lincoln's feet at the Freedom Memorial) attempted to buy his wife in 1863.
When her owner said she "would never get free only at the point of the Baynot," he persuaded
a German farmer to help his wife and daughter to escape. Id. at 119 n.69 (Nov. 16, 1863,
letter from Louisa to Archer Alexander). Lewis Clarke described examples of the sexual ex-
ploitation of slave women and girls, including his own sister, by their owners. He concluded:
I can't tell these respectable people as much as I would like to, but jest think for a
minute how you would like to have your sisters, and your wives, and your daughters,
completely, teetotally, and altogether, in the power of a master. -You can picture
to yourselves a little, how you would feel; but on, if I could tell you! A slave woman
an't allowed to respect herself, if she would.
SLAVE TESTIMONY, supra note 329, at 156 (emphasis in original).
336. Well-known examples are the letters of Henry Bibb (1815-54) to his former owners
and vendors. For a selection of his letters, see SLAVE TESTIMONY, supra note 329 at 48-57.
Bibb attempted many escapes and had six different owners. He finally attained freedom in
Detroit in 1840, and then moved to Canada upon passage of the Fugitive Slave Law in 1850.
Id. at 48 n.43.
337. For a description of living and working conditions, see FELDSTEIN, supra note 329, at
42-52.
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and killings were commonplace.33 Breakup of families was a notorious
and "integral part of the system."33 9 Mothers sometimes would even re-
sort to killing their own children and then themselves to avoid seeing
their offspring sold away.34°
The system's impact on children thus was especially acute. Narra-
tives reveal that their families were destroyed, they were malnourished,
and they were deprived of a fundamental sense of place in society. Sell-
ing of children or parents "down South" and harsh conditions cut chil-
dren off from their connection to both their past and contemporary social
existence:
About this time, I began to feel another evil of slavery-I mean the
want of parental care and attention. My parents were not able to
give any attention to their children during the day. I often suffered
much from hunger and other similar causes. To estimate the sad
state of a slave child, you must look at it as a helpless human being
thrown upon the world without the benefit of its natural guardians.
It is thrown into the world without a social circle to flee to for
hope, shelter, comfort, or instruction. The social circle, with all its
heaven-ordained blessings, is of the utmost importance to the
tender child; but of this, the slave child, however tender and deli-
cate, is robbed.341
Finally, and most pertinent to today's application of the caste-aboli-
tion principle, slavery further dehumanized children by cutting them off
from their future by denying them education. State laws and masters'
rules strictly forbade teaching slaves to read or to write.
To educate a slave was to make him discontented with slavery,
wrote [Frederick] Douglass, and to invest in him a power which
could open the treasuries of freedom. Thus, he reasoned, since the
object of the master was to maintain control over the slave, con-
stant vigilance was exercised to prevent anything which would mil-
itate against or endanger the stability of his authority. 42
338. See, e.g., supra note 332.
339. FELDSTEIN, supra note 329, at 56.
340. Id. at 58.
341. Pennington, supra note 290, at 207-08.
342. FELDSTEIN, supra note 329, at 61. Penalties for educating slaves were severe. "The
Georgia Narratives reported that the owners who caught their sons teaching slaves to read and
write would become so furious they would give their children severe beatings, and cut off the
thumb and forefinger of the slave. Such mutilation became known as the sign of attempted
education." Id. at 62. Illiteracy and ignorance likewise can be painful, as evidenced by es-
caped slave John Pennington's reactions when first exposed to formal education:
I now began to see, for the first time, the extent of the mischief slavery had done to
me. Twenty-one years of my life were gone, never again to return, and I was as
profoundly ignorant, comparatively, as a child of five years old. This was painful,
annoying, and humiliating in the extreme.... It is quite easy to imagine, then, what
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Once again, however, it is important to realize the indirect way in
which the dehumanization process occurred. In fact, recorded instances
of enforcement of governmental prohibitions on slave education are rare.
First, few freeman were inclined to violate such laws. Second, slaves'
living and working conditions left them scant wherewithal to tempt them
to violate those proscriptions.343 Thus, although a de jure ban on educa-
tion existed, the deprivation resulted largely from de facto forces arising
out of the entire social framework.
The foregoing overview of antebellum caste conditions informs the
content of the caste-abolition principle. The Civil War Amendments ar-
ticulate the social revolution undertaken in the Civil War. That revolu-
tion would abolish the caste system prevalent in the South, the chief
incident of which was the profound dehumanization and disempower-
ment of its victims. Such dehumanization can be inflicted by pervasive
social structures quite apart from positive legislative enactments, individ-
ual or collective intent, or a discernable net benefit to any particular
party. Among the most vulnerable victims of the caste system were the
children, and an important vector for trapping them within their caste
status was the systematic denial of education-although, once again, that
deprivation could and did occur without actual intervention by state
authorities.
Considered as an expression of the constitutional response to the
range of dehumanizing conditions called slavery, the caste-abolition prin-
ciple satisfies the interpretive demand mentioned above. It finds a com-
fortable footing in the text and history of three closely related
amendments. It identifies a unifying purpose behind those amendments
that is consistent with a national commitment so strong that the United
States was willing to endure the bloodiest war in our history for its ac-
complishment. That kind of historical context provides an especially
compelling claim on subsequent generations. Moreover, the caste-aboli-
tion principle is congruent with the widely accepted representation-rein-
forcing and antidiscrimination principles. Further, enforcement of the
caste-abolition principle does not depend on a finding of direct state ac-
tion. Instead, that principle imposes an affirmative duty on government
to provide protection from the conditions that threaten to recreate the
caste system; and one especially potent kind of protection is the empow-
ering force of adequate educational opportunity. Finally, the caste-aboli-
was the state of my mind, having been reared in total moral midnight; it was a sad
picture of mental and spiritual darkness.
Pennington, supra note 290, at 237.
343. FELDSTEIN, supra note 329, at 61.
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tion principle is strongly connected to the traditions of our normative
political culture. Consideration of the adequacy and manageability of
the caste-abolition principle as a judicial implement is taken up in the
following Part, which discusses application of the principle to the ine-
quality of educational opportunity facing today's underclass children.
IV. Application of the Caste-Abolition Principle to
Disadvantaged Neighborhoods and Equality of
Educational Opportunity
This Part contends that a look at today's underclass, and especially
its children, finds conditions of dehumanization, powerlessness, and ex-
clusion severe enough to recreate a caste society in violation of the Civil
War Amendments. These people face dehumanizing conditions of pov-
erty, joblessness, crime, welfare dependency, drug addiction, inadequate
health care, and broken families-a combination that leaves them in a
state of chronic powerlessness relative to the rest of society. As the gap
widens between the richest and poorest classes in America, and as the
poor become even more desperately poor in absolute terms, the under-
class's status becomes ever more marginal and its plight becomes ever
more hopeless. Like the members of the antebellum slave caste, a few
lucky individuals manage to escape through rare good fortune or almost
superhuman effort, but most are locked into their status by an over-
whelming combination of adverse social forces. And the growing power
of the dominant class ensures the preservation of social, economic, and
legal institutions that contribute to such extreme disparity-including
the greatly unequal distribution of educational resources. 3"
A. The Underclass
The United States now leads all other major industrial nations in the
inequality of wealth distribution, and the gap is widening. 345 For exam-
ple, the percentage of money income received by the poorest quintile has
fallen steadily from 5.6% in 1969 to 4.6% in 1988, while the richest
quintile's share has increased steadily from 40.6% to 445.346 Poverty is
344. See supra note 225 (noting that even neoconservatives, such as Charles Murray, are
concerned with the increasing marginalization of the underclass).
345. See generally PHILLIPS, supra note 225, at 11.
346. Id. at 13 (citing U.S. Census Bureau data). The disparity is even more striking when
stated in dollar terms. Between 1977 and 1987,
the average after-tax family income of the lowest 10 percent, in current dollars, fell
from $3,528 to $3,157. That's a 10.5 percent drop. During the same period, average
family income of the top 10 percent increased from $70,459 to $89,783-up 24.4
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nothing new to America, and its cities have had ghettos for over a cen-
tury. But
[d]espite a high rate of poverty in ghetto neighborhoods through-
out the first half of the twentieth century, rates of inner-city job-
lessness, teenage pregnancies, out-of-wedlock births, female-
headed families, welfare dependency, and serious crime were sig-
nificantly lower than in later years and did not reach catastrophic
proportions until the mid-1970s.347
This new American "underclass"34 is not merely poor. Its members
face an overwhelming combination of socioeconomic problems-includ-
ing long-term unemployment and unemployability, street crime and
other antisocial behavior, drug dependency, residential segregation, bro-
ken families, chronic poverty, and welfare dependency-that trap them
"in an intergenerational cycle of dysfunction and self-destruction
percent. The incomes of the top 1 percent, which were "only" $174,498 in 1977, are
up to $303,900-a whopping 74.2 percent increase over the decade.
Id. at 14 (quoting Gap Grows Between Rich, Poor, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 16, 1988).
Other data reflect a 14.8% decrease (from $4,113 to $3,504) in the average income of the
lowest decile between 1977 and 1988. Id at 7 (citing Urban Institute, Challenge to Leader-
ship). Thus, not only is the gap enormous, but the depth of poverty faced by persons at the
' bottom is almost unimaginable to middle-class Americans (let alone persons on the high end of
the income scale).
347. WILSON, supra note 210, at 3 (1987).
348. Use of the term "underclass" has provoked objection from some liberal scholars in
part because of its associations with the victim-blaming "culture of poverty" explanation of-
fered by neoconservatives. See, eg., Herbert J. Gans, Fighting the Biases Embedded in Social
Concepts of the Poor, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 8, 1992, at A56; Hochshild, supra note
209. In my view, this kind of sterile debate over labels and symbolism exemplifies the manner
in which liberals sometimes spike their own cannon and thus unwittingly advance the con-
servative mission of preserving the status quo. The word "underclass" does convey the image
of marginalization relevant to the group it describes, is not inherently pejorative, and finds
general currency in the social science literature. One wonders whether, instead of diverting
discourse into this kind of rhetorical cul-de-sac, we might better spend our energy searching
for ways concretely to solve social problems as profound as the plight of underclass children.
According to Paul E. Peterson,
underclass is a word that can be used by conservatives, liberals, and radicals
alike.... But underclass, like lumpen proletariat, is also a suitable concept for those
who, like Karl Marx, want to identify a group shaped and dominated by society's
economic and political forces but who have no productive role. And underclass is
acceptable to some liberals who somewhat ambiguously refuse to choose between
these contrasting images but who nonetheless wish to distinguish between the main-
stream of working-class and middle-class America and those who seem separate from
or marginal to that society. But, above all, the concept has been called back into the
social science lexicon because it offers an explanation for the paradox of poverty in an
otherwise affluent society that seems to have made strenuous efforts to eradicate this
problem.
Paul E. Peterson, The Urban Underclass and the Poverty Paradox, in THE URBAN UNDER-
CLASS 3-4 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
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... . And, although analysts disagree about the underclass's precise
ethnic composition, it consists of a disproportionate number of blacks
and Hispanics.35 °
Wilson describes how the social transformation of the inner city has
left the underclass isolated in pockets of extreme poverty and despair.
349. Roy L. Brooks, The Ecology of Inequality: The Rise of the African-American Under-
class, 8 HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 1, 4 (1991).
350. Id. Some data illustrate the magnitude of this crisis. Wilson reports the alarming
increase in inner-city crime, poverty, family dissolution, welfare dependency, and underclass
isolation. For example, homicide rates increased in Chicago from 195 in 1965 to 970 in 1974
(201%), and most were intraracial. WILSON, supra note 210, at 22-23. Wilson reports that in
1983, 98% of the perpetrators of black homicide were black, 81% of the perpetrators of His-
panic homicide were Hispanic, and 52% of the perpetrators of white homicide were white. Id
at 25. Crime rates correlate strongly with socioeconomic class: violent crime is disproportion-
ately concentrated in disadvantaged neighborhoods. In 1980, 11% of Chicago's homicides,
9% of its rapes, and 10% of its aggravated assaults were committed in the Robert Taylor
Homes public housing project, which housed a mere 0.5% of the city's population. Id. at 25
(citing N. Sheppard, Jr., Chicago Project Dwellers Live Under Siege, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1980,
at A14).
Welfare dependency and dislocation of families also characterize the inner-city under-
class. For example, in 1983, the Chicago Housing Authority's projects contained 92% single-
parent families (overwhelmingly female-headed); and 80% of the inhabitants received Aid to
Families with Dependent Children. WILSON, supra note 210, at 26-27; see also AUL=rrA,
supra note 209, at 38-39. Between 1970 and 1984, the number of female-headed households
with one or more of their children present in the home increased 77% in the United States.
This translates to even more severe poverty, as the median income of black female-headed
families was only $7,999 (as compared to $21,840 for black two-parent families and $27,286
for all two-parent families). WILSON, supra note 210, at 26-27. Further, "of the roughly 3.6
million families that reported incomes of less than $5,000 [in 1983], 57 percent were headed by
women." Id. at 27 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
SERIES P-60, No. 146, MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND INDIVIDUALS IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1983 (1985)). Unemployment figures are devastating, especially for
black males. Between 1960 and 1984, black males' participation in the civilian labor force
declined substantially (particularly for 16-17 year-olds): for 16-17 year-olds, the rate dropped
from 45.6% to 27.0%; for 18-19 year-olds, from 71.2% to 55.4%; for 20-24 year-olds, from
90.4% to 77.2%; and for 25-34 year-olds, from 96.2% to 88.2%. Id. at 42. Wilson further
reports that
the percentage of black male youth who are employed has sharply and steadily de-
clined since 1955, whereas among white males it has increased only slightly for all
categories. The fact that only 58 percent of all black young adult males, 34 percent
of all black males aged eighteen to nineteen, and 16 percent of those aged sixteen to
seventeen were employed in 1984 reveals a problem ofjoblessness for young black
men that has reached catastrophic proportions.
Id. at 43. More recent data report that
[by] the summer of 1988, 45.3 percent of New York city residents over the age of
sixteen could not be counted as labor force participants because of poverty, lack of
skills, drug use, apathy or other problems. Similar circumstances were reported in
Detroit and Baltimore, while the ratio of unaccountables for the nation as a whole
was 34.5 percent.
PHILLIPS, supra note 225, at 20 (citing 45 Percent of New Yorkers Are Outside Labor Force,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1988, at Al).
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Despite an overall decline in urban populations across America and in its
largest cities, the number of persons (overwhelmingly minority) living in
urban poverty areas has skyrocketed.351 Other researchers have docu-
mented a persistent pattern of residential segregation along racial
lines.352
Wilson cites a complex combination of factors contributing to the
emergence of an American underclass-factors mostly beyond its
control:
[H]istorical discrimination and a migration to large metropolises
that kept the urban minority population relatively young created a
problem of weak labor force attachment among urban blacks and,
especially since 1970, made them particularly vulnerable to the in-
dustrial and geographic changes in the economy. The shift from
goods-producing to service-producing industries, the increasing po-
larization of the labor market into low-wage and high-wage sec-
tors, innovations in technology, the relocation of manufacturing
industries out of central cities, and periodic recessions have forced
up the rate of black joblessness ... despite the passage of antidis-
crimination legislation and the creation of affirmative action pro-
grams. The rise in joblessness has in turn helped trigger an
increase in the concentrations of poor people, a growing number of
poor single-parent families, and an increase in welfare
dependency.
353
These problems have become concentrated in the ghetto, where the un-
derclass suffers from "joblessness reinforced by growing social isola-
tion.' '354 Out-migration of working-class and middle-class black families
has "removed an important social buffer that once deflected the full im-
pact of the kind of prolonged high levels of joblessness in these neighbor-
hoods that has stemmed from uneven economic growth and periodic
recessions. ' 35 Wilson explains that these
351. For example, although the total urban population in the United States declined by 5%
between 1970 and 1980, the number of persons living in urban poverty areas increased by more
than 20%. In the five largest American cities during this period, despite an overall 9% de-
crease the population living in poverty areas increased by 40%, by 69% in high poverty areas,
and by a breathtaking 161% in extreme poverty areas. WILSON, supra note 210, at 46. The
five cities are New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, and Los Angeles. A high poverty
area is defined as having a poverty rate of at least 30%, and an extreme poverty area has a
poverty rate of at least 40%. Id. The poor black population in extreme poverty areas soared
by 164%. Id
352. Douglas Massey & Mitchell L. Eggers, The Ecology of Inequality: Minorities and the
Concentration of Poverty, 5 Am. J. Soc. 1153 (1990).
353. Wilson, supra note 210, at 594 (summarizing his conclusions).
354. Id. at 595.
355. Id. at 594. But see Massey & Eggers, supra note 352 (disputing the conclusion that
black middle class "flight" from the inner city caused concentration of urban poverty). One
analysis of the Massey and Eggers study concludes "the article does not really undermine the
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concentration effects, reflected, for example, in the residents' self-
limiting social dispositions, are created by inadequate access to jobs
and job networks, the lack of involvement in quality schools, the
unavailability of suitable [steadily employed] marriage partners,
and lack of exposure to informal "mainstream" social networks
and conventional role models. 6
Wilson's work has prompted renewed scholarly attention to the un-
derclass issue. Recent research leads to two conclusions. First, the "cul-
ture of poverty" hypothesis of the neoconservatives is empirically
suspect. Studies refute the contention that government assistance under-
mines willingness to work, and "do not support the claim of widespread
shiftlessness among inner-city parents." '357 To the contrary, recent re-
search "lends support to ...Wilson's claim . .. that many of the
problems of the inner city are the direct result of the loss of jobs in the
local labor markets. ' 358 Thus, "full employment is a powerful weapon
against poverty"; and the poor will work if given a meaningful opportu-
nity.3 59 Second, although some writers have challenged aspects of Wil-
[black exodus] theory. Massey and Eggers do not measure the degree of interclass social and
cultural interaction among African-Americans or disprove the exodus theory in any other
way." Brooks, supra note 349, at 13.
356. Wilson, supra note 210, at 595.
357. Marta Tienda & Haya Stier, Joblessness and Shiftlessness: Labor Force Activity in Chi-
cago's Inner City, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 348, at 135, 151: "Most of the
evidence showed that willingness to work was the norm in Chicago's inner city. We gathered
only limited evidence on discouragement, but the large share of unemployed parents who re-
ported wanting a job suggests that discouragement may be pervasive in Chicago's inner-city
neighborhoods." Id. at 151-52. See generally Peterson, supra note 348, at 14-15 (summarizing
studies rebutting Charles Murray's thesis, including the proposition that welfare programs
such as AFDC provide an incentive for "welfare motherhood"). See also Wilson, supra note
209, at 605 ("The problem for poor blacks is not one of a culture of poverty or of being so
devastated by racism that they have lost the will to work; rather, the problem is that our
economy is not organized to sustain tight labor market situations, and, therefore, gains that
minorities experience in a favorable economic climate are often wiped out when the economy
turns sour.").
358. Richard B. Freeman, Employment of Earnings of Disadvantaged Young Men in a La-
bor Shortage Economy, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 348, at 103, 119 (docu-
menting "strong link between area unemployment and the economic position of black
youths").
359. Paul Osterman, Gains from Growth?: The Impact of Full Employment on Poverty in
Boston, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 348, at 122, 127. Osterman concludes:
Full employment does in fact deliver many of the benefits its advocates have prom-
ised. Poverty rates fell substantially in Boston, and it is very clear that the poor did
respond to economic opportunity when it was offered. The sharp drop in the incidence
of poverty and the high percentage of the poor who are working undercuts the idea
that an active government social policy is debilitating.
Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
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son's account of the underclass dynamic,' 6° several recent studies,
including subsequent work by Wilson himself, substantiate the existence
of a socially and economically marginal and severely isolated urban sub-
population, which Wilson currently describes as the "ghetto poor.5
361
This refined sociological focus on the most extremely disadvantaged and
isolated class, and the support it provides for the existence of an under-
class dynamic, reinforces the relevance of underclass conditions to the
caste-abolition principle.
Other writers emphasize stigmatic factors to account for the emer-
gence of the underclass. Some studies focus on the lingering effects of
slavery, American apartheid, and societal discrimination.362 This history
of subordination and its consequences (in the form of chronic poverty
and unemployment, welfare dependency, and crime) has exacted its psy-
chological toll, especially on black males. It has been suggested, for ex-
ample, that this impact partly accounts for the high rate of intraracial
360. See, eg., Christopher Jencks, Is the American Underclass Growing?, in THE URBAN
UNDERCLASS, supra note 348, at 28. Jencks asserts that the underclass concept must be re-
fined to be useful, because according to his research "while economic conditions began to
deteriorate for less skilled workers in the 1970s, most of the other problems that led Americans
to start talking about an underclass followed different trajectories." Id at 93-94. Jencks con-
cludes that the problems of male joblessness and unwed parenthood have worsened, problems
of welfare dependency and violence have levelled off, problems of academic performance
(graduation rates and basic skills test performance) have lessened, and problems of teenage
pregnancy and poverty have lessened. Id at 94-95. Jencks' conclusions, however, have only
limited relevance to Wilson's hypothesis because they are based on national samples and do
not focus on conditions in the inner city. See Peterson, supra note 347 at 22.
361. William Wilson, Public Policy Research and the Truly Disadvantaged, in THE URBAN
UNDERCLASS supra note 348, at 460; Paul A. Jargowsky & Mary Jo Bane, Ghetto Poverty in
the United States, 1970-1980, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 348, at 235; Freeman,
supra note 358; Osterman, supra note 359; Tienda & Stier, supra note 357; Peterson, supra note
348.
362. As one writer recently observed, at least part of the underclass dynamic was foreseen
more than two decades ago:
In its 1968 report on the causes of America's race riots, the National Advisory Com-
mission on Civil Disorders, better known as the Kerner Commission, cited some of
the lingering effects of slavery and Jim Crow: acute unemployment, high underem-
ployment, shabby housing, second-rate education, poor municipal services, inade-
quate welfare assistance, and, of course, racism. Significantly, the Commission said
that "segregation and poverty converge on the young to destroy opportunity and
enforce failure. Crime, addiction, dependency on welfare, and bitterness and resent-
ment against society in general and white society in particular are the result."
Brooks, supra note 349, at 7 (quoting NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, RE-
PORT 5 (1968)). Brooks argues that the successes of some African-Americans evidence excep-
tional triumph over the extreme adversity of discrimination, not the absence of
discrimination's debilitating effects, and he asserts that the experience of other ethnic minori-
ties in America tell us little about the unique experience of African-Americans, with its roots
in slavery. Id. at 7-8.
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violence among young black men.3 63
In sum, America has developed a large and growing class of persons
who are desperately poor and chronically unemployed, who are increas-
ingly alienated from mainstream American society, and whose prospects
for substantial improvement in their social and economic condition are
becoming ever more remote.364 As described above, "[t]he rates of crime
[especially violent crime], drug addiction, out-of-wedlock births, female-
headed families, and welfare dependency have risen dramatically in the
last several years, and they reflect a noticeably uneven distribution by
race."
365
While the plight of the black underclass in urban ghettos is decid-
edly acute, the problems of severe poverty are by no means confined to
the cities or to blacks. Unemployment, extreme poverty, and homeless-
ness are becoming increasingly common features of the rural landscape
as well.366 Most recently, the largest increases in poverty have been
among whites367 and Hispanics.3 68  Black poverty, however, has re-
mained steady at the highest level.369  And poverty on the whole in
America is increasing sharply after several years of moderate decline.370
This emergence of an American underclass threatens the perpetua-
tion of a caste society. Overwhelming conditions of poverty, joblessness,
and powerlessness lock the "ghetto poor" into their chronically disad-
vantaged circumstances. The following section discusses the role of ine-
363. Id. at 8-11.
364. While perhaps invisible to many American policy makers, the social dislocation of
these people is sufficiently obvious to foreign observers to provoke the conservative periodical
The Economist to criticize America's abject failure to address the problem. See supra note 203.
365. WILsON, supra note 210, at 20. For example, black unemployment in 1990 was twice
that for whites, 43% of black children are born into poverty, and approximately one-third of
African-Americans live in poverty. America's Blacks: A World Apart, ECONOMIST, Mar. 30,
1991, at 17. The average life expectancy of a white person born today exceeds that of a black
person by more than five years. Larry Lipman, Study: White, Black Life Spans Vary, ARK.
GAzETE-r, Apr. 9, 1991, at A3 (citing Health & Human Services Report). Black males have
significantly higher rates of heart disease, stroke, and cancer; and homicide is the leading cause
of death for black males between the ages of 15 and 34. Id. And African-Americans display
the highest levels of poverty concentration. Massey & Eggers, supra note 352, at 1174.
366. PHILLIPS, supra note 225, at 199-201.
367. The poverty rate for whites rose from 10% in 1989 to 10.7% in 1990. Jason DeParle,
Poverty Rate Rose Sharply Last Year as Incomes Slipped, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1991, at Al
(reporting U.S. Census Bureau data).
368. The rate for Hispanics increased from 26.2% to 28.1%. Id.
369. The black poverty rate for 1990 was 31.9%. Id.
370. It rose to 13.5% in 1990 from 12.8% the previous year. Id. Even sharper increases
are anticipated for 1991. An additional 2.1 million Americans fell below the poverty line
following an increase in unemployment from 5.3% to 5.5%. Unemployment for 1991 is ex-
pected to hit 6.7%. Id.
688
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quality of educational opportunity in creating and sustaining the
underclass's caste status.
B. Relation Between Equality of Educational Opportunity and the
Caste-Abolition Principle
1. Dual School Systems as Determinants of Class
A society's class structure is defined in significant part through its
educational system.3 71 James Coleman has compared the nineteenth-
century development of universal education in free (white) public schools
in the United States with England's dual school system, and has con-
cluded that denial of educational opportunity is an incident of a caste
society, even absent the chattel incident of slavery:
[T]he character of educational opportunity reflected the class
structure. In the United States, the public schools quickly became
the common school, attended by representatives of all classes; these
schools provided a common educational experience for most
American children-excluding only those upper-class children in
private schools, those poor who went to no schools, and Indians
and Southern blacks who were without schools. In England, how-
ever, the class system directly manifested itself through the
schools. The state-supported, or "board schools" as they were
called, became the schools of the laboring classes with a sharply
different curriculum from those voluntary schools which served
the upper and middle classes. [Coleman then describes the "strik-
ing duration of influence" of a dual school system.]
This comparison of England and the United States shows clearly
the impact of the class structure in society upon the concept of
educational opportunity in that society. In nineteenth-century
England, the idea of equality of educational opportunity was
hardly considered; the system was designed to provide differential
educational opportunity appropriate to one's station in life. In the
United States as well, the absence of educational opportunity for
blacks in the South arose from the caste and feudal structure of the
largely rural society.372
371. The underlying pattern of school differences is deep and structural. Wherever
one looks, there are strong and disconcerting relationships between race, income, and
every aspect of schooling. The relationships are so powerful that they enable reliable
prediction of the school's test scores without any information at all about the educa-
tional program in the school or the school district .... In metropolitan America the
schools that are poor are almost always minority schools.
Gary Orfield, Race, Income, and Educational Inequality, in COUNCIL OF CHIEF STATE
SCHOOL OFFICERS, SCHOOL SUCCESS FOR STUDENTS AT RISK 45, 52 (1988) [hereinafter
SCHOOL SUCCESS].
372. JAMES COLEMAN, EQUALITY AND ACHIEVEMENT IN EDUCATION 19 (1990).
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As was the case under slavery, grossly unequal access to educational
opportunity remains an especially powerful force confining the under-
class to its caste status in the United States today. Even the Supreme
Court acknowledges that education is a sine qua non of virtually every
important dimension for participation in society, including access to hon-
est and satisfying employment, socialization through acquisition of pre-
vailing civic and cultural values, development of analytical ability and
learning skills, and participation in the democratic process.373 Extreme
deprivation of equal educational opportunity offends the Constitution
under the caste-abolition principle not because there is an implied "fun-
damental" right to an education, but because denial of educational op-
portunity perpetuates the "caste and feudal structure" that the Civil War
Amendments sought to abolish. Brown addressed one inescapable mani-
festation of such a caste system: segregation by race. But Brown, based in
part on the stigmatic harm of racial segregation, was never clearly
grounded in a complete articulation of the caste-abolition principle.
That principle certainly embraces racial (and gender) discrimination; but
it also requires consideration of socioeconomic context (which could in-
lude non-race-based deprivations and those that do not arise from any
overt, intentional legislative act) in a way that Brown's progeny (espe-
cially Milliken) eschewed.374
2. Underclass Schools
There are at least two perspectives from which to consider whether
certain sectors of today's school-age population are exposed to the risk of
caste-creating gross disadvantages in educational opportunity. One ap-
proach is technocratic and quantitative. It looks at public inputs such as
per-pupil expenditures; the effect of nonpublic inputs such as parents'
socioeconomic status, family stability and support; and student motiva-
tion and aptitude. This approach also examines outputs such as student
achievement on tests measuring basic academic skills, and graduation
rates.3 75 Another approach is narrative and qualitative. It considers
how things really look from "the bottom." The narrative approach is
uniquely appropriate to the problem of caste because it conveys the se-
373. See supra note 98 and accompanying quotation from Brown I see also Bethel Sch.
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (citing Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979))
(objectives of public education include "inculcation of fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of democratic political system").
374. See supra notes 97-122 and accompanying text (school desegregation cases).
375. See generally COLEMAN, supra note 372, at 24-25.
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verity of the problem in a way that numbers cannot.3 76 Either approach
reveals school conditions that invoke the caste-abolition principle.
a. The Experts' Views
Although experts debate the extent and causes of the underclass
problem, 377 "[t]here is no disagreement . . . that disadvantaged youth
concentrated in our inner cities represent the most imperiled portion of
our growing population of at-risk students. ' 37 Thus, "[o]ur most acute
problems are found in our big cities and, especially, in inner-city ghetto
schools., 3 79  The literature reveals a range of explanations for those
problems. One study of poverty's impact on schools predicts that the
underclass process of concentration of poverty and erosion of community
will have a substantial adverse impact on education: "Among the possi-
ble consequences for education are a deterioration of the ability of fami-
lies and neighborhoods to supervise children and support the schools,
growing race and class isolation in inner-city schools, and a decline in the
financial resources available to big-city school districts. 3 80
Factors38 1 include inequality in allocation of economic resources;
38 2
discriminatory "tracking" and disciplinary policies;383 and "environmen-
tal" effects such as family, peer pressure, and out-of-school activities.384
376. As Kozol observes, "[t]he voices of children, frankly, had been missing from the
whole discussion." KozoL, supra note 3, at 5. For discussion of narrative's role in legal schol-
arship, see supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 349-70 and accompanying text.
378. William L. Boyd, "hat Makes Ghetto Schools Succeed or Fail?, 92 TCHRS. C. REC.
331, 332 (1991).
379. Ia at 331.
380. Kathryn M. Neckerman & William . Wilson, Schools and Poor Communities, in
SCHOOL SUCCESS, supra note 371, at 25.
381. Neckerman and Wilson present an overview of the literature documenting the effects
of a number of factors, including the tendency of educationally disadvantaged parents to "pass
on" educational disadvantage to their children; "[c]lass- or ethnicity-related differences in pat-
terns of language acquisition"; teenage pregnancy and delinquency; expectations of future dis-
crimination in the job market; school and class size and teacher credentials; tracking; "[c]lass
or ethnic tension between middle-class teachers and lower-class parents"; and "teachers'
preconceived notions about poor children's capacity to learn... ." Id. at 35.
382. Id.
383. JEANNIE OAKES, MULTIPLYING THE INEQUALITIES: THE EFFECTS OF RACE, SOCIAL
CLASS, AND TRACKING ON OPPORTUNITIES TO LEARN MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE, RAND
PUB. No. R-3928-NSF (1991).
384. See COLEMAN, supra note 372. For a meta-analysis of the research on the correlation
between socioeconomic status (SES) and educational achievement, see Karl R. White, The
Relation Between Socioeconomic Status and Academic Achievement, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL. 461
(1982). White concludes that SES is strongly correlated with academic achievement under
aggregated units of analysis, but only weakly correlated when the student is used as the unit of
analysis. He also finds that family characteristics, such as home atmosphere, are substantially
correlated with academic achievement.
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Gross disparities exist in many states (as a consequence of state educa-
tional finance schemes) between the per-pupil resources devoted to poor
inner-city children and their more affluent suburban counterparts. 8 5
James Coleman has argued that because liberty principles constrain the
extent of regulatory impact on private family conditions that affect aca-
demic achievement, reform ought to focus on maximizing the equalizing
force of public, in-school influences on achievement. 86 One review of
the literature found, not surprisingly, that the amount and quality of in-
struction (which may be in part a function of school resources) correlates
positively with achievement.38 7
Recent research has found a pervasive pattern of "tracking," in
which "high-ability students at low-socioeconomic status, high minority
[inner-city] schools may actually have fewer opportunities than low-abil-
ity students who attend more advantaged schools."3 Another study
found that "[a]s black incomes and education increase, black students
gain greater access to gifted classes," providing support for the "under-
class thesis" as an explanation for inequality in the delivery of educa-
tional services.3 89 That study also found a significant correlation between
black poverty and the imposition of school discipline (in the form of sus-
pension).390 As one writer observed, "[t]he difficulties of schools in
teaching poor, minority children and the negative effects of labeling and
teacher expectations have been well documented." '391
The environmental effect theory seeks to take into account a variety
of variables. Studies have found a correlation between academic achieve-
ment and students' financial status and home environment. 392 Other
mediators of achievement by at-risk, poor, minority students include pa-
385. See infra notes 431-39 and accompanying text.
386. COLEMAN, supra note 372, at 31-62.
387. Herbert J. Walberg, Improving the Productivity of America's Schools, EDUc. LEADER-
SHIP, May 1984, at 19, 23-24. This effect becomes more pronounced when this factor is com-
bined with other mediators. Id.
388. OAKEs, supra note 383, at vii.
389. Kenneth J. Meier et al., The Politics of Bureaucratic Discretion: Educational Access as
an Urban Service, 35 J. AM. POL. ScI. 153, 168 (1991).
390. Id at 171.
391. Arthur J. Reynolds, Early Schooling of Children at Risk; 28 AM. EDUc. RES. J. 393,
413 (1991) (citing James P. Comer, Effective Schools: Why They Rarely Exist for At-risk Ele-
mentary-School and Adolescent Students, in SCHOOL SUCCESS, supra note 371, at 72-88); see
also James P. Comer, Educating Poor Minority Children, 259 Sci. AM. 42 (1988).
392. One study found that, when school resources are held constant, much of the variance
in second-grade reading and mathematics could be attributed to non-school factors such as
students' eligibility for free or reduced-price lunch (as a measure of public financial support),
whether the students lived in a one- or two-parent household, whether the students left the
school during the year (as a measure of stability), and the percentage of minority students.
John Alspaugh, Out-of-School Environmental Factors and Elementary-School Achievement in
rental involvement (although the effects are inconsistent over time);
393
school mobility;394 and motivation, attitude, and aptitude. 395 Peer pres-
sure, stressful social circumstances, the absence of positive role models,
and cultural differences between the child's community and school exper-
iences (especially linguistic differences) also may play important roles in
educational performance.396
If, as seems indicated by the social science literature, educational
disadvantage stems from a combination of forces--deficiencies in
schools, families, and communities397-- then the problem is large and
likely to get worse. "Even conservative estimates put the proportion of
educationally disadvantaged students at one third. '398  Demographic
trends since 1984 indicate that "the size of the disadvantaged student
population will assume unprecedented proportions in the coming [thirty]
years. '399 First, educational disadvantage is in part a function of ethnic
status; and the proportion of minorities (especially Hispanics) to whites
is expected to increase dramatically so that by 2020 only one in two chil-
dren will be white (as opposed to three in four today); today's majority
may well become tomorrow's minority.' Second, the number of chil-
dren in poverty is expected to increase from 14.7 million to 20.1 million,
or 37%. 1 Third, the number of single-parent families is projected to
increase 30% (from 16.2 million to 21.1 million), and the number of chil-
dren living with poorly educated mothers is expected to increase by 56%
(from 13.6 million to 21.2 million).4 °2 The researchers making these pro-
jections conclude:
Mathematics and Reading, J. REs. & DEv. IN EDUC., Spring 1991, at 53; see also White, supra
note 384, at 474.
393. Reynolds, supra note 391, at 414. But see Karl R. White, Efficacy of Early Interven-
tion, 19 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 401 (1985-86) (meta-analysis of research results reported in litera-
ture does not support hypothesis that parental involvement improves efficacy of early
intervention program for disadvantaged children).
394. Reynolds, supra note 391 at 415; Alspaugh, supra note 392, at 53.
395. Reynolds, supra note 391, at 413-14; Walberg, supra note 387, at 19.
396. E-g., Boyd, supra note 378, at 347-49; Charles Whitaker, Do Black Males Need Spe-
cial Schools?, EBONY, Mar. 1991, at 17; Shirley Brice Heath, Oral and Literate Traditions
Among Black Americans Living in Poverty, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 367 (1989).
397. This is the definition of educational disadvantage adopted by some researchers. E.g.,
Aaron M. Pallas et al., The Changing Nature of the Disadvantaged Population: Current
Dimensions and Future Trends, EDuc. REs. June-July 1989, at 16.
398. Id. at 18. This estimate is based on examination of background indicators and Na-
tional Assessment of Educational Progress reading test scores.
399. Id. at 21.
400. Id. at 19.
401. Id. Indeed, that prediction appears to be rapidly materializing as the poverty rate for
children rose from 19.6% in 1989 to 20.6% in 1990. DeParle, supra note 367.
402. Pallas et al., supra note 397, at 19-20.
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Failure to anticipate the coming changes in the composition of the
student population and to plan appropriate responses will leave us
not with the same educational problems we face today, but with
problems so severe and widespread as to threaten our economic
welfare and even our social and political stability." 3
According to a recent report of the Children's Defense Fund, child
poverty has both widened and deepened since the 1970s, and its charac-
teristics are changing. Almost 5 million American children live in fami-
lies with annual incomes at half the poverty level (less than $6,338). 4
Although blacks make up the largest ethnic group in proportion to their
share of the population, poverty is spreading to other ethnic groups as
well, with two out of three poor children being white, Latino, Asian, or
Native American." Further, this poverty is not confined to the central
city, to welfare recipients, or to female-headed households. A higher per-
centage of poor children live outside the inner city in families whose larg-
est source of income is wages rather than welfare, and two in five live in
families with the father present." 6 Finally, and most tragically, the most
rapidly growing segment of the poor child population is under six years
old-the most "vulnerable to developmental delay and damage caused by
inadequate nutrition or health care or poor living conditions." 7 The
report concludes that if the recession and recovery patterns of the 1980s
are duplicated in the 1990s, the child poverty rate will top 22.8% by the
year 2000.408
b. Narratives
In his recent book, Savage Inequalities, Jonathan Kozol sets forth
the results of his personal investigation of schools in thirty disadvantaged
neighborhoods across the country, including New York City, Chicago,
East St. Louis, Camden, Washington, D.C., and San Antonio. What he
found was a pervasive pattern of deeply segregated, glaringly inferior
school systems where "social policy has been turned back almost one
hundred years.""
403. Id. at 21.
404. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND REPORT, CHILD POVERTY IN AMERICA 2 (1991).
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 7.
408. Id. at 6.
409. What seems unmistakable, but, oddly enough, is rarely said in public settings
nowadays, is that the nation, for all practice and intent, has turned its back upon the
moral implications, if not yet the legal ramifications, of the Brown decision. The
struggle being waged today, where there is any struggle being waged at all, is closer
to the one that was addressed in 1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson ....
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A selection of Kozol's observations illustrates the shocking caste
conditions facing underclass children in ghetto schools. East St. Louis is
a compelling example. First, the conditions children endure in that conf-
munity-which Kozol characterizes as "[m]etaphors of caste" 41 -in
some respects resemble those in the Third World.411 Because of inade-
quate sewage systems, raw sewage periodically floods neighborhoods in
East St. Louis, and the city is also afflicted with "disturbing quantities of
arsenic, mercury and lead-as well as steroids dumped in previous years
by stockyards in the area."41 2 Those conditions-along with air pollu-
tion from local industry, poverty, inadequate education, violent crime,
substandard housing, inadequate health care, and joblessness-are re-
sponsible for the producing "some.of the sickest children in America. "413
As Kozol observes, these problems "spill over into public
schools."41 4 For example, raw sewage has flooded East St. Louis schools,
including food preparation areas. Massive layoffs have decimated the
teaching staff. School facilities are crumbling, and equipment and basic
texts are lacking.415 The children's reactions are revealing.4 16 Referring
to the students' annual ritual of reading Dr. King's "I have a dream"
In many cities, what is termed "restructuring" struck me as very little more
than moving around the same old furniture within the house of poverty. The per-
ceived objective was a more "efficient" ghetto school or one with greater "input"
from the ghetto parents or more "choices" for the ghetto children. The fact of ghetto
education as a permanent part of American reality appeared to be accepted.
Liberal critics of the Reagan era sometimes note that social policy in the United
States, to the extent that it concerns black children and poor children, has been
turned back several decades. But this assertion, which is accurate as a description of
some setbacks in the areas of housing, health, and welfare, is not adequate to speak
about the present-day reality in public education. In public schooling, social policy
has been turned back almost one hundred years.
KozoL, supra note 3, at 4.
410. Id. at 10. Another metaphor of caste is the symbolic excision of the city from public
consciousness-Kozol reports that East St. Louis was omitted from Illinois maps several years
ago and the regional phone directory did not list residences or business in East St. Louis. Id. at
18.
411. Indeed, the Daughters of Charity, who serve the Third World, maintain a mission in
the city. Id. at 11.
412. Id. at 10-11.
413. Id at 20.
414. Id. at 23.
415. When asked what he would do with sufficient funds, one principal did not invoke
fashionable terms like "restructuring" or "teacher competency," but instead "[h]is focus is on
the bare necessities: typewriters [not word processors], windows, books, a renovated build-
ing." Id at 33.
416. One student at South Bronx's Morris High-a school that offers its kids gaping holes
in the floors and ceiling, a steady shower of plaster and peeling paint, and a waterfall that runs
down six flights of stairs after heavy rainfall-expressed the following incisive perception of
the caste dynamic:
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speech, one fourteen-year-old student said, "We have a school in East St.
Louis named for Dr. King. The school is full of sewer water and the
doors are locked with chains. Every student in that school is black. It's
like a terrible joke on history." '17 Another student's trenchant inquiry
exposes the shortcoming in the Supreme Court's equality paradigm and
illustrates the problem of caste. She wanted to know whether the chil-
dren in her school are "getting what we'd get in a nice section of St.
Louis." When Kozol explained that she went to school in a different
state and city, she pointedly asked, "Are we citizens of East St Louis or
America?"41
East St. Louis is by no means an isolated example, but rather reflects
a pattern replicated in other central-city school districts. As one Chicago
alderman observed, "[n]obody in his right mind would send [his] kids to
public school." '4 19 Kozol recites some illuminating figures: "On an aver-
age morning in Chicago, 5,700 children in 190 classrooms come to school
to find they have no teacher."'42 Non-achievement is the norm: The
city's overall drop-out rate has been estimated to approach 60%, and in
some schools reaches 86%.421 Of the 6,700 students entering ninth grade
in Chicago's eighteen most poverty-stricken high schools, only 300 both
See, the parents of rich children have the money to get into better schools. Then,
after a while, they begin to say, "Well, I have this. Why not keep it for my chil-
dren?" In other words, it locks them into the idea of always having something more.
After that, these things-the extra things they have-are seen like an inheritance.
They feel it's theirs and they don't understand why we should question it.
See, that's where the trouble starts. They get used to what they have. They
think it's theirs by rights because they had it from the start. So it leaves those chil-
dren with a legacy of greed.
Id. at 105.
417. Ide at 35.
418. Id at 30 (emphasis added). Kozol reiterates her question. First, he observes that, like
the members of the Antebellum caste, "[e]very child, every mother, in this city is, to a degree,
in the position of a supplicant for someone else's help.., in much the way that African and
Latin American nations beg for grants from agencies like AID." Second, he poses the question
that the caste-abolition principle would translate into a constitutional claim:
These are Americans. Why do we reduce them to this beggary-and why, particu-
larly, in public education? Why not spend on children here at least what we would
be investing in their education if they lived within a wealthy district like Winnetka,
Illinois, or Cherry Hill, New Jersey... ?... What do Americans believe about
equality?
Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
419. Id. at 53.
420. Id. at 52. During one period, nearly 18,000 students went without teachers two days a
week; and in some schools textbooks are hopelessly inadequate or lacking altogether. Id. at
53-54.
421. Id. at 58. Kozol notes that this exorbitant dropout rate has become a planning param-
eter for school administrators: "If over 200,000 of Chicago's total student population of
440,000 did not disappear during their secondary years, it is not clear who would teach them."
Id. at 54.
graduate and are able to read at the national average.422 The course of
study available to those students who manage to survive in inner-city
schools often is tracked toward dead-end, entry-level jobs in the service
sector.
423
Kozol's visit to New York's schools revealed equally distressing
conditions: "Denial of 'the means of competition' is perhaps the single
most consistent outcome of the education offered to poor children in the
schools of our large cities; and nowhere is this pattern of denial more
explicit or more absolute than in the public schools of New York
City."'424 In New York, as elsewhere, the children most in need get the
least capable teachers, the poorest equipment (if any), the worst facilities,
the largest classes, almost complete racial segregation, and the worst
health care (if any).425 Consignment of poor minority children into
lower tracks, even in suburban schools, is common. The staggering dep-
rivation of these children, and the consequently greater needs they bring
with them to their grossly inferior schools, is reflected in the infant mor-
tality rates: Congressman Bill Bradley has stated that "[a] child's
chances of surviving to age five are better in Bangladesh than in East
Harlem.
426
422. Id at 58-59. Wilson also reports evidence of a "shockingly high degree of educational
retardation in the inner city": for example, out of 25,500 black and Hispanic students enrolled
in the ninth grade in 1980 in Chicago's segregated inner-city schools, 16,000 or 63% did not
graduate; and only 2,000 (7.8% of the total) of the 9,000 who did graduate could read at or
above the national average. WILsoN, supra note 210, at 57-58. These data do not specify how
many students left school because they moved out of the neighborhood in which the counted
school was located. But even conservative assumptions would leave a disastrously high non-
achievement rate.
423. Kozol notes that "[t]he evolution of two parallel curricula, one for urban and one for
suburban schools, has also underlined the differences in what is felt to be appropriate to differ-
ent kinds of children and to socially distinct communities." KozoL, supra note 3, at 75.
424. Id. at 83. Grace Torres, grade K-1, has the following insightful parable to tell about
New York's treatment of its children:
The Angry Bird
The bird wanted some food. But the bad birds ate all of the food. The bird got away
and she flew to another country. The birds in the other country shared the food with
her.
So she stayed there and never went back to New York.
Gloria Strickland & Lois Holzman, Developing Poor and Minority Children as Leaders with the
Barbara Taylor School Educational Model, 58 J. NEGRO EDUc. 383, 383 (1989).
425. Kozol describes one inner-city school he visited that is housed in a windowless former
skating rink, where the temperature ranges from 56 degrees in the winter to 90 degrees in the
summer. Thirteen hundred students crowd a school with a "capacity" of 900. Kozol watched
as, in a single room measuring 25 by 50 feet, "52 people in two classes do their best to teach
and learn." KozoL, supra note 3, at 90.
426. Id at 115-16. Kozol goes on to explain that many infants who do survive bear a
lifetime injury:
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The disparities between affluent public schools and conditions in the
inner city are extreme, and the message of caste status communicated by
those differences is not lost on the children.427 Kozol's narrative con-
trasts the conditions in Chicago's ghetto schools with, for example, the
wealthy suburban school of New Trier. Ninety-three percent of New
Trier's students go on to four-year colleges, many to elite institutions
such as Harvard, Yale, Brown, or Princeton. New Trier sits on an invit-
ing campus of twenty-seven landscaped acres; contains the latest in lab
and computer equipment; and boasts seven gyms, a fencing room, dance
studios, a wrestling room, an Olympic pool, and an FCC-licensed TV
station. The curriculum is enriched, offering in addition to the excellent
core academic program, music, drama, art, modem and classical lan-
guages, literature, aeronautics, criminal justice, and philosophy. Ample
and highly competent personnel allow average class sizes of twenty-four
(fifteen for slow learners) and personal advising by a faculty member for
each student (at a ratio of about one faculty member for two dozen stu-
dents). And only 1.3% of the students are black.428
For Kozol, who has seen both sides, "[i]t is impossible to read this
without thinking of Goudy [Elementary School, not even one of Chi-
cago's worst], where there are no science labs, no music or art classes and
In the South Bronx, says the author of a recent study by the nonprofit United Hospi-
tal Fund of New York City, 531 infants out of 1,000 require neonatal hospitaliza-
tion-a remarkable statistic that portends high rates of retardation and brain
damage. In Riverdale, by contrast, only 69 infants in 1,000 call for such attention.
Id. at 116. Notes a South Bronx physician,
like the often costly salvage programs of teen-age remediation for the children we
have first denied the opportunity for health care, then for preschool, then for equal
education, these special wards for damaged infants are provisions of obligatory
mercy which are needed only as a consequence of our refusal to provide initial
justice.
Id. at 117. Pervasive class- (and thus largely race-) based inequality thus affects health care as
well as education. Inner-city hospitals have been reported to lack microscopes to study cul-
tures and samples, gauze and syringes to collect blood samples, sutures, and even penicillin.
Id. at 116.
427. According to Israel, a student at Morris High, "[people on the outside may think that
we don't know what it is like for other students, but we visit other schools and we have eyes
and we have brains. You cannot hide the differences." Id. at 104. His classmate Alexander
observes,
You look around you at their school, although it's impolite to do that, and you take a
deep breath at the sight of all those beautiful surroundings. Then you come back
home and see that these are things you do not have. You think of the difference. Not
at first. It takes a while to settle in.
Id.
428. Id. at 65-66. Town & Country magazine gushingly described New Trier's "temperate
climate" as "aided by the homogeneity of its students," presumably because "[a]Ilmost all are
of European extraction and harbor similar values." Id. (quoting Let's Hear it for New Trier,
TOWN & CouNTRY, June 1986).
no playground-and where the two bathrooms [for 700 children], lack-
ing toilet paper, fill the building with their stench."429 A remedial class
at Goudy contains 39 students. Teaching materials are decades out of
date. Paper, crayons, and pencils must be rationed. The least competent
teachers in the district are transferred there as a form of discipline.43°
c. School Finance
One denominator here that is not common, of course, is money.
The disparities in spending between the wealthiest and poorest school
districts in many states are staggering. For example, more than 15 years
after Rodriguez, per-student spending in Texas ranged from a low of
$2,112 to a high of $19,333.431 The 100 poorest districts in Texas spent
an average of $2,978 per student, while the 100 wealthiest districts spent
an average of $7,233.432 On Long Island, spending per student ranges
from $17,435 in the richest district to $7,305 in the poorest.433 This pat-
tern is replicated in many states, under the prevalent forms of school
financing that rely heavily on local property taxes and thus depend on
the respective wealth of school districts. Such systems (including
Texas's) have been successfully challenged on state constitutional
grounds.434 The typical method of school finance allows affluent districts
to "tax low and spend high while the property-poor districts must tax
high merely to spend low."435 Moreover, the disparity in spending is
even greater than the raw numbers indicate, for those figures fail to re-
flect the enormous deficits in infrastructure that tend to absorb huge por-
tions of already strained inner-city school budgets.
The Texas Supreme Court concluded, in view of the huge disparities
in that state's school-financing scheme, that "[t]he amount of money
spent on a student's education has a real and meaningful impact on the
educational opportunity offered that student. ' 436 Recent scholarship has
429. Id. at 65.
430. Md at 63-64. Similar comparisons could be made with the schools in New York and
elsewhere. For example, class sizes in New York's inner-city schools reach into the 40s and
50s. Compare Kozol's description of Morris High with the public high school in Rye, New
York. Id. at 124-26.
431. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989) (Edgewood 1).
432. Id. at 393.
433. School Spending Suits in New York Area, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1991, at B9.
434. See infra notes 481-85 and accompanying text.
435. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 393.
436. Id The court continued:
High-wealth districts are able to provide for their students broader educational ex-
periences including more extensive curricula, more up-to-date equipment, better li-
braries and library personnel, teacher aides, counseling services, lower student-
teacher ratios, better facilities, parental involvement programs, and drop-out preven-
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linked resource deprivation with, for example, educational outcomes in
math and science:
While there is little evidence that the actual quantity of resources
available to schools, teachers, and students has a direct effect on
learning or willingness to persist in science and mathematics, re-
sources are enablers. They provide the context in which schools
and classrooms operate; they often define the outer limit of what is
possible. For example, if a school has no science laboratory facili-
ties, even the best-prepared teachers will be unable to engage stu-
dents in laboratory work.437
That study found, for example, that students at high-minority, inner-city
schools "had access to far fewer computers" than their affluent, white
counterparts, "even when computers were available."438 The study con-
cluded, not surprisingly, that "[s]tudents in high-poverty, high-minority,
and inner-city schools, more than others, have resource constraints that
affect the quality of their science and mathematics programs."439
C. Violation of the Caste-Abolition Principle
1. Children of the Caste
The Third World conditions facing children in America's inner-city
schools ought to shock the conscience of any decent society as affluent as
ours. The caste-abolition principle, however, is relativistic. No indicia of
a caste system arise from poverty, lack of education, or joblessness in a
society where everyone is poor, illiterate, and unemployed. But that is
not the case in the United States. Ours is not a Third World country.
The existence of such severely distressed communities here, and the
maintenance of school systems so inadequate that they almost guarantee
tion programs. They are also better able to attract and retain experienced teachers
and administrators.
Id.
437. OAKrES, supra note 383, at 68.
438. "Schools with 90 percent or greater minority populations had an average of 1.76 com-
puters per 100 students; schools with less than 90 percent minorities averaged about 2.70.
Inner-city schools averaged 1.88; other urban schools, 2.48; suburban schools, 2.80; and rural
schools, 2.86." Id. at 72-73 (footnotes omitted).
439. Id. at 75. A 1987 study of Chicago's high schools found
dramatic differences in graduation rates, in percentages taking college admissions
tests, and in college test scores, and all of these were related to racial and economic
differences. Racial differences between schools were very closely linked to economic
differences. All schools with the highest ratings were middle class and almost en-
tirely white, while those at the other extreme were virtually all minority and
predominantly poor.
Orfield, supra note 371, at 54 (citing Jim Garrett, Metropolitan Chicago Public High Schools:
Race, Poverty, and Educational Opportunity (June 1987) (Metropolitan Opportunity Project:
Working Paper No. 5, University of Chicago)).
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that children born into abject poverty will stay there, evidences the crea-
tion and perpetuation of a caste society.
The foregoing findings and narratives suggest that the possibility of
any meaningful participation in "mainstream" American social and eco-
nomic life will remain remote for underclass children. Assuming that
adequate education is a necessary condition to such participation, a point
that seems beyond dispute," 0 and in view of the dramatic increase in
child poverty and the demonstrated link between the social and eco-
nomic conditions of the underclass and educational disadvantage, it
seems clear that the two problems perpetuate one another. Children
from the underclass are especially at risk when they enter school, largely
as a consequence of their underclass status-which is often characterized
by poverty, a distressed environment, a single-parent household, and cul-
tural differences. This risk often translates into academic and discipli-
nary difficulty, which further frustrates their chances for economic
advancement and contributes to the cycle of joblessness, dysfunctional
behavior, and welfare dependency. Disadvantage thus begets disadvan-
tage, locking the underclass into its caste status. According to Wilson,
this process transpires within a context of social and economic isolation
from the other American classes and from access to employment oppor-
tunity.4" And this Article has attempted to show how prevailing consti-
tutional paradigms contribute to that isolation.
America's urban poor children are subjected to the caste-creating
and caste-perpetuating condition of "savage inequality" in their educa-
tion. First, the squalor of many inner city schools is dehumanizing
enough; but the point that these children simply do not count as human
beings of comparable intrinsic worth is driven home by the sharp con-
trast between the educational experience society provides them and that
offered to students in affluent school districts. Second, when even the
brightest and most highly motivated student faces almost insuperable ob-
stacles in ghetto schools, it is no wonder that most children either drop
out or graduate with huge deficiencies in basic skills. And the prevalent
form of school financing leaves their parents with little power as a practi-
cal matter to bring central-city schools anywhere close to achieving par-
ity.' 2 The conditions are so bad that for many children the result is no
real education at all. Consequently, these children are effectively de-
440. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
441. See supra notes 349-61 and accompanying text.
442. As the Supreme Court of Texas observed, "[p]roperty-poor districts are trapped in a
cycle of poverty from which there is no opportunity to free themselves." Edgewood I, 777
S.W.2d at 391, 393.
Spring 1992]
702 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:599
prived of the one real avenue out of the vicious cycle of poverty and
despair that is theirs solely by accident of birth. They thus are effectively
excluded from an opportunity to participate in the remainder of society.
They are forced into the caste.
2. Manageability of the Principle
Although a finding of caste-creating and cast-perpetuating condi-
tions rests in part on qualitative judgments about a combination of fac-
tors, the standard of extreme dehumanization, powerlessness, and
exclusion is nevertheless a manageable one for courts. Although the
caste-abolition principle is relativistic and seeks to identify a constellation
of caste-creating factors, a determination whether a violation is occurring
does not involve either of the two kinds of balancing that characterize
much of the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence." 3 Under the
categorical approach, the Court balances broad institutional concerns-
separation of powers, for example-in determining the taxonomic scope
of constitutional rights. Thus, as the Court stated in Dandridge, reluc-
tance to intrude into the legislative domain and a sense of the judiciary's
institutional limitations contributed to the Court's rejection of a claim to
a fundamental right to minimum subsistence. This kind of balancing
sometimes leads the Court to deny the existence of a right for fear of the
judiciary's remedial impotence; as Professor Tribe put it, "reservations
about remedies masquerade as questions about the existence of constitu-
tional violations." 4 " The other kind of balancing is more ad hoc than
definitional, and weighs competing governmental interests against claims
of private right in determining whether the right has been violated in a
particular case.445
The institutional concerns that motivate the Court to deny a right's
existence at all, or to take a constrained view of a right's scope, need not
preclude or sabotage a claim under the caste-abolition principle. For one
thing, there is a rich historical record of caste conditions in America to
serve as a frame of reference. Second, because the standard is compara-
tive, it rests not on an individual judge's personal conception of the good
life, but rather on the extent and impact of the disparities between
groups. Third, as discussed above, the standard is not one of wholesale
443. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943 (1987).
444. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1502-14.
445. For example, although the Supreme Court has recognized a prisoner's right to be free
of unconsented administration of psychoactive medication, the Court also has upheld the
forced administration of such drugs under a procedure that passed the Court's deferential
balancing of penological concerns. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
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distributive egalitarianism in which everyone must win a perfectly equal
share of the pie. Instead, the caste-abolition principle prohibits condi-
tions so extreme as to exclude a sector of the population from even enter-
ing the competition. Fourth, the fact-finding and decisional
requirements of the caste-abolition principle are no more obstreperous
than many others routinely confronting courts, such as the propriety of
punitive damages, 4' the existence of discriminatory intent,' 7 and the
propriety of capital punishment in a particular case." 8 Whether a
Supreme Court more sensitive to, and better informed of, contemporary
underclass conditions would have reached a different conclusion under
the Court's fundamental rights/suspect class paradigm in Rodriguez is
impossible to say. But there appears to be sufficient evidence in some
communities to sustain a prima facie case of a violation of the caste-
abolition principle, and Plyler demonstrates that a court can make analo-
gous findings when presented with an adequate record. The remaining
question concerning judicial manageability of the principle thus is one of
remedy.
D. Remedies
The first question in addressing the issue of appropriate remedies
under the caste-abolition principle is conceptual. What should inform a
court's remedial considerations? It is here that a court should take into
account the interests that the Supreme Court currently balances at the
rights-recognition or liability-determination stage. A court's equitable
powers are much better suited to that kind of balancing at the remedial
stage than is the Court's current approach, which results in an incom-
plete conception of constitutional requirements and an aggravation of the
caste problem.449
Under the caste-abolition principle, a finding that the caste-creating
conditions of dehumanization, powerlessness, and exclusion are operative
suffices to establish a violation, without the need to weigh competing gov-
ernmental interests. This finding gives rise to an obligation on the part of
the state to remedy the caste-creating condition. Judge Easterbrook re-
cently argued the converse of the rights-versus-remedy problem: "Most
disputes over remedies in civil rights cases have nothing to do with reme-
dies and everything to do with substantive entitlements. ' 450 According
446. E.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
447. E.g., Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
448. E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
449. See supra notes 15-124 and accompanying text.
450. Frank H. Easterbrook, Civil Rights and Remedies, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 104
(1991).
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to Judge Easterbrook, disputes over school desegregation decrees, for ex-
ample, often really are concerned with the underlying conflict between
individual versus group rights and the corresponding conflict between
governmental neutrality toward race versus governmental obligation to
achieve racial balance.45 ' The caste-abolition principle seeks to hurdle
that substantive gap by providing a clearer articulation of the underlying
constitutional obligation, an articulation which avoids entanglement in
the intractable debate over "color-blindness" and state action, as well as
the enigma of intent.
Once the substantive underbrush is cleared away and the court has
focused on the caste conditions that require remediation, it is free to en-
gage its broad equitable powers to mandate an appropriate remedy. As
stated above, that deliberation ought to include consideration of the legit-
imate concerns that the Supreme Court has misplaced at the rights-rec-
ognition stage, while ensuring accomplishment of meaningful remedial
objectives. A principal concern is avoidance of the tendency toward judi-
cial micromanagement that characterizes remedies in school desegrega-
tion cases.4 52 Another is the preservation of federal-state comity that is
threatened by such judicial intervention.453
The primary remedial question is whether to focus on educational
results rather than resources. The so-called "excellence movement" in
education, which grew out of American students' declining performance
on achievement and aptitude tests, is one example of result-based re-
form.454 That movement has produced legislative adoption of minimum
performance standards in most states, and the proposal by the President
of the United States and the governors of all fifty states of a "Jeffersonian
compact" to attain national performance goals for all schools. 45 5 The
problem with the excellence approach, according to James Leibman, is
that "the imposition of higher standards on poor and minority children
than they currently can satisfy, without a concomitant change in instruc-
tional environment, can only hurt those children. '456 Politically popular
451. Id. at 104-05.
452. One account of an historically significant example of this struggle is Henry Woods &
Beth Deere, Reflections on the Little Rock School Case, 44 ARK. L. REv. 971 (1991). For an
argument that such concerns animated and justified the Court's conclusion in Rodriguez, see
Robert W. Bennett, The Burger Court and the Poor, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 46, 53-55 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
453. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1973).
454. For a description of the excellence movement and extensive citation to the literature,
see Leibman, supra note 99, at 371-77.
455. Id. at 373-74.
456. Id. at 376. "The situation is exacerbated by the fact that many states have enacted
minimum-standards legislation without providing remedial services to children who do not
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because it does not directly mandate redistributive policies for educa-
tional reform, the excellence movement leaves disadvantaged children at
an even greater disadvantage because performance standards "are used in
fact to mark disproportionate numbers of poor and minority children as
failures and thereby to deprive them of higher educational and employ-
ment opportunities." '457 Absent some means to coerce provision of ade-
quate resources for the attainment of performance standards, the
excellence movement appears more likely to perpetuate caste conditions
than to remedy them.458 Indeed, the existence of legislatively mandated
academic performance standards, without provision for accomplishing
them in poor and minority schools, itself evidences the caste-creating
propensity of severely inadequate education.
Other, more aggressive result-based proposals conflict with concerns
of separation of powers and federalism. For example, Denise Morgan
argues that the Constitution creates a property right in a minimally ade-
quate education, which is to be enforced through a remedial focus on
meet the standards on the first try, thus suggesting that the standards' primary purpose is
exclusion, not diagnosis or resource allocation." Id.
457. Id. at 375 n.100. Gary Orfield concurs:
If the schools offered to the 29 percent of American families who live in central cities
are consistently unequal to those provided the 48 percent of families who live in
suburban areas and if the vast majority of nonwhite students continue to attend de-
clining central city schools, then a major inequality will be compounded if state gov-
ernments adopt policies [such as "excellence" reforms] that have the effect of
penalizing central-city students for the inferior schools they attend without address-
ing any of the underlying causes of the inequalities or providing the additional help
needed in such schools.
Orfield, supra note 371, at 55. But see, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EDUCATION RE-
FORM: INITIAL EFFECTS IN FOUR SCHOOL DISmICTs (1991) (concluding that, at least in the
districts studied, school reforms in four urban districts had neither helped nor hurt the aca-
demic performance of educationally disadvantaged students).
458. Leibman proposes use of "the enactment into law of minimum educational-perform-
ance standards as a basis for inferring and enforcing a democratically legitimated obligation on
the part of public authorities to distribute to children the educational means necessary to sat-
isfy those standards." Leibman, supra note 99, at 378. His proposal has the distinct advantage
of using the political outcome of the widely popular excellence movement as a majoritarian
basis to legitimize a judicially enforced redistributive agenda, rather than relying on "judicially
'discovered' constitutional norms." Id. at 379. Nevertheless, I believe that there remains a
place for discourse about the content of constitutional norms, even in the 1990s and especially
at the federal level. See infra notes 486-90 and accompanying text. Moreover, the remedial
impact of Leibman's proposal is contingent on the legislative or regulatory creation of per-
formance standards to serve as a majoritarian expression of a remedial duty. In any event, the
caste-abolition principle and Leibman's proposal are not mutually exclusive. The first derives
from a constitutional obligation to remedy social conditions that degrade, exclude, or dis-
empower a group of citizens. The second derives from an inferred statutory obligation to keep
an implied legislative promise. It seems likely that the two categories of claimants will largely
overlap.
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educational outcomes rather than inputs.45 9 Although there are impor-
tant differences between the substantive basis for the claim she describes
and the caste-abolition principle,4 1° the similarities do allow a meaning-
ful comparison of remedies.
The range and complexity of educational reforms currently in
vogue, apart from the excellence movement, raise a risk of overreaching
by a court that focuses on educational outcomes rather than public in-
puts. For example, James Comer, who has achieved enviable success in
reforming disadvantaged schools in New Haven and elsewhere, has em-
phasized remedying the "sociocultural misalignment between home and
school" by "fostering positive interaction between parents and school
staff," training staff in child development, establishing a bond between
the child and the school, engaging parents in the educational process,
and fostering a team approach to education that brings all participants-
teachers, administrators, support personnel, parents, and children-into
a cooperative group.461
Other studies illustrate the complex factors involved in improving
the school success of children at risk. One scholar has directed reform
attention toward mediators such as cognitive readiness in kindergarten,
and found that variables that can be altered by families and schools-
such as pre-kindergarten experience, motivation, mobility, and parental
involvement-have a demonstrable impact on early school outcomes.416
Another has asserted that "[w]hat might be called the 'alterable curricu-
lum of the home' is twice as predictive of academic learning as is family
[socioeconomic status]. '4 6 Another approach contends that at-risk chil-
dren need more than teaching of basic skills, and offers a model that
focuses on overcoming social barriers to development. 4 "
Some proposals, such as multiculturalism, emphasize the role of cul-
ture in education. For example, one writer has criticized traditional
schools' inability "to recognize and take up the potentially positive inter-
active and adaptive verbal and interpretive habits learned by Black
American children (as well as other non-mainstream groups), rural and
459. Denise C. Morgan, What is Left to Argue in Desegregation Law?: The Right to Mini-
mally Adequate Education, 8 H. BLACKLETrER J. 99 (1991).
460. One difference is that the caste-abolition principle has a potentially broader sweep and
arguably could be extended to address other underclass conditions, such as chronic joblessness.
461. Comer, supra note 391, at 44.
462. Reynolds, supra note 391.
463. Walberg, supra note 387, at 25.
464. Those barriers include the "isms" (racism, sexism, classism, anti-Semitism,
homophobia); forcing children to repress emotions rather than learning how to develop and to
express them; and abuse (sexual, verbal, assaultive, and substance). Strickland & Holzman,
supra note 424, at 385-86.
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urban, within their families and on the streets."46 Another team of writ-
ers decries the paucity of black teachers and emphasizes the role of the
university in preparing teachers to cope with ghetto schools.466 And the
perceived need to provide black male students (who appear to be espe-
cially at risk for educational failure) with positive role models and a suffi-
ciently supportive environment has led to controversial experiments in.
special school programs for inner-city black male students." 7
Any court that attempts to select from this smorgasbord of reforms
will quickly find itself immersed in micromanagement and the nuances of
pedagogical judgment. Performance- or outcome-oriented remediation
of educational inequality thus raises serious concerns about judicial in-
trusion into pedagogical decision-making468 and respect for federal-state
comity." 9 Further, as mentioned above, given the demonstrable impact
of private (especially family) inputs on educational outcomes, judicially
coerced interventions that depend on educational results could raise
countervailing privacy claims by parents.470
Focusing instead on the equalization of public inputs, specifically
the funds allocated to public education, would avoid those difficulties.
This method would require approximately equal allocation of funding to
schools across the state. Such relief would be prospective only, and
therefore would not violate the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
465. Heath, supra note 396, at 370.
466. Leonard C. Beckum et al., The Urban Landscape Educatingfor the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 58 J. NEGRO EDUC. 430 (1989). Others have offered teacher training programs designed
to improve performance in urban schools. Eg., H. Jerome Freiberg et al., Turning Around At-
Risk Schools Through Consistency Management, 58 J. NEGRO EDUC. 372 (1989).
467. Eg., Charles Whitaker, Do Black Males Need Special Schools?, EBONY, Mar. 1991, at
17; Brenda Gilchrist & Robert Musial, Detroit Board Allows Girls into Academies, It Plans to
Keep Fighting for All-Male Schools, DET. FREE PRESS, Aug. 28, 1991, at IA.
468. A common law expression of such concern is evident in the many cases refusing to
recognize a tort claim for "educational malpractice." See generally JOHN COLLIS, EDUCA-
TIONAL MALPRACTICE (1990). This deference to pedagogical judgment does not ignore the
numerous criticisms of the American system of educating the educators. See, eg., NATIONAL
COMM'N FOR EXCELLENCE IN TEACHER EDUC., A CALL FOR CHANGE IN TEACHER EDUCA-
TION (1985). Rather, the point is that such concerns may lie beyond the reach of viable consti-
tutional principle. See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
469. Eg., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
470. See supra note 386 and accompanying text. Indeed, the precedential roots of the mod-
em constitutional privacy right are traceable to two education cases: Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923); and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The relationship be-
tween private inputs and educational results, however, might serve in part as a basis for a claim
for job training and other social programs for parents under the caste-abolition principle. The
caste-creating potential of chronic joblessness itself might also give rise to a such a claim by the
parent (or childless adult) on his or her own behalf as well, apart from the instrumental rela-
tionship to the child's education.
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Eleventh Amendment's bar to suits for retroactive monetary relief.471
To be sure, as the foregoing catalogue of reform proposals indicates,
more money will not solve all the problems of the underclass in general
or ghetto schools in particular. But perfect, or even approximate, social
equality is not the test. Just because "'equal opportunity across the
board' will not automatically 'produce equality' in school performance[,]
... 'one doesn't force a losing baseball team to play with seven men.' ,472
Equalization of funding would be a substantial step toward relieving the
grossest inequalities, which are the immediate focus of the caste-abolition
principle, but would not result in strict egalitarianism. As noted above, it
would take far more than equal spending to bring ghetto schools into
parity with wealthy suburban schools. The deficit has been too large for
too long for equal allocation to produce complete catch-up now.
473
A principal prudential advantage of this remedial approach is that it
would leave the details of implementation to the public officials of each
state. They would be free to choose how to fund that equalization,
whether through the "Robin Hood" technique of redirecting funds from
affluent to poverty-stricken schools, or through raising taxes, or some
combination of the two.474 And the principle would not require entan-
glement in the internal management of inner-city school districts. School
administrators would not be under the direct supervision of the courts,
and their operational decisions would not be subject to ongoing judicial
review. Inner-city residents who complain that their school districts are
mismanaged would have to seek what relief they can within their dis-
tricts where it currently is available-at the ballot box.475
The caste-abolition principle therefore would operate as a constitu-
tional minimum with ample room for majoritarian decision-making.
Thus, this remedial scheme would not violate the democratic principle of
"no taxation without representation."476 Instead, it would constrain
471. As the Court observed in Missouri v. Jenkins, "the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
federal courts from imposing on the States the costs of securing prospective compliance with a
desegregation order, [Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 290 (1977)], and does not afford local
school boards... immunity from suit, [Mt. Healthy City Seh. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977)]." 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1665-66 n.20 (1990).
472. KozoL, supra note 3, at 77.
473. In any event, no remedial measure should be whipsawed between a test that requires
achievement of perfect results in terms of equality, and then condemns the operative constitu-
tional principle as violative of libertarian norms.
474. For a description of the options available for restructuring school finance, see Robert
L. Manteuffel, Comment, The Quest for Efficiency: Public School Funding in Texas, 43 Sw.
L.J. 1119 (1990).
475. For a study of the relationship between electoral politics and bureaucratic responsive-
ness in school boards, see Meier, supra note 389.
476. Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
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majoritarian allocation of revenues. It would not mandate any particular
level of educational achievement for students, nor would it demand any
particular state-wide level of educational investment. The electorate
would remain free to provide for their children just as much ignorance as
desired,477 subject perhaps to some absolute minimum (as discussed be-
low). But the one thing they clearly could not do is single out any group
of children on any basis (racial, geographic, or socioeconomic), and allo-
cate for them substantially fewer resources. Thus, reforms based on in-
stitutionalized reallocation of inequality, such as magnet schools and
parental-choice plans, would not suffice.
478
There is precedent for this kind of approach at both the federal and
state level. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Missouri v. Jenkins
recognizes extremely broad equitable powers in federal district courts to
order remedial measures that require enormous public expenditures, to
apportion the cost between state and local governmental entities, and to
enjoin application of state constitutional provisions that interfere with
the ability of school districts to raise revenue to fund such measures.
Although the Court pretermitted the state's objection to the scope of the
district court's order, the Supreme Court nevertheless reasoned that "the
enforcement of a money judgment against the State did not violate prin-
477. California apparently chose, via Proposition 13, to take the low road after the Califor-
nia Supreme Court mandated equalization of per-pupil expenditures in Serrano v. Priest, 487
P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) and Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976): "The amount spent per
pupil in each district has been nearly equalized, but by 1983, California had fallen from eight-
eenth to forty-fifth in the proportion of personal income spent on schools." Joseph T. Henke,
Financing Public Schools in California: The Aftermath of Serrano v. Priest and Proposition 13,
21 U.S.F. L. REv. 1 (1986).
478. "The Chicago Tribune has called the magnet system, in effect, a 'private school system
... operated in the public schools.' Very poor children, excluded from this system, says the
Tribune, are 'even more isolated' as a consequence of the removal of more successful students
from their midst." KozoL, supra note 3, at 59. This assessment is buttressed by studies show-
ing that an important mediator in student performance is placement with other, high-achieving
students. See supra notes 381-96 and accompanying text. Kozol goes on to state that "[t]he
magnet school system is, not surprisingly, highly attractive to the more sophisticated parents,
disproportionately white and middle class, who have the ingenuity and, now and then, political
connections to obtain admission for their children." KozoL, supra note 3, at 59. By contrast,
[t]he poorest parents, often the product of inferior education, lack the information,
access and the skills of navigation in an often hostile and intimidating situation to
channel their children to the better schools, obtain the applications, and (perhaps a
little more important) help them get ready for the necessary tests and then persuade
their elementary schools to recommend them.
[Thus, t]he system has the surface aspects of a meritocracy, but merit in this
case is predetermined by conditions that are closely tied to class and race. While
some defend it as "the survival of the fittest," it is more accurate to call it the survival
of the children of the fittest-or of the most favored.
Id. at 60.
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ciples of federalism because '[t]he District Court... neither attempted to
restructure local governmental entities nor... mandat[ed] a particular
method or structure of state or local financing.' "9 The plan upheld in
that case provided for an enormous $200 million enhancement of most of
the schools within the Kansas City, Missouri, School District to create a
magnet school in every high school, every middle school, and half of the
elementary schools. Justice Kennedy's description of some aspects of the
program, which bear a striking resemblance to the kinds of enrichments
offered at schools like New Trier, illustrates the extent of a federal court's
power to address educational inequalities.48 0 Although federal-state
comity may limit a federal court's ability directly to impose taxes to fi-
nance a remedial program, federal courts possess extensive equitable
powers to correct constitutional wrongs-powers that include requiring
large-scale redistributive efforts to equalize educational opportunity.
Compared to the luxurious Kansas City order, the requirements of the
equal-finance remedy under the caste-abolition principle appear modest.
At the state level, several courts have overturned school funding
schemes on state constitutional grounds,481 and more litigation is on the
479. 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1664-65 (1990) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291
(1977)).
480. Id. 110 S. Ct. at 1668 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). Justice Kennedy's observations deride what he seemed to perceive as extravagances.
One cannot help but wonder whether he would have adopted a similar attitude had he been
describing to a friend the enrichments offered in his own children's schools. This kind of
classism and insensitivity has appeared in Supreme Court decisions recently with disturbing
frequency. See Donald P. Judges, Confirmation as Consciousness-raising: Lessons for the
Supreme Court from the Clarence Thomas Confirmation Hearings, 7 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL
COMMENT (forthcoming 1992); Donald P. Judges, Keeping the Faith?: The Lower Courts'Du-
bious Interpretation of Lynch v. Donnelly and Stare Decisis, 24 U. Wyo. LAND & WATER L.
REv. 167, 186-87 (1989).
481. E.g., Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (Edgewood I);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991) (Edgewood I1); Rose v.
Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State,
769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Washakie
County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980);
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973)
(Robinson 1); 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973) (Robinson I1); 335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975) (Robinson III);
351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (Robinson IT); DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark.
1983); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Horton v.
Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
The seminal article in the campaign for equality of educational opportunity at the state
constitutional level is John E. Coons et al., Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitu-
tional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CAL. L. Rnv. 305 (1969). For a selection of
commentary on the educational finance cases, see Manteuffel, supra note 474; William E.
Sparkman & Michael P. Stephens, Commentary: Texas School Finance System Unconstitu-
tional, 57 W. EDUC. L. REP. 333 (1990); Donald S. Yarab, Comment, Edgewood Independent
School District v. Kirby: An Education in School Finance Reform, 40 CksE W. REs. L. REv.
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way.4 82 Many state constitutions contain some express provision for
public education,483 and a common requirement is that the system be
"efficient. '4 84 Texas and New Jersey, for example, are now working to
implement court-ordered equalization measures. Litigation in the state
courts provides a valuable basis of experience for implementation of a
federal constitutional remedy, and demonstrates that a finance-equaliza-
tion remedy is both judicially conceivable and articulable.8 5
As promising as constitutional developments are at the state level,
486
it nevertheless would be a mistake to rely completely on state constitu-
tional remedies. First, and by far most importantly, federal constitu-
tional imperatives simply cannot be ignored, whether because of
substantive disagreement 487 or in the interests of convenience.488 If the
caste-abolition principle is a correct interpretation of the Civil War
Amendments, and if gross inequalities in educational opportunity are
caste-creating and -perpetuating conditions, then the Supremacy Clause
commands relief as a matter of federal law, even if analogous relief is also
available as a matter of state law. The presence in many state constitu-
tions of protections for freedom of expression, for example, does not ar-
gue in favor of consigning the First Amendment to desuetude.
Second, despite the growing number of challenges to school finance
schemes at the state level, children in states where no such challenges
develop or succeed will remain at risk for the caste-creating effects of
unequal educational opportunity.48 9 Furthermore, challenges at the state
level are available only so long as state constitutions contain protections
for education. Analogous reform efforts in the past have resulted in reac-
889 (1990); Hubsch, supra note 323; Jamie Plosia, Note, Equal Educational Opportunity Revis-
ited: Abbott v. Burke and the "Thorough and Efficient Law" in New Jersey, 40 RuT. L. REv.
193 (1987); Henke, supra note 477.
482. Robert Suro, Equality Plan on School Financing is Upsetting Rich and Poor in Texas,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 9, 1991, at B9, (lawsuits challenging school finance systems are pending in
22 states). "
483. For a collection of citations, see Morgan, supra note 459.
484. For citations, see Yarab, supra note 481, at 889 n.4.
485. See, e.g., Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391; Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d 491.
486. Such developments are not confined to school finance. Some state courts, for example,
have found a more vigorous protection for reproductive freedom in their constitutions than the
one the Supreme Court seems to be losing in the federal Constitution. See, eg., In re T.W.,
551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989) (construing privacy right in art. 1, § 23, of the Florida Constitu-
tion as extending protection to a greater range of privacy interests, and to a greater extent,
than the United States Constitution-including a woman's right to make her own decisions
concerning continuing pregnancy).
487. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
488. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
489. For an overview of the obstacles such challenges face in many states, including judi-
cial reluctance to interfere in legislative discretion, see Hubsch, supra note 323, at 115-27.
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tionary amendments to state constitutions.490
Third, recognition of a federal constitutional caste-abolition princi-
ple, and its application to unequal funding of education, might become
necessary to prevent a state's affluent and middle-class voters from form-
ing a coalition powerful enough to abandon public education by whole-
sale reductions and tax cuts to instead rely en masse on private schools
for their children. Although the starting place for the caste-abolition
remedy would be equality of public school finance, the principle would
preclude the creation of a caste system through systemic reliance on pri-
vate education. If the net effect of either a dual funding system or a
unitary but grossly inadequate funding scheme for public schools is to
produce a dehumanized, powerless, and excluded class of undereducated
children, then the caste-abolition principle would require remediation.491
In the case of the effective shut-down response, the proper remedy pre-
sumably would be a judicially mandated minimum level of statewide
public school expenditure. This approach would be more intrusive than
an equalization order, and therefore should not be employed absent ex-
traordinary circumstances.
Finally, unlike state constitutional claims, the caste-abolition princi-
ple raises the possibility of a claim against the federal government.492
This is a question of substance, not remedy; and it is largely beyond the
scope of this Article. I therefore will only mention a few considerations
that ought to form the basis for further inquiry. Federal (as well as state)
claims might be brought in the domains of job and job training programs,
subsistence, health care, and shelter, as well as in education. Such claims
would be grounded directly on the heavy contribution to the mainte-
nance of the caste's subjugated status of chronic poverty, long-term un-
employment, and inadequate health care, and homelessness, as well as
indirectly on the demonstrable relationship between such non-school fac-
490. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing Reitman v. Mulkey and
James v. Valtierra).
491. This "shut-down" context further illustrates the power of the caste-abolition princi-
ple's focus on conditions rather than intent. The principle thus avoids the problems presented
by Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (upholding facially neutral municipal decision, in
the face of a court order to desegregate its public facilities, to close five swimming pools-
ostensibly to avoid violence and economic loss), and Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218
(1964) (holding unconstitutional-as evidence of intent to avoid desegregation-the county's
closing of its public schools and funding of discriminatory private schools). The principle also
avoids the refined distinctions between Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (upholding at-
large voting system for lack of a showing of discriminatory intent), and Rogers v. Lodge, 458
U.S. 613 (1982) (invalidating similar at-large system based on record of historical circumstan-
tial evidence of discriminatory intent).
492. The textual basis for such a claim, as in other contexts, would be the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Cf Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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tors and educational achievement. 93
Such claims, however, would have to reconcile recognition of an af-
firmative, judicially enforceable obligation to act with the deference-sug-
gestive wording of the enabling clauses of the Civil War Amendments,
providing that Congress "shall have the power" to enforce the substan-
tive provisions "by appropriate legislation." 94 Nevertheless, the Civil
War and Reconstruction stand as dramatic examples of the federal gov-
ernment's recognition of its obligation to take heroic steps toward aboli-
tion of a caste society. As suggested above, the Civil War Amendments,
with their enabling clauses, can be intelligibly understood as articulating
a powerful demand on subsequent generations not to let such a
deplorable state of social conditions develop and a call to future citizens
to demand positive intervention from their governments, state and fed-
eral, when such a threat arises.495
Conclusion
These are innocent children, after all. They have done nothing
wrong. They have committed no crime. They are too young to
have offended us in any way at all. One searches for some way to
understand why a society as rich and, frequently, as generous as
ours would leave these children in their penury and squalor for so
long-and with so little public indignation.496
The children who live in the caste status of the underclass will pass
their entire lives largely in a blind spot in our constitutional vision. The
Court and much of society deny those children's very existence as a con-
stitutionally meaningful group, ignore the obvious ways in which govern-
ment shapes their lives, and often address problems of social justice
through means that leave them no better and sometimes worse off. This
493. See supra notes 381-96 and accompanying text.
494. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (federal affirmative ac-
tion program entitled to more deferential judicial review than state program); Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (congressional power under Section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment is as broad as it is under the Necessary and Proper Clause); City of Rome v.
United States, 466 U.S. 156 (1980) (same with respect to Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (same with respect to legislation, enacted
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibiting literacy tests as a condition on the
franchise). But see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (Congress lacks power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to establish a minimum age of 18 years to vote in
state and local elections); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991) (applying strict "plain
statement" rule to age discrimination legislation, enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and construed not to apply to state constitutional provision requiring mandatory
retirement of most state court judges at age 70).
495. See supra notes 281-93 and accompanying text.
496. KOZOL, supra note 3, at 40.
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result is justified in part by dire predictions of grave threats to the integ-
rity of the republic posed by interpretive regimes under which the Con-
stitution would demand even partial redress of those conditions.
This state of affairs ought to be cause for amazement and outrage.
A legitimate, coherent, and manageable interpretive principle-the caste-
abolition principle-is available to address one of the most devastating
components of the underclass process. It would require straightforward,
albeit forceful, steps to accomplish the simple, just, and socially responsi-
ble goal of providing all our children with a modicum of equal educa-
tional opportunity. Surely such a requirement poses less danger to the
fabric of our society than the irretrievable and inexcusable waste of a
substantial and growing part of our collective future.
